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ABSTRACT 
The simultaneous use of different market entry methods by international service 
firms is creating complex and compound organisations that operate within and 
across organisational boundaries. These organisations face variable risks related 
to control, resource commitment, flexibility and dissemination across their 
diversely affiliated portfolios. This research seeks to explore how these risks are 
managed within these diverse affiliations through an investigation of organisational 
and inter-organisational design. 
This study draws on three fields of literature; international market entry, alliance 
and networks, and organisation design. A number of gaps have been identified in 
this literature relating to 'how' international service firms, inter-organisational 
alliances, diverse affiliations and international hotel chains are designed and 
managed. Using international hotel chains for the primary investigation, a 
qualitative case study approach was adopted for this study. The research was 
conducted in three phases; the first served to verify the extent of the phenomenon 
under study, the second provided insight into organisation design within firm 
boundaries and the third revealed a detailed picture of inter-organisational design. 
A major contribution of this study is the identification of communities of design 
within diversely affiliated organisations. These communities are created through 
the different structures and processes employed across portfolios and reinforced 
by the perceptions of organisation members. Barriers can develop between the 
communities that limit the degrees of control and flexibility achieved and inhibit 
organisational potential. A further contribution of this study is the development of a 
relational-process framework that can be used to build bridges across these 
communities, break down barriers and enhance relational ties, but only if 
supported by appropriate control procedures. Managers are recommended to 
consider the impact of formal mechanistic structures within and across 
organisational boundaries and the impact of inter-organisational processes on 
relational ties in designs that cross organisational boundaries in order to enhance 
the potential of diverse affiliations. 
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The last few decades have born witness to increasing levels of internationalisation 
in many service industries. International growth is frequently achieved through the 
simultaneous use of different market entry methods, creating complex and 
compound organisations that frequently cross traditional organisational 
boundaries. In these organisations, corporate centres are affiliated in different 
ways with their portfolios and therefore face variable risks associated with the 
different market entry modes employed. This study investigates 'how' service firms 
that simultaneously employ multiple international market entry methods are 
designed in order to manage these risks. This chapter presents a rationale for this 
research and argues that international hotel chains provide a suitable context for 
the primary investigation. The aim and the objectives of the study are identified 
and the chapter concludes by providing an overview of the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Research Rationale 
The business environment is frequently described as global, dynamic and highly 
competitive. Saturation of domestic markets, technological advances and the 
reduction of trade barriers between countries are frequently reported as the driving 
forces underpinning international expansion (Kidger, 2002; Javalgi, Griffith and 
White, 2003; Hollensen, 2004). Consumer mobility and access to information via 
the Internet has boosted demand for products and services from international 
markets. The availability of capital has helped to ensure that supply matches or 
even exceeds this demand (Axinn and Matthyssens, 2001). In order to remain 
competitive in the face of these trends, many firms have expanded from domestic 
to international markets, a process known as internationalisation (Javalgi et al, 
2003). A number of authors report on the increasing internationalisation of firms 
within service industries and the speed at which this growth is occurring (Dunning 
and Kundu, 1995; Clark and Rajaratman, 1999; Gronroos, 1999; Vernard, 2002). 
As a result, the value of services to many national economies and to the global 
economy is also growing (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Patterson and Cicic, 1995; 
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Clancy, 1998; Knight, 1999; Ochel, 2002). Javalgi et al (2003) estimate that the 
service economy now represents around 30% of world trade. 
For many service firms, this growth has been achieved through a variety of 
international market entry methods. Firms can choose to invest directly in 
international markets or to adopt an entry mode from an increasingly diverse array 
of inter-firm arrangements, such as franchising, strategic alliance or network 
agreements. Researchers have sought to explain the international expansion 
patterns of firms through a number of theories derived from different disciplinary 
perspectives. For example, stage models of internationalisation, such as those 
developed by Stopford and Wells (1972) and Johansen and Vahlne (1977) explain 
international entry mode selection on the basis of escalating risk. These theories 
purport that a firm will initially enter new markets through arrangements requiring 
limited levels of investment. As firms' knowledge of the international market 
increases, they'muster the financial and managerial expertise to take greater risks 
of direct investment' (Contractor, 1981: 73). Levels of investment in international 
markets therefore increase according to the firm's life cycle. However, these 
models have been questioned by researchers investigating accelerated 
internationalisation (Pla-Barber and Escriba-Esteve, 2006) or 'born-global' firms 
(Knight, Madsen and Servais, 2004). In addition, they have been challenged as 
researchers have identified simultaneous, rather than sequential, use of 
international market entry strategies (Contractor, 1981). 
The simultaneous use of different market entry modes is recognised within 
transaction cost theories (Williamson, 1975; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Buckley and Casson, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). According to these 
economic theories, firms seek to minimise the cost of transactions and therefore 
choose the market entry mode with the lowest perceived costs. Theories of 
internalisation (Rugman, 1986; Buckley, 1987) address both costs and risks and ... 
purport that firms will undertake direct investment when they consider the risks 
associated with the loss of competitive advantage too great with other market 
entry methods. For instance, firms may opt for direct investment as opposed to 
licensing arrangements in order to protect technological know-how. In contrast, 
resource-based theories purport that firms that have a need for resources will try 
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to gain access to them through inter-firm agreements (Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Barringer and Harrison, 2000). These theories are frequently used to explain the 
growth of inter-firm alliances where access to new skills and resources can help 
firms to remain competitive (Thomas, Pollock and Gorman, 1999; Pett and Dibrell, 
2001). 
However, a number of researchers argue that it is more difficult to examine market 
entry issues from a single theoretical perspective as internationalisation increases 
and the competitive resources and position of firms become more complex 
(Dunning, 1980; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Contractor and Kundu, 1998b; Todeva 
and Knoke, 2005). These researchers contend that eclectic models (Dunning, 
1980) or unified theories (Contractor, 1990) are required to develop a more 
complete understanding of the wide variety of factors that underpin modal choice 
decisions. While eclectic models have also received some criticism (see Ekeledo 
and Sivakumar, 2004 for a critical review), researchers have continued to 
empirically test and build upon them to explain modal choice. The studies 
conducted to date have contributed to the knowledge and understanding of market 
entry by highlighting the particular risks associated with specific market entry 
methods for individual market locations. These studies suggest that firms will 
select different entry modes for different international markets after weighing up 
the perceived risks associated with the financial investment required and control 
over their resources. Understanding these risks and 'how' to manage them 
effectively is deemed critical to survival in the current competitive environment. 
These risks must therefore be considered not only in international market entry 
decisions, but also in the management of the subsequent diversely affiliated 
organisational forms created. The term diverse affiliations is used in this thesis to 
describe organisations that employ multiple market entry methods and operate 
within and across organisational boundaries. 
Despite the requirement to manage variable risks, ̀=research on the 
internationalisation of service firms is reported to be relatively limited (Lovelock, " 
1999; Knight, 1999; Javalgi et al, 2003). Furthermore, most of the research 
conducted to date has focused on 'pre-entry aspects' (Lindsay, Chadee, Mattson, 
Johnston and Millet, 2003) and on 'why' particular market entry modes are 
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selected. There has been comparatively limited research on post market entry 
decisions (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Lindsay et al, 2003) and in particular, on 'how' 
firms that employ multiple market entry modes are managed in light of the risks 
associated with these different modes. These firms are diversely affiliated with 
different constituent parts of their portfolios, with different levels of financial 
commitment and different degrees of control afforded to them. While the difficulty 
of conceptualising these complex organisational forms as single and unified 
entities has been identified (Peng and Litteljohn, 2001), a gap remains in the 
knowledge and understanding of 'how' best to manage these diverse affiliations. 
A further criticism of the empirical studies within the market entry literature is that 
limited attention has been paid to organisational flexibility (Driscoll and Paliwoda, 
1997). The importance of organisational flexibility came to prominence in the 
1980s when international business environments became more competitive 
(Boudreau, 2004). Researchers investigating multinational corporations (MNCs)' 
have identified the requirement for firms to be more flexible to cope with the 
complex and dynamic environments they operate in and to be more responsive to 
local market characteristics and demands (Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Golden and Powell, 1999). However, they also recognise the 
need to balance this flexibility against the requirements for global economies of 
scale and innovation in order to remain competitive. The organisational design of 
the MNC is therefore considered critical to determine 'how' this balance can be 
achieved (Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Malnight, 
1995; Wolf, 1997). Egelhoff (1998a: xiii) suggests that in its broadest sense 
organisation design 'includes organizational structure and a wide variety of 
organizational processes and management techniques. ' In other words, 
organisation designs comprise both formal structures and the processes employed 
within these structures to manage them. The majority of the studies noted above 
investigate organisational processes in relation to structure, strategy and industry 
type (Harzing, 1999). However, these studies highlight the relative importance of 
organisational processes for control, decision making and communication over 
While there is a clear distinction between multinational and international firms (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Harzing, 1999), this study uses the particular term employed by the researcher 
whose work is under review. It is concerned with design in relation to international market entry 
and therefore draws on studies that relate to both types of firms that operate beyond their home 
country. 
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formal organisation structures in their management, and as a result, these 
researchers came to be regarded as representing 'the process school' (Melin, 
1992). It has become apparent from the studies conducted that a 'one size fits all' 
approach to design is not appropriate for firms operating in multinational 
environments (Drucker, 1998). Furthermore, given the multiple environments 
these firms operate in, strategies are also likely to be variable or differentiated 
within any one MNC (Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). 
Despite the contributions from the researchers within this school, there is still 
perceived to be a need for further research on the design and management of 
MNCs (Egelhoff, 1998a; Birkinshaw and Terjesen, 2002). In this way, a better 
understanding can be gained of 'how' multinationals balance economic 
imperatives (global integration) with the flexibility to respond to the demands of 
different markets (local responsiveness). 
Further research on organisation design is also called for within the growing 
stream of literature on alliance and network management. As the popularity of 
these market entry methods continues to grow, so too does their incidence of 
failure, with rates reported between 60-80% (Galbreath, 2002; Sengir et al, 2004). 
The cause of failure is frequently attributed to the organisational design challenges 
created through these market entry methods (Ajami and Khambata, 1991; Judge 
and Ryman, 2001; Galbreath, 2002; Kauser and Shaw, 2004). As Buono 
(1997: 251) identifies, these challenges are amplified as the boundaries of alliance 
firms frequently 'blur together in day-to-day operations'. Empirical studies to date 
have shed light on the motives for alliance formation, the choice of governance 
structure, and effectiveness and performance of inter-firm agreements. However, 
there is a growing recognition that further research is needed into the design of 
these inter-organisational forms in order to understand 'how' they are, or should be 
managed (Grandori, 1997a; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Barringer and 
Harrison, 2000; Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Taylor, 2005). 
The preceding discussion identifies a number of gaps in the current literature. In 
the first instance, there appears to be a gap in the generic management literature 
on the internationalisation of service firms. In particular, there is a need for 'post 
entry' research related to 'how' they are designed and managed. Similarly there 
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are further gaps identified in the literature regarding 'how' inter-organisational 
agreements and 'how' diversely affiliated organisations are designed and 
managed. Siggelknow and Rivkin (2005) argue that the problem of finding 
appropriate designs for different organisational conditions remains a key challenge 
for practicing managers. Friesen (2005) advises that design choices have far 
reaching effects that can make or break a firm. This research therefore seeks to 
close these gaps in the literature through an investigation of the design and 
management of diverse affiliations that operate within and across organisational 
boundaries. By drawing together the three streams of literature identified above; 
international market entry, alliance and network management and organisation 
design, a more comprehensive understanding of these issues can be determined 
in order to close these knowledge gaps. 
1.2 Research Context 
One service industry sector that clearly depicts the use of multiple entry modes is 
the international hotel industry where increasing levels of competition have led 
many firms to pursue aggressive international growth strategies (Olsen and Zhao, 
1997). A number of environmental pressures have also contributed to this trend. 
According to Pine and Go (1996: 97) the, 
'cumulative effects of information technology, the development 
of worldwide media, the ease of long-haul travel opportunities 
and the development of capital markets able to shift resources 
rapidly in response to new opportunities' 
have pulled many hotel firms into the international business arena. At the same 
time, the saturation of many domestic markets has pushed hotel companies to 
expand internationally. The use of mixed market entry modes has increased in 
line with this internationalisation (Contractor and Kundu, 1998b; Jones, 1999; 
Barcala and Gonzalez-Diaz, 2006). While owner-operator strategies were once 
predominant in the hotel industry, the last few decades have seen a greater 
separation of hotel management from hotel ownership (Clancy, 1998; Contractor 
and Kundu, 1998b). International expansion has been achieved through a mixture 
of acquisitions, franchising, management contracts, joint venture and strategic 
alliance agreements with varying degrees of equity participation (Litteljohn, 1997; 
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Contractor and Kundu, 1998b; Jones, 1999). For example, across its portfolio of 
hotel brands, Accor owns and manages some properties, operates others as joint 
ventures or management contracts, and franchises other hotels, some through 
master franchise agreements (www. accorhotels. com). Todd and Mather's (1999) 
study of global hotel brands provides ample empirical evidence of these diverse 
affiliation patterns in the international hotel industry. The authors identify that 
many firms 'seem to cover virtually all the options' (Todd and Mather, 1999: 107) 
and this has blurred the distinction between the various types of hotel companies 
such as hotel owners, management companies and franchisors. Based on the 
findings from an industry study, Contractor and Kundu (1998a: 50) report: 
'In many sectors, global strategic choices are no longer 
across the board, but selective, depending on the country 
in question and the preferences and risk appetite of the firm. ' 
Their study reveals that non-equity modes in the hotel industry account for over 
65% of foreign hotel properties and arrangements involving two companies 
account for as much as 81.2%. The result has been the creation of complex and 
compound hotel chains with diverse patterns of affiliation across hotel portfolios. 
Ingram and Baum (1997: 68) define hotel chains as 'collections of service 
organisations doing substantially the same thing that are linked together into a 
larger organization. ' However, Peng (2004: 243) provides a more comprehensive 
definition of hotel chains as: 
'Organisations which comprise two or more hotel units operating 
under a system of decision making permitting coherent policies 
and a common strategy through one or more decision making 
centres and in which the hotel units and corporate functions are 
linked to add value to each other by ownership or contractual 
relationships. ' 
Both definitions therefore identify that the formation of chains results in the 
creation of distinct organisational forms. However, how they are linked to create a 
specific organisational form is dependent on the market entry methods chosen. 
Industry experts predict that this trend for hotel chain affiliation will continue. 
Forecasts show an increase in chain affiliation within Europe from 23% to 28% of 
total roomstock by 2011 (Slattery, 2003) and to 25.5% (7.65 million hotel rooms) of 
global hotel roomstock by 2050 (Slattery, 2000). 
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The benefits of chain affiliation include economies of scale, inter-organisational 
learning and increased credibility (Ingram, 1998). Furthermore, the use of mixed 
market entry modes has enabled hotel chains to grow more rapidly (Connell, 
1997). However, there are issues associated with co-ordination and control 
across the different types of affiliation (Harrison and Johnson, 1992; Jones, 1999). 
These chains are also under pressure for greater integration and control to 
achieve shareholder returns, yet at the same time they are faced with the 
challenge of ensuring enough flexibility to be responsive to local market demands 
(Olsen, 1999; Aung and Heeler, 2001). Nonetheless, the ability to coordinate and 
control unit hotels is considered an important source of competitive advantage for 
international hotel chains (Horsburgh, 1991; Dunning and McQueen, 1981). Pine 
and Go (1996) identify key issues for their managers are 'how' to organise, 
integrate and manage their activities. Ingram (1998) also cautions that the success 
of hotel chains is related to the way that they are designed and Altinay (2001) 
identifies the impact of organisation design on the international expansion process 
itself. Despite recognition of the need for new designs to meet these challenges 
(Enz, 1993; Blum, 1997), a number of researchers suggest that hospitality firms, 
and hotel chains more specifically, still rely on traditional hierarchical designs that 
impact on their ability to compete effectively (Olsen, 1989,1991; Enz, 1993; 
Espitalier-Noel, 1995). 
Early empirical studies investigating the design of hotel chains examined and 
found support for the relationship between structure, strategy and organisation 
effectiveness (Schaffer, 1984; West and Olsen, 1988; Dev and Olsen, 1989). 
However, these efforts focused upon chains within a domestic context 
predominantly using one type of affiliation. A similar study by Dev and Brown 
(1990) did include owner operated, management contracts and franchised hotel 
units, however the focus of the investigation was not the impact of different 
affiliations on organisation structure. It was Clark's (1987) investigation of 15 UK 
hotel chains that highlighted the relationship (or type of affiliation) between the 
corporate level and the portfolio of hotels as a critical element of structural 
determination and thus organisation design. He identified three models of 
corporate design based on this relationship as corporate governance, corporate 
control and corporate service. These models are differentiated according to the 
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variable levels of control and coordination exercised through organisational 
communication processes. Clark (1987) concluded from his study that one hotel 
chain could have different types of relationships between the corporate level and 
different hotels in the portfolio. 
Subsequent studies also recognised the importance of the type of affiliation to 
organisation structure. For instance, Roper's (1992) research into the structure of 
hotel consortia as transorganisational forms identified strategic and structural 
inconsistencies as a direct result of consortia's particular development and status. 
Connell's (1997: 219) investigation of international master franchise agreements 
revealed that these organisation designs evolve when organisational processes 
are adapted as the franchisor and master franchisee become 'attuned'. Eyster 
(1997) also identifies change in organisational practices within management 
agreements from his latest study of this market entry method. Although these 
studies have contributed further to our understanding of the design and 
management of hotel chains, they have also focused on single types of affiliation. 
One study that did investigate 'how' organisations that employ multiple market 
entry methods are designed was that of Cliquet and Croizean (2002). Their 
investigation encompassed hotel chains in France that employed both franchising 
and ownership entry modes. The firms in their study were found to employ 
different designs, comprising both structure and process, for the different types of 
affiliation. Furthermore, Cliquet and Croizean (2002) determined that this 
approach to design was effective in managing across the different types of 
affiliation as it could yield synergistic benefits in terms of achieving organisational 
goals. To date, however, no studies have been identified that investigate 
organisation designs in international chains using multiple market entry methods. 2 
As such, there is a further gap in the literature on 'how' international hotel chains 
that are diversely affiliated with their portfolio are designed and managed. 
Given the use of multiple market entry methods, the use of inter-firm agreements, 
the limitations of previous research, and their importance as a service industry 
sector (Clancy, 1998), international hotel chains provide a suitable context for this 
2 There have been a number of studies that have looked at design and management practices 
within specific functional areas. For instance, Gannon and Johnson (1997) and Jones, Thompson 
and Nickson (1998) have investigated human resource practices within international hotel chains. 
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study. Furthermore, an investigation of international hotel chains that operate 
across organisational boundaries, will also contribute to the understanding of the 
design and management of inter-organisational alliances. Empirical studies on 
these inter-organisational forms are reported to be limited (Grandori, 1997a). It has 
also been recognised that inadequate attention has been paid to studies 
investigating organisation design since the 1990s (Birkinshaw and Terjesen, 
2002). This research will therefore also contribute to the literature on organisation 
design through the investigation of diverse affiliations. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research study aims to identify 'how' diverse affiliations are designed and 
managed within and across organisational boundaries through a study of 
international hotel chains. In order to achieve this aim, the following research 
objectives have been set: 
1. To analyse the formal organisation structures of a sample of 
international hotel chains, within and across organisational boundaries, 
in relation to the market entry methods employed. 
2. To evaluate management practices within the sample through the 
exploration of processes for control, decision-making and 
communication within and across organisational boundaries. 
3. To contribute to the knowledge of organisation design in international 
hotel chains, inter-organisational alliances and diverse affiliations. 
4. To make recommendations on organisational design for diverse 
affiliations in order to maximise their potential. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured around four key questions as depicted in Table 1.1. As the 
table highlights, this first chapter identifies the overall aim of the research and the 
objectives determined to achieve this aim. It also presents a rationale for the 
research based on current industry trends and gaps identified within the 
international market entry, alliance and network, and the organisation design 
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literature and on international hotel chains. It argues that combining different 
theoretical perspectives from these fields could help to fill these gaps by 
developing an understanding of 'how' diverse affiliations are designed and 
managed through the control, decision making and communication processes 
employed. 
Table 1.1 The Structure of the Thpcic 
Chapter/Purpose Purpose/Content 
Chapter One Research Rationale: Identifying the gaps in the 
literature 
What does the research seek Research Context: International hotel chains 
to achieve? Research Aims and Objectives 
Overview of Thesis 
Chapters Two and Three International market entry modes and the 
implications of adopting multiple modes 
What can be learned from the 
current literature in relation to Dimensions of organisational and inter- 
the research question? organisational design 
Development of research propositions to inform the 
investigation 
Chapter Four Research Design 
Research philosophy, approach and methods 
How to best achieve the Research phases 
research aim? Analysing the data 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven Research Findings: Identifying emergent themes 
What is learned through the Discussion: Relating these themes to the extant 
research? literature and objectives of the study 
Drawing conclusions, contributing to knowledge, 
developing recommendations and recognising 
research limitations 
The following two chapters review the current literature in order to inform and 
frame the investigation. Chapter Two explores the factors that underpin market 
entry decisions in order to determine the impact of different entry modes on 
organisations. In particular, it undertakes an in-depth investigation of the risks 
associated with specific market entry methods drawing on the market entry and 
alliance literature and on research conducted within manufacturing, service and 
hotel industries. It then considers these risks in relation to the use of multiple 
market entry methods to identify the design and management challenges faced by 
firms diversely affiliated with their portfolio. 
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In Chapter Three, the organisation design and alliance literature is used to identify 
the dimensions of design within and across organisational boundaries. Research 
conducted from different theoretical perspectives and within different industry 
sectors is used to inform this review. The chapter concludes with the identification 
of a number of research propositions drawn from the three streams of literature. 
Chapter Four explains the research design and puts forward an argument for an 
inductive and qualitative approach. It identifies how the research was undertaken 
in three distinct phases in order to achieve the research objectives. The first 
phase sought to verify the extent of the phenomena under study. The second 
phase sought to identify design and management issues within organisational 
boundaries and the third to identify these issues across organisational boundaries. 
The different strategies adopted for each phase are justified, as is the approach to 
data analysis. 
Chapter Five presents the research findings according to the three different 
research phases undertaken. These findings are presented according to themes 
that emerge from the data. 
Chapter Six discusses these findings in relation to the extant literature and the 
research propositions identified. Through this process, two further themes emerge 
and these are used to frame the discussion. 
Finally, Chapter Seven presents the conclusions drawn from this study and the 
contributions of the research. The implications of these are considered and a 
number of recommendations put forth as a result. The limitations of the research 
are also identified in this final chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE IMPACT OF MODAL CHOICE ON ORGANISATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the types of risk associated with different 
international market entry modes. This chapter begins with the identification of 
distinct international market entry methods and the factors that influence modal 
choice decisions. Four key underlying dimensions of market entry modes that give 
rise to variable degrees of risk associated with control, resource commitment, 
dissemination and flexibility are determined. The management of these risks is 
then explored in the organisation forms created through ownership, hybrid and 
contractual entry modes. This discussion is drawn together to consider the 
management implications for firms that employ multiple entry modes. A review of 
the research studies conducted to date on diversely affiliated organisations then 
follows. The chapter summary highlights the need to investigate organisation 
designs within and across firm boundaries to determine how the variable risks are 
managed within diverse affiliations. 
2.2 International Market Entry Modes 
The literature identifies a number of distinct international market entry methods 
commonly employed by service firms and suggests that these can be 
conceptualised along a continuum according to the degree of financial 
commitment required. Table 2.1 briefly defines these different modes and depicts 
them along this continuum. 
As Table 2.1 identifies, at one end, ownership of international subsidiaries requires 
the greatest financial investment and at the other, contractual entry modes require 
the least. In between, there are varieties of hybrid arrangements identified that 
require variable levels of investment. Joint ventures, alliances and franchising are 
considered to be hybrid entry modes as they employ elements of ownership 
alongside contractual arrangements. Which of these market entry methods is 
chosen is dependent on a number of factors identified below. 
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Table 2.1 International Market Entry Modes 
Entry Mode Description Level Of 
Investment 
Wholly Owned Subsidiary Direct investment in foreign market HIGHEST 
resulting in full ownership. 
Joint Ventures A partnership between firms that 
entails the creation of a governing 
body to oversee the venture. 
Strategic Alliances & A variety of inter-firm arrangements 
Networks* that encompass resource sharing 
and mutual benefits to the firms 
involved. 
Franchising* A contractual agreement where a 
franchisor provides the brand name 
and know-how to run a business for 
a fee. 
Management Contracts* A contractual agreement where one 
firm provides management expertise 
to another firm for a fee. 
Licensing A contractual agreement where the 
right to produce a product or service 
is granted for a fee. This can 
include the use of patents, 
trademarks and technical advice or 
assistance. 
Exporting Products are produced in the 
domestic market or a third country LOWEST 
and transferred to the host market. 
Haapieu'ruin Juiuisun at Ocnoies, iuuv; Keegan, Zuuz; Hollensen, 2004. 
*The exact investment for these modes can vary according to the particular model adopted. 
2.3 Understanding Modal Choice 
The selection of an appropriate entry mode is deemed to have a significant impact 
on a firm's performance and survival (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli, 
1991; Ali and Camp, 1993; Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997; Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 
2004). As the previous chapter identifies, a number of researchers contend that 
eclectic or unified theories are necessary to understand the wide variety of factors 
that impact upon modal choice decisions. One of the first researchers to explore 
international market entry decisions using this approach was Dunning (1980) 
whose research led to the development and testing of an eclectic model (Dunning 
and McQueen, 1981). Driscoll and Paliwoda (1997: 60) define the eclectic model 
as a `holistic framework that draws together several streams of thought in an 
attempt to explain different routes to entering and serving international markets. ' 
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According to eclectic theories there are a variety of internal and external factors 
that influence market entry decisions. Altinay (2001) argues that internal or firm- 
specific factors are those that provide competitive advantages for firms in specific 
markets. Different researchers have investigated the impact of firm size, firm size 
in relation to internal resources, degree of international experience, managerial 
preference, corporate history, nature of a firm's know-how3, ability to differentiate 
products, and the impact of a firm's strategy on modal choice decisions. Empirical 
studies suggest however that these internal factors must be considered in 
conjunction with a number of external factors in any given market location. 
External factors include location-specific advantages that relate to the market 
potential and investment risk within any given location (Dunning, 1988). Market 
potential refers to the size and growth of a market (Erramilli, 1991) based upon 
current and predicted demand levels (Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997). Investment 
risks concern the economic and political conditions that influence the uncertainty 
or stability of particular markets and the potential repatriation of earnings or 
expropriation of assets (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1991; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). 
Another relevant external factor is that of socio-cultural distance or the degree to 
which a host country's socio-cultural environment is dissimilar to that of the home 
country (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Blomstermo, Deo Sharma and Sallis, 2006). 
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1991) caution that the assessment of location-specific 
advantages may be influenced by management perceptions based upon their level 
of knowledge, past experiences and potential bias about any given country. 
Researchers adopting an eclectic approach have therefore sought to investigate 
both internal and external influences on modal choice decisions. Table 2.2 
presents an overview of 16 empirical studies conducted using eclectic frameworks 
since the seminal work of Dunning and McQueen (1981). All of these studies 
investigate international market entry decisions using a hypo-deductive 
quantitative research design with the exception of Altinay (2001) who uses a 
qualitative grounded theory approach. 
3A firm's know-how can be either tacit or explicit. Explicit knowledge is regarded as codifiable and 
can be incorporated in formal routines and standard operating procedures. Tacit knowledge however, is less codifiable and thus more difficult to articulate and transfer without personal contact 
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While Table 2.2 depicts the support for eclectic models, it also highlights the 
variety of both internal and external factors that have been investigated within 
different industry contexts. However, findings on the exact impact of these 
different factors vary within these studies. A number of explanations have been 
proffered to explain these differences including national culture (Osland, Taylor 
and Zou, 2001), industry specific contexts (Terpstra and Yu, 1998; Agarwal and 
Ramaswami, 1992; Kennedy and Bradley, 1997; Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 2004) 
and product specific contexts (Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 2004). Industry and 
product specific contexts refer to the specific internal or external factors which may 
be of greater or lesser relevance to specific industry or product categories. As 
Table 2.2 identifies, 4 studies investigate manufacturing firms, 7 studies 
investigate service firms and 5 focus specifically on the international hotel industry. 
Table 2.2 also demonstrates the complexity of modal choice decisions and the 
inter-relationship between the antecedent factors. In addition to these factors, 
Dunning (1988) identifies four other influences on modal choice decisions, 
suggesting these are internalisation advantages that relate to perceived risks of 
control, dissemination, resource commitment and flexibility. Driscoll and Paliwoda 
(1997) argue these four factors are best understood as four underlying dimensions 
that are represented by variable degrees in different market entry methods. Each 
of these four dimensions is defined below. 
i) Control 
From a market entry perspective control is reported to be the authority over 
operational and strategic decision making (Kim and Hwang, 1992; Driscoll and 
Paliwoda, 1997). Anderson and Gatignon (1986: 3) advise that `it is the ability to 
influence systems, methods and decisions and therefore has an impact on the 
future of the enterprise'. As a result, it is considered the single most important 
determinant of risk and return in entry mode decisions (Anderson and Gatignon, 
1986; Blomstermo et at, 2006). Contractor and Kundu (1998a, 1998b) identify four 
different types of control from their study of hotel chains as that over daily 
management and quality, physical assets, tacit expertise or know-how, and 
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codified strategic assets. The latter category can include a firm's internationally 
recognised brand name and other proprietal technological systems 
ii) Resource Commitment 
Kim and Hwang (1992: 74) suggest that resource commitment refers to 'dedicated 
assets that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses without loss of value. ' As 
such, they can be likened to what Williamson (1975) refers to as transaction- 
specific assets that are invested to enter new international markets. Woodcock, 
Beamish and Makino (1994) note that these resources can be both tangible and 
intangible. Driscoll and Paliwoda (1997: 67) add that they can be 'financial, 
physical and human resources firms commit to enter foreign markets. ' 
iii) Risk of Dissemination 
This risk is defined as the extent to which a firm perceives that its firm-specific 
advantages will be appropriated by a contractual partner (Kim and Hwang, 1992; 
Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997). While firm-specific advantages can take many 
shapes, dissemination is frequently associated with a firm's know-how. This 
know-how can be technical or market based, tacit or explicit, and is considered to 
be a source of a firm's competitive advantage. The risk of dissemination is directly 
associated with the likelihood of, and ease in which a partner firm can behave 
opportunistically to appropriate that know-how and replicate it to their own 
advantage. 
iv) Flexibility 
Flexibility is defined as 'a blend of capabilities and attributes that facilitate 
adjustments to change' (Bahrami; 1992: 35). Put more simply, it is the ability to do 
things differently or to do different things in order to adapt to changing 
environmental circumstances. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) argue that flexibility is 
necessary to enable international firms to respond to changes in different national 
markets, divert resources when required, and adapt products and services in order 
to compete more effectively. Schilling and Steensma (2001) therefore suggest that 
flexibility can relate to volume, product and strategic decisions. Driscoll and 
Paliwoda (1997) highlight the importance of adapting to changing circumstances at 
minimal costs. Through their study of manufacturing and retail networks, Golden 
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and Powell (1999) identify four dimensions of flexibility as temporal, range, 
intention and focus. These dimensions relate respectively to the speed within 
which change occurs, the range of potential responses, whether the change is 
proactive or reactive, and whether the focus of the change is internal or external. 
Despite these dimensions, the authors conclude flexibility is a difficult concept to 
assess. 
As the perceptions of risks associated with loss of control, resources, competitive 
advantage and flexibility vary for different international markets, they are further 
factors that influence modal choice decisions. Table 2.3 summarises these 
different dimensions and the risks associated with them. 
Table 2.3 Underlvina Dimensions of Market Entrv Modes 
Dimension Definition Associated Risk 
Control Ability to exercise authority over Degree of control is associated with 
systems, procedures and the ability to influence performance 
operational and strategic and ultimate firm survival. 
decisions 
Resource The level of resources invested in The more resources committed, the 
Commitment order to enter any given market greater the potential gain or loss. 
Dissemination Potential loss of firm-specific Working cooperatively with other 
knowledge and competitive firms to enter new markets can 
advantage increase the risk of losing 
competitive advantage. 
Flexibility Ability to adapt to changing Loss of flexibility creates the risk of 
environmental conditions producing products and services 
that become obsolete. 
Summary of Modal Choice 
This review of the literature suggests that modal choice decisions are complex and 
contingent on the inter-relationship between a variety of factors for any given 
market. Figure 2.1 depicts all these antecedent factors that impact on modal 
choice decisions. Given the range of factors involved, Contractor and Kundu 
(1998a and 1998b) conclude from their study that that there is unlikely to be a 
standardised optimum modal choice. Firms are therefore likely to employ multiple 
market entry methods in their pursuit of international growth and become diversely 
affiliated with their portfolios, frequently in ways that cross traditional 
organisational boundaries. 
Figure 2.1 also highlights the perceived risks associated with different market entry 
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but also impact on the subsequent organisations created. They give rise to 
different challenges for managers to minimise the risks associated with control, 
resource commitment, dissemination and flexibility and therefore underpin the 
focus of the remainder of this chapter. While these risks have been investigated in 
specific market entry modes, there has been limited attention given to their 
management in diversely affiliated firms. The following section therefore 
synthesises both conceptual and empirical studies to identify these risks in the 
different organisational forms created through market entry choices. 
2.4 The Risks Associated with International Market Entry Modes 
Drawing on the international market entry literature and the growing stream related 
specifically to alliance and network agreements, this section explores the risks 
associated with control, resource commitment, dissemination and flexibility for 
international service firms. International market entry modes are discussed 
according to the three broad categories identified on the market entry continuum in 
Table 2.1 as: 
" Ownership modes 
" Hybrid modes 
" Contractual modes 
2.4.1 Ownership Modes 
Ownership entry modes require direct investment in the facilities and management 
of physical facilities to produce goods and services in foreign markets (Altinay, 
2001). International growth through ownership can be achieved organically 
through the development of greenfield sites or through merger and acquisition 
(M&A). While the former is generally considered a slow and expensive route to 
international expansion (Paliwoda, 1998), M&A activity is perceived as offering a 
quicker option (Buckley and Casson, 1998). Although these two terms are 
commonly used in conjunction, mergers and acquisitions are distinct market entry 
processes. Schraeder and Self (2003: 511) report that, 
'Mergers are commonly characterized as the consolidation of 
two organizations into a single organization. Acquisitions, by 
contrast, are commonly characterized as the purchase of one 
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organization from another where the buyer or acquirer 
maintains control. ' 
Ownership modes have been traditionally considered to offer greater degrees of 
control over international operations (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1991; Erramilli, 
1991; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). These modes enable full integration of all 
resources into one decision-making body and thus facilitate high degrees of 
control through hierarchy of authority (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1991). 
Integration is defined as `the combination of firms into a single unity or group, 
generating joint efforts to fulfil the goals of the new organisation' (Olie, 1994: 386). 
Corporate-level decision makers are responsible for decisions about capital, 
product and knowledge flows and how these are used and shared across different 
geographical markets (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). Contractor and Kundu 
(1998a, 1998b) identify through their research that full ownership provides 
management with strong levels of all four types of control. Gupta and 
Govindarajan (1991) explain that it is widely acknowledged in the economics 
literature that foreign direct investment occurs because of a desire to internalise 
knowledge transfers. In other words, ownership modes reduce the risk associated 
with dissemination of organisational knowledge or loss of competitive advantages. 
Paliwoda (1998) argues that this greater degree of control comes at a price 
however, and that is a higher level of resource commitment and thus a lower 
degree of strategic flexibility. Within international markets, the issue of 
simultaneously achieving control while giving managers sufficient autonomy to be 
responsive to local market conditions is of widespread significance (Keidel, 1990; 
Craig and Douglas, 1996; Malnight, 2001). This argument suggests that while 
achievable, centralised control may not be the most appropriate to achieve 
sufficient degrees of flexibility across international markets. In addition, 
researchers have begun to question this generally accepted view of ownership as 
there are no tried or tested models of how much control ownership affords 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997). 
Within M&A, integrating the two separate firms into one new organisation often 
poses management challenges for control and flexibility. While M&A remains 
popular, there is a high failure rate associated with these market entry methods 
(Marks, 1997; Balmer and Dinnie, 1999; Appelbaum and Gandell, 2003; Shelton, 
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Hall and Darling, 2003). Many researchers argue that too much attention is given 
to strategic fit and financial and legal issues prior to mergers at the expense of 
considering how the two firms can be integrated post merger (Olie, 1994; Morosini 
and Singh, 1994; Balmer and Dinnie, 1999). Olie's (1994) case study investigation 
of three Dutch-German mergers identifies four potential areas of incompatibility for 
consideration in M&A entry modes; administrative systems, organisation structure, 
management style and organisation culture. National culture has subsequently 
been recognised as a further potential area. Table 2.4 identifies these categories 
and the work of other researchers that support them. 
Table 2.4 Potential Incompatibilities in Mercers and Annuicifinnc 
Incompatibility Of: Definition Supporting Authors 
Administrative Organisational processes Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
Systems that support the 1988; Olie, 1994; Cartwright & 
organisational structure Cooper, 1995; McCann, 1996; 
Schraeder & Self, 2003; 
Lundbacke & Horte, 2006 
Organisation Structure The framework of decision- Ollie, 1994; Balmer & Dinnie, 
making and reporting 1999; Shelton et al, 2003; 
systems Lundbacke & Horte, 2006 
Management Style Includes leadership styles Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; 
and their underpinning Olie, 1994; McCann, 1996; 
human resource practices Covin, Kolenko, Sightler & 
Tudor, 1997; Schraeder & 
Self, 2003 
Organisation Culture Represents the values, Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
attitudes and styles of work 1988; Mayo & Hadaway, 
within organisations, 1994; Cartwright & Cooper 
reflects the nature of 1993,1995; Olie, 1994; 
shared beliefs and McCann, 1996; Marks, 1997; 
expectations about Balmer & Dinnie, 1999; 
organisational life Appelbaum & Gell, 2003; 
Schraeder & Self, 
2003; Shelton et al, 2003; 
Lundbacke & Horte, 2006 
National Culture Represents the prominent Mayo & Hadaway, 1994; 
shared values and Morosini & Singh, 1994; 
attitudes within nations on Shelton et al, 2003 
the basis of ethnicity, 
tradition, history and 
religion 
There is general consensus amongst the 26 authors listed in Table 2.4 that greater 
attention needs to be paid to these issues surrounding M&A activity and the 
human side of integrating firms. As these research efforts acknowledge, the 
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incompatibility within these areas has direct implications on the control and 
flexibility achieved in the newly formed organisations. For example, different 
administrative systems and organisation structures in merged firms could create 
control implications. Similarly, different management styles and organisation 
cultures could impact upon the degree of flexibility achieved. The following section 
explores these issues further for hybrid market entry methods. 
2.4.2 Hybrid Entry Modes 
Hybrid entry modes are those that combine a mixture of equity investment and 
contractual arrangements. These modes do not yield the same degree of 
integration of resources as full ownership and therefore provide less opportunity 
for control through hierarchical authority. While Bradach and Eccles (1989) argue 
that control can be achieved through contractual stipulations, other researchers 
report that these can be less efficient or more costly (Erramilli and Rao, 1993; 
Woodcock et al, 1994). Contractor and Kundu (1998a, 1998b) identify that in 
partially-owned arrangements, strong control is maintained only over codified 
strategic assets, and only weak control is achieved over daily management and 
quality, physical assets and tacit expertise. The authors conclude from their 
research that contractual relationships can effectively substitute for equity 
ownership when the fear of partner opportunism is reduced by the international 
firm's ongoing control over key strategic assets. However, the developing stream 
of alliance and network literature suggests that the degree to which control is 
achieved by either of these means depends on the particular hybrid arrangement 
adopted. The growing popularity of inter-firm agreements has been mirrored by an 
increase in the variety of arrangements made between firms (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). The following discussion addresses two broad types of hybrid 
arrangements used by international service firms; alliances and networks and 
franchise agreements, and considers the degrees of control, flexibility, resource 
commitment and risk of dissemination in each. 
i) Alliances & Networks 
The alliance and network literature presents a variety of definitions of these 
organisational forms. Table 2.5 provides an overview of alliance definitions by 
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various researchers since the mid 1980's when they started to increase in 
popularity. 
The definitions provided in Table 2.5 suggest there is disagreement over the types 
of inter-organisational relationships that constitute alliances. Some authors argue 
that buyer-supplier relationships, joint ventures, licensing and franchising are 
forms of alliance agreements (Starr, 1991; Lorange, Roos and Bronn, 1992; 
Grandori, 1997a; Zeng and Chen, 2003; Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Todeva and 
Knoke, 2005). In contrast, Glaister and Buckley (1996) explicitly argue that buyer- 
seller relationships, licensing and franchising are not alliances as the individual 
organisations may have conflicting goals. They do advise however, that joint 
ventures fall within the domain of alliance agreements due to goal congruence. 
On the other hand, Ajami and Khambata (1991) and Walters, Peters and Dess 
(1994) maintain that joint ventures are technically distinct as they entail the 
creation of a third party legal entity responsible for the alliance management. 
Despite this lack of agreement, it can be concluded that there are a number of 
different types of alliance agreements that share distinct characteristics. The 
literature suggests that alliances: 
" are inter-organisational or inter-firm agreements involving two or more firms 
" create hybrid organisation structures 
" are either cooperative or collaborative 
" have a defined purpose 
" benefit the firms involved 
" share resources 
" have a temporal dimension. 
However, alliances can vary quite significantly within each of these general 
characteristics and this is likely to impact upon the associated risks. For example, 
the number of firms involved in an alliance agreement is likely to influence the type 
and degree of control afforded to a firm. Multi-firm agreements are generally 
considered to be inter-firm networks. As the terms alliances and networks are 
frequently used interchangeably, Table 2.6 provides a summary of several 
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definitions of networks4 in order to compare and contrast them with those given for 
alliances. 
Table 2.6 identifies that there are also a number of different types of network 
agreements, but more general consensus amongst researchers as to what 
constitutes a network. It also highlights the similarity in alliance and network 
definitions. Both alliances and networks share a number of characteristics as 
follows: 
" they are arrangements made between firms 
" they create hybrid organisational forms 
" they can be either cooperative or collaborative agreements 
" they represent a degree of interdependency between firms 
" they are unions with a defined purpose 
" they deliver benefits for the firms involved 
" they share resources between firms. 
Due to these shared characteristics, it is not surprising that these terms are often 
used interchangeably. There are differences however, and according to Sherer 
(2003) networks generally tend to be more informal, do not generally use long- 
term contracts and do not form joint ventures with specific divisions of ownership. 
A network therefore is a particular type of inter-firm alliance, one with multiple 
partners and potentially multi-directional linkages. While there is a growing body 
of literature that focuses specifically on networks, this discussion seeks only to 
identify the variety of alliance agreements in existence as the risks associated with 
control, resource commitment, dissemination and flexibility are likely to be 
variable. The following section therefore synthesises the literature in order to 
classify different types of alliance agreements and identify the risks associated 
with each classification. 
Classifying Inter-firm Alliance Agreements 
Although individual authors have used different criteria to categorise alliance and 
network arrangements, five main classifications have been drawn from the 
literature. This section categorises alliances according to their governance 
4 While there is a substantial body of literature that addresses personal networks within 
organisations, it is the more formalised agreements made between firms that are considered here 
and personal networks are considered in the following chapter. 
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structure, motive for formation, duration, type of linkage and degree of 
interdependence in order to identify their associated risks. 
a) Classification by governance structure 
One of the simplest ways to classify alliances is through their governance 
structure. Gulati and Singh (1998) define governance as the contractual structure 
participants use to formalise agreements. Alliances can range from wide networks 
of loose alliances to tight federations with defined governing bodies (Gerwin, 2004; 
Huxham, 1996) and these differ on the basis of their decision-making authority and 
the degree to which these are controlled hierarchically (Gerwin, 2004; Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). While governing bodies offer potentially greater degrees of control, 
more resources are often required, thereby potentially reducing flexibility. Looser 
alliances may therefore enable greater flexibility. Osborn and Baughn (1990) add 
that looser, non-equity alliances promote reciprocal exchange of information and 
are less likely to stress issues of control. Risks of dissemination may therefore be 
greater in these alliance forms. 
b) Classification by duration 
A temporal dimension has also been utilised to categorise alliances. Dynamic 
agreements are considered to be those formed for a temporary period (Arias, 
1995). Control may be difficult to achieve with this type of arrangement, 
particularly if there is no written contractual agreement. However, flexibility 
remains high and resource commitment low. The temporary nature of these 
agreements may also reduce the chance of opportunistic behaviour and 
dissemination. 
In contrast, stable alliances are reported to tie firms together through long-term 
contractual arrangements. In these types of arrangements, control may reside 
with a core firm as a governing body or be reliant on stipulations in contractual 
agreements. A number of studies identify the emergence of trust between firms in 
long-term agreements (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 
1998; Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Trust is reported to increase levels of control 
as it inhibits opportunistic behaviour and dissemination risks. The concept of trust 
in inter-firm agreements is discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
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c) Classification by motive for formation 
A number of theoretical perspectives have been formulated to explain the rationale 
for alliance formation and the key distinguishing feature of these is the access 
provided to resources. Gomes-Casseres (1997) identifies three main categories of 
resources as material resources, customer markets and knowledge, and capability 
resources. Using this feature, Barringer and Harrison (2000) argue that the 
motives for alliance formation can be considered as economic, strategic or 
learning. Table 2.7 explains the theories that underpin these different 
perspectives. 
Table 2.7 Motives for Alliance Formation 
Motive Theoretical Description 
Underpinning 
Economic Transaction cost Firms seek the most efficient way to 
economics organise resources. Integration is 
preferred if this is perceived as the 
most economically effective, 
otherwise alliances are formed. 
Resource-based Firms prefer to integrate if they have 
theories surplus resources and form alliances 
if resources are in short supply. 
Strategic Strategic choice Firms enter into offensive alliances to 
(Market strengthen market share and 
based) defensive alliances to defend their 
market share against dominant 
competitors. 
Learning Organisational learning Firms form alliances to gain access to 
(Behavioural) theories new knowledge, skills and capabilities 
either with firms with similar 
capabilities (scale alliances) or 
different capabilities (link alliances). 
L ompnea from the worKs of Ajami and Khambata, 1991; Williamson, 1991; Barringer and Harrison, 
2000; Vetschera, 2000; Clarke-Hill et al, 2003; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 2003; Kogut and Zander, 
1993; Neilson, 2003; Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Todeva and Knoke, 2005. 
The risks associated with alliances differ according to the motive for formation. 
From an economic perspective the risks associated with opportunistic behaviour 
are balanced against the costs of integration and the resources committed for this 
purpose. From a strategic choice perspective, the risks are generally linked to the 
ability to retain control within particular markets as these types of alliances are 
often between competitive firms at the same level of the value chain (Klint and 
Sjoberg, 2003; Terpstra and Simonin, 1993). Clarke-Hill et al (2003) argue that 
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these arrangements may be characterised by rival behaviours, calculated 
bargaining, manoeuvring and the use of power to achieve results. From an 
organisational learning perspective, the risks associated with dissemination are 
arguably the highest. Vetschera (2000) argues conceptually that in these 
alliances, opportunistic behaviour can remain undetected, but Todeva and Knoke 
(2005) advise from their review of alliance research that this could depend on the 
type of interdependence between firms, as well as organisational structures and 
processes employed. 
d) Classification by linkage 
Alliances can also be differentiated according to whether firms are linked vertically 
or horizontally (Ahuja, 2000; Bensen-Rea and Wilson, 2003). Vertical linkages are 
formed across different levels of the value chain (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001) 
in order to coordinate the flow of complementary resources (O'Donnell et al, 
2001). These are generally considered to be collaborative arrangements. If 
continued over an extended period, these can be associated with greater risks of 
flexibility for the firms involved as their reliance on the partner firm grows. 
Horizontal alliances, on the other hand, occur at the same level of the value chain 
with competitor organisations (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). As identified 
above, there are risks associated with control in these types of agreements. Klint 
and Sjoberg (2003: 411) report that many inter-firm agreements can involve a 
mixture of both vertical and horizontal linkages and that these have been labelled 
'lateral networks'. Miles and Snow (1995) advise that these firms can 
simultaneously collaborate and compete, and thus arguably incorporate all the 
risks identified above. 
e) Classification by degree of interdependence 
The final type of classification identified for alliances is the degree of 
interdependence between firms. Calori, Lubatkin and Very (1994: 366) define 
interdependence as the level of resource sharing between related businesses and 
the transfer of functional skills or general manager capability. Goh (2001) 
identifies two types of integration relevant to alliances and networks, human and 
task. Human integration is related to people and the degree to which they are 
transferred across the firms involved in the agreement. The more movement of 
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people across organisations, the greater the potential for dissemination, 
particularly of tacit knowledge. Task integration concerns the actual work of the 
companies. Thompson's (1967) study of technical interdependence across 
departments yields three types of interdependence that can be applied to applied 
to alliances as outlined in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 Task Interdependence in Alliance and Network Anrppmpnts 
Type of Definition Degree of 
Interdependence Interdependence 
Pooled Each organisation makes a discrete Lowest 
contribution to the output of the 
alliance. Interdependence is pooled 
as each organisation is supported 
in some way by the alliance and 
may be threatened by the failure of 
any of its member firms. 
Sequential Each organisation makes a 
successive contribution to the 
development of a product or 
service as in vertical alliances. 
Reciprocal Different organisations contribute Highest 
and interact in a number of ways to 
contribute to the output of the 
alliance. 
Haaptea from i nompson, 1 yti7. 
Table 2.8 identifies that the degree of interdependence between firms is lowest in 
pooled alliances. These types of agreements tend to be looser organisational 
relationships and therefore associated with higher risks of control. The complexity 
and types of interaction between firms in reciprocal alliances on the other hand, 
create a higher degree of interdependency between the alliance firms (Vetschera, 
2000; Kaplan and Hurd, 2002). This interdependence can increase the risks 
associated with resource commitment, control and dissemination. In addition, it 
can have a negative impact on organisational flexibility. 
Summarising the Underlying Dimensions in Alliances and Networks 
The preceding discussion suggests that alliances represent multifaceted 
organisational arrangements (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). However, the 
particular type of inter-firm agreement formed can impact on the degrees of control 
and flexibility afforded and the risks associated with dissemination and resource 
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commitment. The classification scheme presented above has been derived from 
the literature in order to determine the impact of these dimensions on the different 
organisations created. Table 2.9 presents an overview of this scheme and 
illustrates the potential risks according to each classification. It draws on 30 
studies published between 1991 and 2005 that provide support for these 
classifications. However, only 9 of these have been empirically tested. 
Using this classification scheme, the underlying risks associated with different 
types of alliance and network agreements can be more readily identified. As Table 
2.9 depicts, higher control is associated with stable and tight alliances where 
greater levels of resources are committed, particularly if the motive for formation is 
access to financial resources. On the other hand, control risks are highest with 
dynamic or short-term alliances with market-driven motives, horizontal linkages 
and a high degree of interdependence. Greater risks of dissemination are 
associated with short-term and tighter alliances formed for learning purposes with 
high levels of interdependence. Flexibility is highest with dynamic or short-term 
alliances with a low number of links and lower degrees of interdependence. 
Despite the application of this classification scheme, Table 2.9 depicts the 
variability of the risks of alliances. While the literature sheds little light on the best 
approach to managing these risks, it does emphasise the need for further 
empirical research. Kauser and Shaw (2004: 6) advise that 'the management of 
alliances poses unique problems of conceptualization, design and performance 
evaluation. ' 
35 
Z (Z 2 (O 
° 
O) Sd f9 C O 




COO 6- Ö 
O0 o 
Nýi, > >, 




O .0C ý 




















E CU O 0ö 





dO _ ýmýýO 
cfl ýp 
(Q C 
, (DM 00 
C4 
p) o 
O2m CO Co Co 
0 
E c» E 
O Y 
LO >'N N 
rnW. n CO. 0 `oö 






E= _ O cÖ ?: 
Ir- > 
NOO 




ca am ýX=e ° ýý, oM LU N° 
cý v- O CU. 12- C: ) _ C». a 0 c2 CD r- (0 ZZ: odN QýodN ýýO oöNNCa ä) 
N ¬ ` 
O 
`10 .0 ö r 
0) U) 
( Z9 (0 T3 
ccc 
0N 
C o ö c 3ý a cv c 
No 
c 
ý_, , 3c 
.o c . a E 
.cN ca ° 3E 
3 -o E > 0E 'v E 
rn 
°' c, = c 
aVONO `° RSC cn E ° Cn > oo U N ca aD .o No > im CM 
v cCa 
VOy 







(h C 0- 
`%) 
= La N 
t n 
cu V v) :. 
cß c ` 
ý i L- 
o c ö° °5 I- 
(0 





2 p_ cp 
c Ec COOO 
U) 0 C: Y 
ca N 'X N 
u)Y 
C N NY CO 
N 
O E Co 
00 NO U ýO ý-"p, ` 
OY N Ný N .. co 
N 
O. 0'C 
O O LyN V 
"°ý` °ý" 2' 0 °? o 
v- C °ý öaý äý 0 M M- MQ -L (um 
(j 0 C 
a) 
"c 
o cU v i 0 cC N YOX0 N 0_ 
O 
ýCD cCSCýý2 














O E o 
O 
I- o U) 
s E Ü 
O e: cm (D 















ö ° L N Co C i. 
° C 3.. C» .000 
0 
ö 0 li sc 
° 0c i cvEa 0 
c i 32 aý 1. - cca ° °' r0 
(D Co >+ rn "-e 
L 
rn c 
2 °ca°i J äß ý 0 0omcn co Yý 
a) _ 
:E (4 
,a 15 NL 
fC CC 
0) . F,, ß 
Ö c? 
O-- 
öo O V) 
V 
LL &- M .. ai 







-VON: O O fß 









































O pý M 
mOÖ 
c> CLCD (13 mNN OYN 
r. 13,0 . C7 ' O _ , CD (0 M OC° (0 N 
mN Co N r- 06 
MON 
O C, to 
m. 
QNY 






























O N 'C 
N >+ yO C O 
(0 tC Ca NM k. O 




. p) mp v) a) v) aY N cß to cO 




N c9 "0 
.ý tý CC 








YN .OL b.. - 0 
L 





= Q. U LZ 
Q ) O_) 
_ 
















ýý fß = 

































Franchise agreements are the second type of hybrid arrangement considered in 
this study. While some authors argue that franchising is a type of alliance, it is 
included as a separate section given its distinct characteristics. Fulop (1999) 
suggests simply that franchising is a method of marketing goods and services 
dependent on complex contractual arrangements. There are two main types of 
franchising; product tradename5 and business format franchising. It is the latter 
type that is commonly used in service firms and therefore is the focus of this 
discussion. 
According to Paliwoda (1998: 139) business format franchising 'transfers the legal 
right to a third party to use a company's registered trade name, trademarks and 
logo, products, packaging and business system'. McGuffie (1996: 40) defines 
franchising as a process where, 
'the franchisor grants the right to use the brand and 
operational systems to third parties (the franchisees) for 
a number of years in exchange for fees. The franchisee 
continues to own/manage [the firm] but has to guarantee 
that the property will feature the brand name, identity, 
graphics, logo, etc of the franchisor's chain and conform, to 
its operational standards and methodology. ' 
Fees are rendered for the initial application, annual royalties, advertising and 
marketing and a variety of miscellaneous services depending on the nature of the 
business (McGuffie, 1996; Khan, 2005). Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) argue 
that franchising differs from most other types of organisational forms in three ways; 
the geographic dispersal of units, the replication across units and the joint 
ownership involved. Fulop (1999) adds that it is the nature of the integration 
between business units that differentiates business format franchising from other 
organisational forms. As this integration represents an ongoing relationship 
between the franchisor and franchisee (Contractor and Kundu, 1998a), franchising 
is frequently considered to be a collaborative alliance. However, it is also argued 
that franchising depends on cooperation amongst all of the different franchise 
5 Product tradename franchises are distribution agreements commonly employed in the automobile 
industry (Hoffman and Preble, 1991) and hence are of little relevance to this study. 
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members and therefore a franchise system is alternatively viewed as a network 
with the franchisor in a focal or hub position (Hoffman and Preble, 1991; Fladmoe- 
Lindquist, 2000). Hoffman and Preble (1991) note that the exact nature of the 
network depends on the type of franchise adopted and the type, number and 
intensity of the links within it. Empirical studies suggest that there are four main 
approaches employed in business format franchising; direct, direct investment, 
corporate and master franchising and these are defined in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10 Tvpes of Business Format Franchisina 
Type of Definition 
Franchise 
Direct The franchisor directly establishes and runs individual franchisees in a 
franchise foreign location from a domestic base. Normally the franchisor grants 
rights to individual franchisees usually on a unit-by-unit basis however, 
these agreements are frequently extended to include multiple units. 
Direct The franchisor establishes a subsidiary operation in the new market, 
investment which then grants franchises for individual units. The subsidiary could be 
franchise wholly-owned or established through a joint venture or alliance 
arrangement with another firm. 
Corporate The franchisor grants exclusive rights to a developer to develop a territory 
franchise by opening a number of franchise outlets itself. The developer is 
responsible for running the individual units. 
Master The franchisor grants to another firm, the master franchisee, the rights to 
franchise open franchises itself and to grant the rights to third parties as 'sub- 
franchisor' within a specified or exclusive territory. The master franchisee 
usually assumes responsibility for training, coordination of local 
franchisee activities, monitoring performance and implementing 
franchisor strategies. They charge local franchisees and compensate the 
franchisor for the authority they are given. 
Compiled trom the works of cjo and Christensen, 1989; Connell, 1997; Quinn, 1998; Sashi and 
Karuppur, 2002. 
As Table 2.10 identifies, the four types of franchising differ in the number of 
organisational levels between the franchisor and the franchisee and the number of 
firms involved. These differences are depicted in Figure 2.2. These different 
arrangements create different types of relationships between franchisors and 
franchisees (Price, 1997) and as a result, the risks associated with control, 
resource commitment, dissemination and flexibility are variable. These risks are 
explored below. 
39 






Level Franchisor in Franchisor in 




























































Maintaining a tightly controlled and integrated system that supports a defined 
brand name and image is deemed essential to gain competitive advantage in 
franchise systems (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2000; Eroglu, 1992). Control is frequently 
used to explain the rationale for franchising by agency theorists (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987; Lafontaine, 1992; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Dant and Nasr, 
1998; Ingram, 1998; Shane, 1998; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Quinn and 
Doherty, 2000). Agency theorists argue that there are often divergent interests 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) in organisations. 
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Managers make decisions under conditions of bounded rationality6, are 
considered self-interested and opportunistic, and therefore seek to maximise their 
own interests even at the expense of shareholders. As franchisees have a vested 
interest in the efficiency of their unit, they require less monitoring than company- 
owned units. Firms therefore adopt franchising to reduce monitoring costs that are 
inherent in international and geographically dispersed operations (Shane, 1998; 
Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1999). However, control risks cannot be completely 
eliminated as franchisees may reduce the quality of their unit to achieve cost 
savings, a process known as free riding (Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1999). As 
this has a cost to the brand and other franchisees, there is a need to control free 
riding in order to protect a franchisor's brand name and image (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 
2000). There are three main types of control available to franchisors; legal, 
administrative and economic (Hoffman and Preble, 1991) and these are defined in 
Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11 Tvnes of Control in Franchise Systems 
Type of Control Definition 
Legal Control achieved through contractual stipulations. 
Usually relates to fee structures, termination 
clauses and restrictions, territory rights and 
adherence to operating manuals. 
Administrative Operational processes used to achieve goal 
congruence between the franchisor and 
franchisee and the processes used to monitor 
adherence to those. 
Economic Franchisor has control as a result of the promise 
of economic rewards from joining the franchise 
system and through franchisee fear of losing 
upfront investment made to join the system. 
Adapted from Hoffman and Preble (1991). 
a) Legal controls 
The extent to which the contract is the main source of control in franchising has 
been the subject of a number of investigations (Feistead, 1990; Standworth, 1991; 
Stem and EI-Ansary, 1992; Fulop and Forward, 1997). Contractor and Kundu's 
(1998a) study suggests that contractual agreements have standard provisions that 
6 Bounded rationality is a term used to describe the inability of managers to predict the future when 
undertaking decisions (see for instance Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1999). 
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reduce problems of bounded rationality thereby increasing the degree of control 
for the franchisor. However, there are limitations of contractual control 
mechanisms in international franchise systems as contracts cannot be 
standardised and are more difficult to enforce due to the geographic distances 
involved (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996,2000). Empirical evidence also suggests that 
the franchise contract is only used as a control tool when there are serious 
breaches of agreement (Connell, 1997; Quinn, 1997), or when franchisors wish to 
establish structural system changes (Connell, 1997). The franchisor's willingness 
to use the contract as a source of power and thus as a control mechanism, 
therefore impacts upon the effectiveness of this mechanism (Quinn and Doherty, 
2000). These limitations apply to all types of franchise agreements. However, in 
corporate and master franchise agreements, greater involvement of franchisees in 
decision-making is reported to have shifted the balance of power towards the 
franchisee (Fulop and Forward, 1997; Connell, 1997; Quinn, 1998) thereby further 
reducing the effectiveness of contractual controls. 
b) Administrative controls 
When franchisors are unwilling to use the contract as a control mechanism, 
administrative controls, such as training, operating manuals and regular 
communication must be relied upon (Quinn, 1998; Fulop and Forward, 1997). 
Dant and Nasr (1998) conclude from their study of international franchise systems 
that communication and information sharing between franchisees and franchisors 
has a key impact on control. Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott (1999) argue that 
control in franchise systems can also be developed through effective relationship 
management, although there is no guarantee that this will be achieved in all 
franchise situations. As the effectiveness of administrative control is related to the 
geographical distances involved and the different environments of the host 
countries (Hoffman and Preble, 1991; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996; Elango and Fried, 
1997), it is considered to be a particular issue with direct franchising (Mendelsohn, 
1992; Quinn and Doherty, 2000). In direct investment franchise systems, 
however, franchisors frequently set up pilot stores in international locations to 
increase the effectiveness of administrative control procedures. In both types of 
franchising, empirical studies suggest that the need for tight administrative controls 
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are reduced through the use of multi-unit franchises as these franchisees replicate 
the franchisor's systems (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Bradach, 1998; Bercovitz, 
2002; Skalins and Mayer, 2002). However, in corporate and master franchise 
arrangements, control is devolved from the franchisor to the franchisee, potentially 
reducing the effectiveness of administrative controls for the franchisor. 
The physical distances involved in international franchise systems are also 
reported to make communication less effective for all types of franchising, thereby 
compounding the administrative control risks (Quinn, 1998). Corporate and 
master franchisees are also reported to filter franchisor communication, thus 
reducing the direct administrative control afforded to the franchisor (Ryans, Lotz 
and Krampf, 1999). Despite these risks, master franchising is reported to be the 
most popular type of international franchising (Welch, 1992; McIntyre and 
Huszagh 1995; Gonclaves and Duarte, 1994; Quinn 1998). 
c) Economic controls 
The effectiveness of contractual controls also impacts on economic controls. 
Franchisees' fear of losing their investment and their willingness to engage in free 
riding is based upon the threat of potential expulsion from the system (Hopkinson 
and Hogarth-Scott, 1999) and thus on the franchisor's willingness and ability to 
enforce the contract. Empirical studies suggest that economic control may be 
higher in multi-unit franchising. By raising reward expectations, economic control is 
increased as self-enforcing mechanisms that reduce opportunistic behaviour are 
created and the risks of free riding are reduced (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; 
Bradach, 1998; Bercovitz, 2002; Skalins and Mayer, 2002). This argument might 
equally apply to corporate and master franchise agreements, where franchisees 
also have higher potential rewards. 
Resource Commitment 
The level of resources committed by the franchisor varies between the different 
types of franchise arrangements. In direct, corporate and master franchise 
arrangements, fewer resources are required as franchisees provide both the 
financial and human capital. However, Fulop (1999) cautions that it is easy to 
underestimate the time and resources required, especially in the early stages of 
43 
development. Greater resources are committed to direct investment franchising in 
order to establish a host market base for operations. 
Risk of Dissemination 
There are risks of dissemination for franchisors within all types of business format 
franchising. These risks arguably increase with the number of firms involved in the 
system. For example, in master franchise arrangements, the franchisor faces risks 
of dissemination to both the master franchisee as well as to individual sub 
franchisees as depicted in Figure 2.2. Furthermore, the ability to control for 
dissemination contractually across international markets has been questioned. 
Flexibility 
Opinions and empirical findings on flexibility are mixed. Some researchers argue 
that all types of flexibility are increased through franchising (Sashi and Karuppur, 
2002; Hoffman and Preble, 2004). In contrast, Fulop (2000) argues that if 
franchisors have to rely on more persuasive methods of control, flexibility is 
reduced and franchise organisations become less capable of adapting to change 
than fully integrated companies. Bradach's (1995) study also suggests that there 
may be reduced levels of product flexibility in multi-unit franchising as the 
franchisee becomes more removed from the local marketplace. This argument 
can also be applied to corporate and master franchising. Connell's (1999) study of 
master franchise agreements within the international hotel industry however, 
identifies there is greater flexibility in master franchise systems as these systems 
eventually become 'attuned' to local market demands and conditions. In direct 
investment franchising, strategic flexibility may also be reduced given the 
resources committed to establish a country-level operational base. 
As with alliance and network agreements, the underlying dimensions of franchising 
are variable. Table 2.12 summarises the preceding discussion and depicts these 
differences according to the particular type of franchise system. 
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Tahle 2.12 Underlvina Risks of Different Franchise Systems 
Type of Implications of Underlying Dimensions 
Franchise 
Direct franchise " Greater risks of control through geographical distance 
between franchisor and franchisee 
" Less resources required 
" Risk of dissemination to many individual franchisees 
" Individual franchisees may be more flexible to local market 
conditions, but it may be difficult to initiate change across a 
number of widely dispersed franchisees 
Direct investment " Greater control afforded through establishment of country 
franchise level base 
" More resources required increasing investment risk 
" Risk of dissemination to many individual franchisees 
" Flexibility reduced through investment 
" May be difficult to initiate change over all individual 
franchisees 
Corporate " Control of individual units devolved to corporate franchisee. 
franchise " Fewer resources required 
" Risks of dissemination to one franchisee with multiple units, 
impact of dissemination may be greater 
" Empirical findings mixed as to degree of flexibility afforded 
Master franchise " Control devolved to master franchisees to monitor individual 
sub franchisees 
" Fewer resources required 
" Risks of dissemination to master franchisee and to many 
individual sub franchisees 
" Empirical findings mixed as to degree of flexibility afforded 
Summarising the Underlying Risks of Franchising 
Researchers have sometimes portrayed franchising as a paradox (Felstead, 1993; 
Price, 1997) where there is decentralisation of labour without authority, particularly 
in highly standardised franchised systems. In other words, franchisees actually 
have limited authority over their own operations. However, Contractor and 
Kundu's (1998a, 1998b) study identifies that franchising allows for strong control 
over codified assets, weak control over tacit expertise, and non-existent control 
over daily management and quality and physical assets. The argument presented 
above suggests that given the diversity of franchise agreements, the situation may 
be rather more complicated than either of these arguments suggest. Bradach 
(1998) reports that the variety of international franchise arrangements can add 
complexity to the structure of control systems, particularly when mixed with 
corporate ownership arrangements. In any type of international franchise system 
however, control remains a key concern to practitioners (Gonclaves and Duarte, 
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1994; Quinn, 1998) and the need for further research has been widely recognised 
(Elango and Fried, 1997; Dant and Nasr, 1998; Doherty and Quinn, 1999; Sashi 
and Karuppur, 2002). Morrison (2000) adds to the argument by suggesting that 
franchising should be viewed as a form of intrapreneurship where the degree of 
control in the system must be balanced with a degree of autonomy (and thus 
flexibility) to facilitate innovation while maintaining an appropriate degree of 
uniformity across the network. Morrison (2000) presents a conceptual argument on 
the importance of organisational policy and procedures to achieve this balance. 
The preceding discussion identifies that empirical findings on flexibility afforded 
through different franchise arrangements are mixed and a number of researchers 
argue that a better understanding of both flexibility and control can be gained 
through the application of alliance theory. 
2.4.3 Contractual Entry Modes 
Contractual arrangements between international corporations are viewed at the 
polar end of the continuum to ownership, as resources are not integrated into one 
decision-making body. Control in these arrangements is considered achievable 
predominantly through price mechanisms and other contractual stipulations 
(Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1991). The risk of control in this market entry method 
therefore is reflected in the cost of making and enforcing contracts and the fear of 
quality deterioration (Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997). Contractor and Kundu (1998b) 
conclude from their research that contractual relationships can effectively 
substitute for equity ownership when the fear of partner opportunism is reduced by 
the global company's ongoing control over key strategic assets. Two contractual 
entry modes are considered within this section, licensing arrangements and 
management contracts. 
i) Licensing 
A common contractual entry mode employed by international service firms is a 
licensing agreement (Contractor, 1981). Hollensen (2004: 311) identifies licensing 
as an arrangement whereby one firm grants another the right to produce its 
products and services using its patents, know-how, technology and trademarks in 
exchange for a fee. As the definition implies, there is a considerable similarity to 
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franchise agreements and franchising is often viewed as a form of licensing. 
Hollensen (2004) specifically identifies a lack of quality control in licensing 
arrangements. Given that the licensor shares patents, technology and other 
know-how with another firm, there is also a high risk of dissemination of firm- 
specific advantages through opportunistic behaviour of licensees. However, fewer 
resources are required in this market entry mode, potentially leaving the licensor 
with greater strategic flexibility. The use of a local firm as a licensee could also 
potentially facilitate greater product and volume flexibility to better meet local 
needs. 
ii) Management Contracts 
Another type of contractual entry mode frequently employed by service firms is a 
management agreement or contract (Price, 1997; Hollensen, 2004). Altinay 
(2001: 2) defines a management contract as a situation where, 
'a firm with an established reputation for being an excellent 
manager will grow by contracting to manage properties for an 
owner in return for a fee. ' 
Management contracting is frequently viewed in the generic management 
literature as temporary in nature, where the contracted firm will train local 
employees to manage when contracts expire (Hollensen, 2004). However, in the 
hotel industry management contracts have historically covered lengthy time 
periods and owners rarely take over the management of unit properties upon 
contract expiration. Given these fundamental differences, this section focuses on 
management contracts within the international hotel industry. Within this industry 
context, Contractor and Kundu (1 998a: 329) suggest, 
'A management service contract is a long-term agreement, of 
up to ten years or even longer, whereby the legal owners of 
the property and real estate enter into a contract with the 
hotel firm to run and operate the hotel on a day to day basis, 
usually under the latter's internationally recognized brand 
name. ' 
Put more simply, a hotel or other service firm leases its brand name while under 
contractual agreement to provide extensive technical and management support 
(Erramilli et al, 2002). In return, the management company earns a fee for these 
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services, usually expressed as a percentage of gross revenue (Contractor and 
Kundu, 1998b) and incentive payments based on performance. Under such an 
arrangement, the ultimate legal and financial responsibilities, the rights of 
ownership of the property, its furniture and equipment, its working capital, and 
ultimate profits or losses remain those of the owner (Field, 2005). The key 
contents of management agreements include pre-opening and technical 
assistance, rights and duties concerning daily operations, budgets, 
owner's/operator's costs, central services, banking, accounting and reporting, fees 
and the term of the contract and termination (Field, 2005). A perceived advantage 
of management contracts is reported to be the high degree of direct managerial 
control afforded (Connell, 1997; Contactor and Kundu, 1998a; 1998b). However, 
Contactor and Kundu (1 998a; 1 998b) report that it is control over codified strategic 
assets that is the strongest despite responsibility for quality control, daily 
management and senior staffing resting principally with the management firm. 
The authors further advise that due to the limited investment risk, there is non- 
existent control over physical assets. Risks of dissemination are also low, as 
management know-how is not shared between the management firm and the 
owner (Dev et al, 2002). 
Empirical studies suggest however, that the balance of control within management 
contracts has changed over the last three decades. Eyster's (1977,1980,1988, 
1993,1997a) series of studies on hotel management contracts in the US identify 
three factors fostering these changes; increased competition amongst operators, 
increasing sophistication of owners, asset managers and lenders, and recent 
legislative decisions in disputes between owners and management firms. These 
factors are reported to have shifted some of the control away from the 
management firm toward the owner. Eyster (1997b) reports that the biggest gains 
in decision-making for owners are within budgeting and personnel decisions 
regarding the selection of executive staff members. In addition, the studies 
identify that financial, marketing and operational reporting have become more 
defined in terms of formal written reports to owners, access to financial records 
and owner/operator meetings. The management companies are also often 
required to make an equity contribution, normally a 'sliver' commitment of between 
5% and 10% (Eyster, 1997: 23). The increased involvement of the owner in 
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decision making and the increased financial commitment by the management firm 
arguably have a negative impact on the flexibility traditionally inherent in this 
market entry mode. Nine studies that provide further empirical support of the shift 
in the balance of power towards hotel owners are depicted in Table 2.13. 
However, most of these studies have investigated US hotel management 
companies and many are based on secondary data or rather loose research 
designs. Furthermore, while these changes have been argued to have an impact 
on the control and flexibility afforded hotel management companies, there appears 
to be virtually no research conducted to date on how these changes are being 
managed. There is arguably a need to extend these research efforts to 
international firms to address these issues. 
2.4.4 An Overview of International Market Entry Modes 
This review of the market entry literature highlights the extent to which control has 
been a key research focus and is still positively associated with ownership. 
Control through hierarchical authority is generally perceived more efficient than 
that achieved through contractual mechanisms. This suggests that control and 
market entry are still frequently conceptualised along Williamson's (1975) market 
vs. hierarchy continuum, where ownership and contractual agreements are at 
polar ends, and different hybrid arrangements fall in the middle. For example, 
Price (1997) adopts a continuum perspective in his efforts to develop a taxonomy 
of hybrid organisational forms. However, the author acknowledges that his 
taxonomy is incomplete, and what is missing in terms of this research is the 
dimension of flexibility. Powell (1990) did consider the concept of flexibility in his 
award-winning article on network arrangements. He presents an argument that 
flexibility is low in hierarchies, high in markets, and medium in hybrid 
arrangements. Figure 2.3 draws these studies together and the findings from the 
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Figure 2.3 displays the inverse relationship between control and resource 
commitment to flexibility and risks of dissemination. Resource commitment 
creates switching costs for firms and this, in turn, inhibits their ability to respond to 
changing environmental demands (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Flexibility can 
therefore be maintained through lower resource commitment and less integrated 
market entry modes. This argument suggests that there may be some degree of 
trade off between hierarchical control and resource commitment against loss of 
flexibility and increased risk of dissemination within different market entry modes 
(Anderson and Gatignon; 1986; Erramilli, 1992; Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997; 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 2004). 
However, Bradach and Eccles (1989) argue that adopting a continuum perspective 
can be misleading. The authors report that there are no longer clear distinctions 
between the polar extremes as there are elements of hierarchy involved in market 
transactions and elements of market (e. g. pricing mechanisms) involved in 
hierarchical arrangements. Furthermore, they identify that trust is used as a 
control mechanism in stable, enduring hybrid relationships, a contention supported 
by Vosselman and Meer-Kooistra (2006). Similarly, Powell (1987: 81,82) also 
questions the relevance of a continuum perspective suggesting that hybrid 
arrangements occur 'neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, 
but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential and 
mutually supportive actions'. Bradach and Eccles (1989) note that firms that 
employ hybrid market entry modes use a mixture of hierarchical controls, 
contractual stipulations and administrative processes that may be combined in 
complex ways. Furthermore, trust and relational issues also play a critical role in 
governing these hybrid arrangements (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1987, 
1990; Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1990; Price, 1997). The perceived risks 
associated with international market entry modes may therefore be more 
accurately represented diagrammatically as in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 An Alternative Perspective on the Management of Market Entry 
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Figure 2.4 suggests that there may be greater or lesser degrees of hierarchy, 
contractual mechanisms and trust in different market entry arrangements to 
manage the associated risks. How these hybrid arrangements are designed 
around these mechanisms is not clear from the current literature. What also is not 
clear is how the different mechanisms for control are blended in diversely affiliated 
firms to manage the variable risks. involved. The following section therefore 
examines the management of these risks within diversely affiliated organisations. 
As Chapter One identified, the term diverse affiliations is used within this study to 
refer to firms that employ multiple market entry modes. However, other 
researchers investigating these organisational phenomena have employed 
different terms. These are considered in the following section, as are the outputs 
of their research efforts. 
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2.5 Diverse Affiliations 
A rather limited number of empirical investigations have taken place on firms that 
use multiple market entry methods. They can however, be divided into two broad 
streams. One stream has sought to explore the rationale for the use of dual 
distribution systems predominantly within firms that employ a mixture of company- 
owned and franchised units. This stream is therefore labelled the 'why' stream and 
is generally underpinned by theories of ownership redirection that adopt both 
resource scarcity and life cycle perspectives. These theories seek to explain why 
firms replace franchised units with company-owned units over the life cycle of the 
franchise system. They suggest that firms use franchising due to a scarcity of 
financial and human resources, but once these have been built up, franchisors will 
redirect market entry towards ownership and buy back franchised units. Table 2.14 
depicts the research reviewed for this study on 'why' mixed modes are utilised. 
This table also identifies that findings on ownership redirection are mixed and this 
is often attributed to different industry sectors or the research approach adopted 
(Dant, Kauffman and Paswan, 1992; Dant, Paswan and Stanworth, 1996; 
Kauffman and Dant, 1996). As the table identifies, much of the research has 
examined a mixture of industries, including the hotel industry, using a quantitative 
research approach. 
A number of the studies included in Table 2.14 also provide evidence of 
'synergistic benefits' afforded firms that employ these particular mixed modes (La 
Fontaine and Kauffman, 1994; Sen, 1998). Dant et al (1992) also note these 
synergistic benefits from their review of the literature. 'How' these organisations 
are managed so that these benefits materialise forms the basis of the second 
stream of research depicted in Table 2.15. This stream appears to have begun 
with the work of Bradach and Eccles (1989) who sought to develop an 
understanding of how price, authority and trust are used as control mechanisms in 
hybrid organisational forms. The authors introduced the concept of the plural 
organisation that they define as 'an arrangement where distinct organizational 
control mechanisms are operated simultaneously for the same function by the 
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Bradach (1995) subsequently investigated plural organisations for his doctoral 
thesis with further publications of his research in both 1997 and 1998. Bradach 
(1997: 374) revised the definition of a plural organisation to 'an organizational form 
which mixes a hybrid price/authority mechanism, usual in franchising, and a strictly 
hierarchical mechanism, related only to authority. Bradach's (1995) research 
investigated organisational structure and processes used within restaurant chains 
that comprised both franchised and company-owned units. Specifically, he 
examined the different processes used for each type of affiliation to achieve four 
organisational goals; unit growth, uniformity, systemwide adaptation and local 
responsiveness. These organisation goals therefore reflect the restaurant chains' 
management of the risks associated with control and flexibility. 
Bradach (1995,1997,1998) identified that the chains in his study use one set of 
organisational processes within franchised divisions and a different set within 
company-owned units. The author reports that using these two distinct sets of 
processes gives rise to a third or 'plural' organisation process that creates 
synergistic benefits for the firm and better enables them to achieve their goals. 
These different organisational structures and processes are depicted in Table 
2.16. 
Table 2.16 Orqanisation Structure and Processes in Plural Organisations 
Key Attribute Company Plural-form 
process 
Franchise 
Structure Hierarchy Modellin Federation of 
process mini-hierarchies 







Career paths Ascend hierarchy Socialisation Business builders 
and small 
business owners 






(Bradach, 1997: 283) 
As Table 2.16 identifies Bradach (1995,1997,1998) argues that four plural-form 
processes; modelling, ratcheting, socialisation and mutual learning, are created by 
linking the distinct processes for each organisational arrangement. Bradach (1995) 
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explains that modelling takes place when individual franchisees become multi-unit 
owners. As they grow through this method they create organisation structures 
modelled on those of the company-owned units, thus increasing the degree of 
control for the franchisor. Control is also enhanced through a ratcheting process. 
Ratcheting occurs when an element of competition is introduced to the different 
organisational forms and they try to outdo the other in financial and quality 
performance measures. Control through socialisation is achieved when members 
of one organisational form alter their career path to the other form. In the study 
franchisees became area managers for the company-owned units and company 
personnel became franchisees. Greater flexibility was reportedly achieved 
through drawing on the local expertise of franchisees to identify new product and 
service initiatives, but these were then tested centrally. As a result, these dual 
processes give rise to mutual learning that creates a higher degree of flexibility, 
but ensures that only viable concepts are introduced. Bradach (1995) concludes 
from his research that the plural form is best suited for firms to achieve greater 
degrees of both control and flexibility and thus overall organisational goals. 
Building on Bradach's (1995) framework, Cliquet (2000) and Cliquet and Croizean 
(2002) investigated plural forms in hotel, bakery and cosmetic firms in France. 
Their research sought to identify the advantages of plural store networks. While 
their research identifies a number of limitations of Bradach's (1998) study, it does 
support the advantages of 'plural organisational forms in managing the risks 
associated with control and flexibility. However, Cliquet and Croizean (2002) also 
highlight potential limitations to be problems associated with complexity, conflict 
and the difficulty in actually reconciling the different organisational processes 
employed. 
As this review suggests, the research to date on the management of 
organisational forms created through the use of multiple market entry modes is 
somewhat limited. In addition, the studies conducted have investigated 
organisations that employed only two different market entry modes in domestic 
markets. There is a distinct gap in the literature on the management of more 
diversely affiliated international organisations. Nevertheless these studies serve 
to highlight the relevance of organisation structures and processes to develop an 
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understanding of the management of control and flexibility within firms that are 
diversely affiliated with their portfolios. Further research that investigates multiple 
market entry modes within an international context could therefore contribute to 
the understanding of these complex organisational forms. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter sought to identify the types of risks faced by service firms that employ 
multiple international market entry methods. Understanding these risks is 
fundamental to understanding 'how' they might be managed in the organisational 
forms created through ownership, hybrid and contractual market entry modes. 
Ownership modes are perceived to yield the strongest degree of control and this 
can be managed through the creation of a hierarchy of authority. However, 
ownership does require greater resource commitment that can limit the strategic 
and product flexibility afforded. In contrast, contractual agreements have been 
determined to yield higher levels of strategic, product and volume flexibility, but 
can limit the degree and type of control afforded as pricing and other contractual 
stipulations are not deemed as effective as hierarchical mechanisms. Within 
hybrid arrangements however, the degrees of control and flexibility afforded are 
variable and dependent on the particular type of agreement formed. A 
classification scheme has been developed for both alliances and franchise 
agreements to depict the variability of these risks in these hybrid arrangements. 
The literature suggests that control in hybrid agreements can be managed through 
an unspecified mixture of hierarchical mechanisms, contractual mechanisms and 
trust. 'How' flexibility is managed in all three types of organisational arrangements 
remains unclear from the international market entry literature and there is clearly a 
need for further research to fill these knowledge gaps. 
This chapter presents an argument that firms that employ mixed market entry 
modes therefore face variable risks. They must balance the different levels of 
control achieved through hierarchy, contractual stipulations and trust across the 
diverse affiliations created against the flexibility required to operate in different 
national markets. Empirical studies conducted on plural organisations suggest 
that high levels of both control and flexibility can be achieved through the use of 
distinct organisational designs comprising both structure and process for the 
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different market entry modes employed. However, these studies also identify 
limitations of these mixed designs. This review has emphasised the need to 
understand organisation designs, including structure and processes employed 
within diverse affiliations in order to develop an understanding of how the variable 
risks are managed. The following chapter therefore explores the concept of 
organisation design within diversely affiliated organisations that operate both 
within and across organisational boundaries. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. ORGANISATION DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the need to manage the variable risks associated 
with different market entry methods in diverse affiliations. This chapter identifies 
how these risks might be managed through organisation design. It begins by 
providing an overview of organisational theories that led to current perspectives on 
organisation design. It then draws on the design and alliance literature? to identify 
the dimensions of organisational and inter-organisational design. Current 
perspectives on organisational design within dynamic international business 
environments are then examined. The chapter summary identifies eight research 
propositions drawn from the literature review that are used to frame the research 
investigation. 
3.2 Perspectives on Organisation Design 
Although writers on organisations can be traced back for thousands of years 
(Mullins, 1999), the 
. 
last century witnessed substantial contribution to our 
understanding of how organisations work. Organisations have been likened to 
machines, organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, flux and 
transformation, and instruments of domination (Morgan, 1986). They have been 
investigated by management theorists, organisation theorists, organisational 
behaviourists, strategists, economists, sociologists, social psychologists, and 
anthropologists. They have been analysed at the macro level through 
investigations of whole organisations and at the micro level through investigations 
of group or individual behaviour (Pugh and Hickson; 1990; Daft and Steers, 1986). 
These research efforts have predominantly sought to explore problems of 
efficiency and effectiveness and have shaped our current understanding of 
organisation design and management (Silverman, 1978). A number of theories to 
investigate, analyse and explain organisations have been developed by 
organisation theorists. Galbraith (1977) proposes that these can be classified 
Both of these streams of literature encorporate strategic management, marketing and economic 
perspectives. 
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according to three main schools of thought; the classical school of management, 
the information processing school and the human relations school. The classical 
school includes the works and theoretical contributions of early theorists including 
Fayol, Urwick and Weber (Parker and Ritson, 2005). The information processing 
school was developed through studies such as those of Simon, March, Cyert, and 
Crozier (Pugh and Hickson, 1990). According to Ouchi and Price (1978) the 
human relations school was shaped most prominently by the studies of Mayo, 
Argyris, McGregor and Likert. 
The principle difference between these three schools is how organisations are 
viewed. The classical school considers organisations as inanimate entities 
consisting of clearly defined divisions of labour, and hierarchical lines of authority 
(Louadi, 1998; Parker and Ritson, 2005). The information processing school views 
organisations predominantly as a series of decision-making and information 
sharing processes (Galbraith, 1977; Curado, 2006). As its name suggests, the 
human relations school depicts organisations as the set of relationships between 
groups of organisational members and considers how the interactions amongst 
actors and organisational goals affects decisions in a firm (Ouchi and Price, 1978; 
Augier and Knudsen, 2004). These different schools therefore seek to explain 
organisations in terms of how activities are structured, through relevant 
organisational processes or through the behaviour of organisational members. 
Individually each of these schools provides a partial explanation of why different 
organisations adopt different forms (Silverman, 1978). Taken together however, 
they provide a more comprehensive picture of organisation design and its 
dimensions. 
3.3 Dimensions of Organisation Design 
Drawing on all three schools, Galbraith (1977: 5) defines organisation design as 
'the search for coherence or fit between strategy, organising modes for 
coordinating subtasks and integrating individuals'. He adds the purpose of design 
is to bring about 'coherence between organisational goals, the patterns of division 
of labour and interunit coordination and the people who do the work' (p5). 
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Similarly, Child and McGrath (2001: 1136) suggest that organisational designs are 
essential to three sets of activities: 
1. identifying and disseminating collective aims of the organisation, 
2. regulating the flow of resources into and out of the organisation and 
3. identifying and governing duties and rights, as well as functions and roles, of 
members of the organisation. 
Newman (1973: xi) adds that the starting point in design is the identification of 
objectives and reports that, 
'organization design is more than the design of the pattern of 
positions and functions often described as the 'organization 
structure'; it is the design of the organizational processes of 
work............ whose features are as structural in their 
implications as those more usually recognized in the 
organization chart. ' 
Organisation designs therefore comprise both organisation structure and 
organisational processes. Gordon (1996: 565) advises that 'structure refers to the 
delineation of jobs and reporting relationships' in an organisation. The function of 
structure is to influence and coordinate the work behaviour of organisational 
members in accomplishing the organisation's goals. Blau (1974: 12) argues that 
structure also influences the role relations between organisational positions and 
therefore acts as a skeletal framework for organisation behaviour (Luthens, 1992). 
Other researchers also liken organisation structure to a framework within which 
organisational processes for control, decision making and communication operate 
(Newman, 1973; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Hall, 1991). The importance of these 
processes and their reflection of how international organisations actually work is 
increasingly recognised in the literature (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Malnight, 
2001; Child and McGrath, 2001). There are three reasons given to explain this 
occurrence. Newman (1973) argues that as 'knowledge' becomes a more 
important resource for firms, organisation processes become a more relevant 
dimension of design. The growing prevalence of inter-firm arrangements is also 
cited as a key reason (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin 
and Priem, 1995). The final reason for this contention is the recognition of the 
relevance of the informal organisation. Galbraith (1977) suggests that the informal 
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organisation represents the processes through which the organisation 
accomplishes most of its work despite the formally designed structure. Hastings 
(1996) reports it reflects the soft or personal networking amongst organisational 
members. Kutschker and Baurle (1996) argue this reflects the deep structure, 
which is represented by values, beliefs and attitudes and by informal relationships. 
Hall (1991) argues that the informal organisation represents the unwritten norms 
and standards within organisations and that these can be just as binding as written 
rules and regulations. However, Child and McGrath (2001) caution that informal 
organisations are only effective given the right conditions. 
Understanding how organisations are designed and managed therefore requires 
an understanding of organisation structure, and both formal and informal 
organisation processes. Formal organisation structures depict how work is divided, 
the resources input and the allocation of these according to the classical school of 
management. Organisational processes are those that are used to process 
information and make decisions to achieve organisational goals according to the 
information processing school. Both formal and informal structures impact upon 
the behaviour of people within the organisation according to the human relations 
school. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989: 201) suggest that the formal structure defines 
an organisation's basic anatomy; the system of information flows shapes its 
physiology, and its culture and values, the organisation's psychology. Table 3.1 
below depicts these key dimensions in relation to the three schools of design. 
Table 3.1 Dimensions of Oraanisation Desian 
Dimension of Likened To Definition Representative Of 
Design 
Organisation Anatomy How work is divided, Classical School of 
Structure resources input and Management 
allocation of these 
Formal & Physiology Information processing Information 
Informal procedures and decision- Processing School 
Organisational making processes 
Processes 
Organisation Psychology Behaviour of people within Human Relations 
Culture and organisations School 
Values 
c: ompea from the worK of Newman, 1973; Galbraith, 1977; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Martinez 
and Jarillo, 1991; Hall, 1991. 
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Newman (1973) argues that one of the purposes of organisation design is to 
achieve as much reinforcement as possible between the three features of 
structure, process and people in order to achieve organisational goals. In order to 
understand how this reinforcement occurs, it is important to understand the 
interaction between the different dimensions of organisation design. 
3.3.1 Organisation Structure 
Three commonly applied dimensions of organisation structure are complexity, 
formalisation and centralisation (Olsen, 1989; Calori et al, 1994; Pugh and 
Hickson, 1990; Ozsomer, Calantone & Benedetto, 1997). Hall (1991) suggests 
that complexity concerns three types of differentiation within the firm. Horizontal 
differentiation reflects the degree of divisionalisation or specialisation within a firm, 
vertical differentiation, the number of hierarchical levels, and spatial differentiation, 
the degree to which physical facilities are geographically dispersed. As such, 
large and diversified international corporations are more complex than small, 
single unit firms. The higher the level of differentiation within a firm, the greater the 
need to integrate physical, financial, human, and know-how resources across 
divisions in order to achieve desired goals (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; 
Kutschker and Baurle, 1997). Kimura and Mourdoukoutas (2000) add that know- 
how comprises both technology and market knowledge. 
Formalisation8 refers to how jobs are standardised and specified in written rules 
and procedures (Hall, 1991; Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Zhiang, 1999). According 
to Daft and Steers (1986) the greater the amount of written and formal 
documentation concerning regulations, job descriptions and policy manuals, the 
more formalised the organisation. Formalisation represents the desired set of 
relationships a firm wants to maintain. As such, Child and McGrath (2001) argue 
that as the size of an organisation grows so too does the extent of formalisation. 
Daft and Steers (1986) advise that formalisation enhances organisational control 
across geographical distances and national boundaries. Calori et al (1994) add 
8 Early studies focused on formalisation and standardisation as distinct variables in organisation 
design, but these dimensions have be found to be closely related (Child, 1973) and thus are 
treated as one dimension in this study. 
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that formalisation is a means of controlling behaviour through the reliance on 
procedures and records to limit discretion. 
Centralisation has two key aspects; the hierarchy of authority and degree of 
participation in decision-making procedures (Louadi, 1998; Abernathy, Bowens 
and van Lent, 2004). Accordingly, Martinez and Jarillo (1989: 491) report that 
centralisation determines whether the locus of decision-making authority lies in 
higher or lower levels of the chain of command. If most decision-making is 
undertaken at the corporate level, it is centralised and thus the role of subsidiaries 
is reduced. Hall (1991) cautions however, that if decisions are made at subsidiary 
level, but they are programmed, then the organisation is still considered to be 
centralised. Calori et al (1994) suggest that centralisation is a key dimension of 
control strategies and Louadi (1998: 74) notes that it refers to the 'distribution of 
power within organizations'. Centralisation is noted as one of the most important 
design choices in international and divisionalised firms where a balance is sought 
between centralised control and sufficient autonomy for local managers 
(Flamholtz, 1996; Kidger, 2002; Abernathy et al, 2004). 
Organisation theorists have long argued that structure is developed as a response 
to the desire for control (Flamholtz, 1996). Formalisation and centralisation are 
reported to be key dimensions of organisational control strategies (Child, 1973; 
Calori et al, 1994). Flamholtz (1996) adds that complexity also influences the 
design of control procedures as these need to be developed in accordance with 
the degree of vertical or horizontal integration required (Calori et al, 1994; 
Birnberg, 1998). However, Ouchi (1977) advises that organisation structure and 
organisation control are not always clearly distinguished from each other in the 
literature. On the basis of his research, he argues that a better understanding of 
control can be gained when it is viewed as a process rather than as an attribute of 
structure. The following section therefore explores organisational processes that 
underpin structural frameworks. 
3.3.2 Organisation Processes 
Although influenced by formal structures, organisational processes are 
increasingly recognised as important dimensions of design in international firms, 
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particularly by researchers within the process school. This section therefore 
identifies the organisational processes that constitute further dimensions of design. 
It begins by exploring organisational processes for control and coordination, and 
then those for decision-making and communication. 
i) Organisation Processes for Control and Coordination 
One of the most prolific writers on organisational control is Ouchi who suggests 
that it is a 'process of monitoring, evaluating, and providing feedback' (Ouchi, 
978: 174). His early work on spans of control led him to conclude that 
`organizational control is a multidimensional phenomenon' (Ouchi and Dowling, 
1974: 364). Drawing on transaction cost analysis, Ouch! (1979,1980) identifies 
different mechanisms for control on the basis of whether firms operate within 
market, bureaucratic or clan organisations. Market and bureaucratic forms are 
explained as within the market entry literature. The tools used for control are price 
and hierarchy of authority respectively. In hierarchies, rules and role status that 
legitimise authority are required to maintain control. 
Clan control on the other hand, relies on socialisation into organisational culture 
that serves to produce a strong sense of community (Ouch!, 1980). Organisation 
culture is defined as 'the sum total of the learned behaviour traits, beliefs and 
characteristics of the members of a particular organization' (Grieves, 2000: 367). 
Control is achieved as clan members act according to these beliefs and therefore 
in ways that best serve the interest of the community. Ouchi (1979: 840) argues 
that none of. these three forms of control are perfect and 'real organizations will 
contain some of the features of each'. This argument is consistent with that of 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) identified in the previous chapter. 
Recognising control as a multi-dimensional concept, researchers have sought to 
develop more comprehensive definitions. For instance, Flamholtz (1996: 597) 
defines control as the process of 'controlling or influencing the behaviour of people 
as members of a formal organization to increase the probability that they will 
achieve organizational goals. ' He reports that the four functions of control are to: 
1. motivate people to make decisions and take actions consistent with 
organisational objectives; 
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2. integrate efforts of different parts of the organisation; 
3. provide information about organisational results and 
4. facilitate the implementation of strategic plans. 
These four functions can be achieved through two types of control; behaviour9 and 
outcome control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ouchi 1979; Martinez and Jarillo, 
1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Das, 1993; Chang and Taylor, 1999). 
Behaviour control relates to 'surveillance over the manager's decisions and 
actions that are expected to produce the hoped-for end results' (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991: 295). Output control concerns assessment against end results 
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991) and is sometimes referred to as impersonal 
control (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989, Harzing, 1999). Outcome control mechanisms 
include the processes and tools employed to set budgets, allocate resources and 
determine quality, and the reporting procedures to monitor performance against 
targets set (Daft and Steers, 1986; Chang and Taylor, 1999; Cardinal, Sitkin and 
Long, 2004). Behaviour control mechanisms include direct supervision, training 
and job descriptions, standard operating procedures and formalised policies and 
the processes used to ensure adherence to these (Das, 1993; Cardinal et al, 
2004). As such they also depict the level of formalisation within organisations 
(Hall, 1991). The utility of a behavioural control classification has been questioned 
on the basis that all control mechanisms are aimed at changing behaviour (see for 
instance Harzing, 1999). Nonetheless, researchers investigating both 
organisational and inter-organisational control continue to use these categories 
and they are therefore considered appropriate for this study. Both approaches to 
control are deemed important and Ouchi and Maguire (1975) advise that they 
should not be used as substitutes for each other. However, within hierarchical 
organisations, limitations have been identified for both types of control. 
Ouchi's (1978) investigation of control in department stores suggests that 
behavioural control is not easily transmitted through hierarchical layers. Das 
(1993) observes it can actually produce dysfunctional behaviour such as 
resistance (rule avoiding) or bureaucratic behaviour (rigid rule observance). 
9 Ouchi (1979) adds a third approach, that of ceremonial control. This is another form of 
behavioural control that the author argues is only found in clan type arrangements. 
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Chang and Taylor's (1999) study of Korean subsidiaries provides support for the 
argument that behavioural control is less effective in multinationals due to cultural 
differences. In hierarchies, employees are reported to furnish incorrect data on 
outcome control measure that can be lost through transmission up organisational 
layers (Ouchi, 1978; Das, 1993) or across national boundaries. Most organisations 
therefore use a combination of these techniques. However, there is growing 
recognition that they should be integrated in a systematic way to be most effective 
(Flamholtz, 1996; Kimura and Mourdoukoutas, 2000; Birnberg, 2001). Kimura and 
Mourdoukoutas (2000: 44) suggest that management control systems 'refer to the 
deployment of various techniques in order to monitor and measure employee 
performance against certain management targets. ' Flamholtz (1996: 598) however, 
advises that a series of ad hoc techniques does not necessarily constitute a 
management control system, rather an organisational control system, 
'comprises a set of mechanisms- both processes and 
techniques- which are designed to increase the probability 
that people will behave in ways that lead to the attainment of 
organizational objectives. ' 
The author also argues that control systems are not easily observed because they 
tend to comprise a complex set of ongoing organisational processes at three 
levels; a core control system, the organisational structure and organisational 
culture. The core system includes the organisational processes for planning, 
operations, measurement and feedback incorporating both outcome and 
behavioural control. In this system, objective setting defines the standards that are 
used to motivate behaviour and subsequent measurement and reward systems 
(Flamholtz, 1996). Das (1993) notes that most control systems are based on this 
framework despite the potential for dysfunctional behaviour. Flamholtz (1996) 
argues therefore that organisational culture must be the starting point for the 
design of control systems. Organisation culture influences the structure adopted 
which then influences the processes that underpin that structure. Flamholtz (1996) 
therefore adopts Ouchi's (1978) argument that culture can influence acceptable 
behaviour and adherence to organisational procedures. 
Simons (2000) also highlights the role of organisation culture within his control 
systems framework. This framework incorporates diagnostic control systems, 
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boundary control systems, interactive systems and belief systems. Diagnostic 
control systems are reported to be conventional systems to measure and monitor 
employee performance. Kimura and Mourdoukoutas (2000) argue however, that 
diagnostic processes can act as a deterrent to employee productivity and 
creativity. Boundary systems, on the other hand, are more generalised guidelines 
that set the parameters within which employees can act. They therefore 
encourage employee initiative within clearly defined boundaries. However, Hall 
(1991) argues this approach still facilitates a high degree of centralisation. 
Interactive control systems are management processes that supplement boundary 
systems and allow employees to interact. These systems are made up of more 
informal methods and Kimura and Mourdoukoutas (2000: 45) argue that these can 
be further reinforced by a 'system of beliefs and values'. This last system 
therefore reflects an organisation's culture (Buono, Bowditch and Lewis, 1985; 
Schraeder and Self, 2003). 
There is clearly a good deal of similarity between these two systems. As Kimura 
and Mourdoukoutas (2004) point out, the different component parts within both 
control systems can be distinguished by degrees of formality. For instance, within 
the core or diagnostic systems identified above, formal mechanisms are used for 
output and behavioural control purposes. However, organisation culture and 
interactive and belief systems comprise more informal methods. These informal 
mechanisms are considered by a number of researchers to be coordination rather 
than control processes (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991). 
Coordination Processes 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) argue that a richer and more detailed 
understanding of how international firms are managed emerged when researchers 
started to investigate linkages between the design of control systems and informal 
coordination. Not all researchers make this distinction between control and 
coordination but Zhiang (1999) reasons that whilst the concepts are different, they 
are not mutually exclusive. Coordination processes are required to integrate 
different organisational divisions. Integration was introduced in the last chapter 
but is reviewed again here in relation to organisation design. 
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Barki and Pinsonneault (2005: 166) define organisational integration as the 'extent 
to which distinct and interdependent organizational components constitute a 
unified whole'. Kobrin (1991) reports that from an organisation design perspective, 
integration is the flow of resources between parents and subsidiaries and between 
different subsidiaries. Kutschker and Baurle (1997) elaborate on the preceding 
definition and suggest resources, people and organisational culture all require 
integration and this demands a certain level of organisational flexibility. Kutschker 
and Baurle (1996) argue that it is a firm's coordination strategies that determine 
the way in which dispersed activities are integrated across international borders 
and subsidiary divisions. Martinez and Jarillo (1991) also found from their study of 
Spanish manufacturing subsidiaries that the level of integration correlates with the 
degree of co-ordinated activities. Himmelman (1996: 27) defines coordination as 
'exchanging information and altering activities for mutual benefit and to achieve a 
common purpose. ' While this definition is remarkably similar to that of integration, 
Sadler (1994: 149) argues there is a subtle difference between the two concepts. 
He reports that integration is a more diffused process than coordination as it has 
more to do with states of minds and attitude than with concrete activities and 
behaviours and therefore is the 'process of building a seamless organisation'. 
Control, coordination and integration are therefore three distinct but inter-related 
concepts. Harzing (1999) sums up the distinction between the first two concepts 
quite succinctly. She advises that 'control is a means to achieve an end called 
coordination, which in turn leads towards the achievement of common 
organisation goals' (p 9). By the same principle, integration is argued to be a 
means to achieve an organisation's goals, but one that includes the attitudes of 
organisational members. 
Coordination challenges become greater within complex organisations with high 
degrees of vertical, horizontal and geographical differentiation (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1969; Galbraith, 1977; Porter, 1986). Cultural diversity, linguistic 
differences and conflicting demands of different host governments also create 
coordination challenges (Gupta and Govindarajan; 1991). Martinez and Jarillo 
(1989: 490) suggest coordination mechanisms can be differentiated by degree of 
formality. The researchers identify the following coordination mechanisms by 
decreasing degree of formality: 
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1. lateral or cross-departmental relations: direct managerial contact, temporary 
or permanent teams, task forces, committees, integrators and integrative 
departments. 
2. informal communication: personal contacts among managers, management 
trips, meetings, conferences, transfer of managers. 
3. socialisation: building an organisational culture of known and shared 
strategic objectives and values by training, transfer of managers, 
measurement and reward systems. 
Determining Appropriate Control and Coordination Processes 
The preceding discussion has thus far presented an argument for the use of 
organisation control systems that comprise different mechanisms to control and 
coordinate activities that vary according to degree of formality. What it has not yet 
considered is which types of mechanisms are appropriate for organisations to 
employ and under which conditions. The suitability of different control and 
coordination mechanisms for different organisations has been considered by a 
number of authors (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Birnberg, 1998; Harzing, 1999; 
Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005). Within international firms however, research 
studies investigating the impact of environmental and firm specific characteristics 
have yielded mixed results (Harzing, 1999). However, there has been greater 
consistency in findings on interdependence and MNC control'°. The concept of 
interdependence was introduced in Chapter Two in relation to alliances and 
networks, but it was originally applied to subunits of a single organisation 
(Thompson, 1967). Martinez and Jarillo (1991) found in their study that as the 
degree of differentiation increases within firms, particularly horizontally, informal 
coordination processes are required in addition to formal control procedures. The 
relationship between interdependence and types of coordination and control is 
supported by a number of studies (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Grandori, 
1997a, 1997b; Barki and Pinsonneault, 2005). Thompson's (1967) model of 
interdependence is used In Table 3.2 to present the control and coordination 
processes identified as appropriate through previous empirical research. 
10 Harzing's (1999) study of control and MNC's identified a strong relationship between 
interdependence and control through bivariate analysis but the relationship was much weaker 
through multivariate analysis. 
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i aale s. z Interclepence nce, control and Coordination 
Type & Degree of 
Interdependence 
Definition Control and Coordination 
Mechanisms Deemed 
Appropriate 
Pooled: Each organisation makes a Able to rely on more formal 
Lowest discrete contribution to the processes such as: 
output of the alliance, but these . Clearly defined rules 
are not directly connected. . Standardisation of skills, Interdependence is pooled as knowledge and norms 
each organisation is supported . Standard operating in some way by the alliance and procedures 
may be threatened by the . Direct supervision failure of any of its member . Monitoring adherence to the firms. 
processes and rules 
" Low levels of vertical 
communication are deemed 
sufficient 
Sequential: Each organisation makes a Requires the formal control 
Medium successive contribution to the processes identified above plus: development of a product or . More formalised planning 
service as in vertical alliances. 0 SchMrii Jinn of nrnrii jminn 
activities 
" Scheduled meetings 
" Standardised output 
" Formal and informal 
communication that 
facilitates feedback to 
different organisation units 
Reciprocal: Different organisational units Requires the formal control 
Highest contribute and interact in a processes identified above plus: 
number of ways to contribute to Coordinating mechanisms of the output. cooperation and mutual 
adjustment 
" Horizontal (lateral) 
communication 
" When horizontal integration 
is required, more informal 
processes for communication 
and corporate socialisation 
become important 
l-, urnpueu lruri, 1 lwilipbuu, iaof; martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Barki 
and Pinsonneault, 2005. 
Table 3.2 identifies that as the degree of interdependence becomes greater, more 
control and coordination processes are required to effectively integrate 
organisational divisions. However, Gittel's (2000) investigation into two American 
airlines reveals control procedures can serve either to enhance or undermine 
coordination processes within firms. Similarly, Cardinal et al's, (2004) longitudinal 
study of a moving firm highlights the need for balance between formal and informal 
mechanisms within control systems. Their study identifies that control systems 
evolve through the life of a firm and are subject to periods of imbalance if there is 
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an over reliance on either formal or informal mechanisms. As this imbalance can 
impact on organisational performance, the researchers recommend that balance 
must be sought through adding, subtracting, substituting or reactivating control 
mechanisms whenever an imbalance is achieved. This review suggests that 
control and coordination processes are closely interlinked within organisation 
design and as a result, they need to be developed or rebalanced in accordance 
with each other in a comprehensive control system. Control and coordination 
processes are also interlinked with those for decision making and communication 
and these are considered in the following section. 
ii) Organisation Process for Decision Making and Communication 
The impact of control and coordination on decision-making processes is well 
recognised in the literature (Galbraith, 1977; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991). Calori et al (1994) advise that formal control can even be 
measured through decision-making processes. They suggest that an 
understanding of the extent to which consensus is reached in decision making is 
important to develop an understanding of organisational control. Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989) identify three necessary and closely interrelated tasks for effective 
decision making: 
1. ensuring relevant data are brought to bear on key decisions, 
2. creating the conditions for consensus among managers and 
3. managing relative power among managers. 
The authors argue therefore that careful consideration must be given to the 
appropriate processes for data, people and conflict management. Data 
management includes information systems, resource allocation procedures, 
strategic planning, budgeting processes and measurement systems. These 
processes bear a striking resemblance to outcome control processes identified 
above. Decision-making processes are thus reliant on the flow of information 
through organisations and therefore on a firm's communication practices. 
Gordon (1996) advises that communication processes can be can be classified 
according to a number of different characteristics. In the first instance, they can be 
formal or informal. Formal processes make use of established scheduled 
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channels, such as the budgeting process. Informal processes are considered to 
be more spontaneous and take place without regard for the formal channels. As 
such they are reflective of the informal organisation. Communication can also be 
characterised by its direction and whether it is downward, upward or lateral, and 
whether it is one-way or interactive. Gordon (1996) suggests that coordination 
mechanisms such as specific boundary-spanning roles can facilitate interactive 
lateral communication. Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) identify one further 
characteristic of communication as its intensity along three dimensions; frequency, 
informality and openness, and density or the number of people who interact. 
These different dimensions are depicted in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Characteristics of Orcianisatinn Cornmunir_atinn Prncpccpc 
Characteristic Scope/Direction 
Degree of Formality Formal or informal 
Direction Upward, downward or lateral 
(horizontal) 
Direction One way or interactive 
Intensity Frequency, openness and density 
L; ompuea from the works OT iupta ana ciovindarajan, 1991 and Gordon, 1996. 
Given these different characteristics, Gordon (1996: 275) argues that it is important 
to understand the whole of a communication network including 'patterns of both 
formal and informal communication'. Communication patterns are regarded as a 
major determinant of an organisation's effectiveness in creating and diffusing 
innovation (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). Martinez 
and Jarillo (1989) report that interactive communication practices help to create 
conditions for consensus amongst managers to enable effective decision making 
to take place. Luthens (1992) adds that interactive communication serves to aid 
task coordination, problem solving, information sharing and conflict resolution. 
However, there are a number of barriers to effective communication identified in 
the literature. Gordon (1996) reports that organisation structures and 
centralisation are commonly seen as communication barriers. Other barriers 
identified by the author include perceptual and attribution biases, interpersonal 
relationships, physical distance and cultural differences. Marschan, Welch and 
Welch (1997) add that language can be an impediment to effective 
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communication. All of these barriers arguably have greater resonance with 
international firms. 
Birnberg (1998) suggests that degree of interdependency in firms is positively 
correlated to communication requirements and the complexity of decision-making. 
It was identified in Table 3.2 that there is a greater need for more coordination 
processes with higher degrees of interdependency. Ghoshal, Korine and 
Szulanski (1994) found from their research that interpersonal relationships 
developed through lateral coordination processes such as work teams and 
taskforces have significant positive effects on the frequency of both subsidiary- 
headquarters and inter-subsidiary communication. Lindsay et al (2003) also 
identify the importance of interpersonal relationships and communication in their 
study of international service firms. Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) report that 
coordination can be measured by the informal communication practices of the firm 
and through the cooperation between members or units. Harzing (1999) also 
identifies the positive influence of coordination mechanisms on communication 
amongst organisational members. Birnberg (1998) advises however, that control 
processes also need to reinforce cooperation rather than self-interested behaviour, 
an argument consistent with that of Gittel (2000). 
Hall (1991) argues that the coordination mechanism of socialisation can help 
reduce communication problems within organisations. Personal behaviour is at 
the core of socialisation processes (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1997; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991) and what is deemed acceptable 
behaviour is learned and internalised by individuals thereby obviating the need for 
formalised control procedures (Edstrom & Galbraith, 1997). Socialisation is 
perpetuated mainly through management transfers as a socialising process and as 
a verbal information network (Gannon and Johnson, 1997). It encourages the 
development of personal networks, or informal links between individuals 
developed for commercial, social or communication purposes (O'Donnell et al, 
2001). In this way coordination is achieved through the development of shared 
values amongst differentiated organisations. Communication is therefore at the 
heart of socialisation and this in turn is reported to enhance decision-making and 
to manage relative power amongst organisational members. This discussion 
76 
therefore serves to highlight the inter-related nature of the requirements for 
effective decision-making identified by Martinez and Jarillo (1991) as well as the 
inter-related nature of organisational processes. 
Summary of Dimensions of Organisation Design 
Organisation designs are comprised of structural elements and formal and 
informal organisational processes. Control appears to be a dominant dimension of 
design, influencing both structure and process. Formal structures create a 
framework that impacts on organisational processes developed to achieve 
coordination and control. These processes in turn impact upon organisational 
decision-making and communication. These dimensions can be influenced by the 
organisation culture that can also serve as a control mechanism. The literature 
highlights the importance of developing organisational processes that are mutually 
supportive. Figure 3.1 depicts these dimensions of organisation design and how 
they inter-relate. The following section considers the relevance of these 

























































































































3.4 Dimensions of Inter-Organisational Design 
Despite the proliferation of research on inter-firm alliances and inter-organisational 
relationships, there has been rather limited attention paid to the specifics of inter- 
organisational design (Grandori, 1997a). Speckman et al (1998: 747) report a 
distinct research gap in the understanding of 'the practice of alliance 
management'. Dekker (2004) argues more specifically that there is comparatively 
little research into the actual structuring, management and control of inter-firm 
agreements and reports that research efforts to date focus on three interrelated 
issues: 
1. motivation for formation, 
2. choice of governance structure and 
3. effectiveness and performance. 
In order to identify the dimensions of design within inter-firm alliances, the 
following discussion draws predominantly on the research studies relating to 
governance structure and effectiveness and performance. It begins with an 
investigation of inter-organisational structure before examining inter-firm 
processes for control and coordination, decision-making and communication. 
3.4.1 Inter-Organisational Structure 
The structural dimensions of complexity, formalisation and centralisation are also 
deemed important in inter-organisational design (Provan and Skinner, 1994) yet 
they are reported to have received limited attention (Kauser and Shaw, 2004). 
The wide variety of inter-firm arrangements may explain this lack of attention as 
each dimension could vary considerably according to the type of agreement. By 
their very definition, alliance and network relationships are complex, but the 
degrees of horizontal and geographical differentiation could also differ 
substantially. Centralisation in inter-firm agreements can refer to both decision 
and control rights, as well as to property rights (Grandori, 1997b). Where 
independent governing bodies are created, there may be higher levels of 
centralisation yet within some arrangements centralisation may be dependent on 
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what is stipulated in the contract between firms (Grandori, 1997b; Kauser and 
Shaw, 2004). Degrees of formalisation may also be reliant on contractual 
stipulations. In informal arrangements that are not underpinned by a contract, 
formalisation might also be more difficult to implement across organisational 
boundaries. These dimensions of inter-organisational structure therefore appear to 
be dependent on particular contractual agreements (Spekman et al, 1998) and the 
extent to which they are prescribed within them (Iberra, 1992). Taylor's (2005) 
study of software alliances identifies that these structural factors have an impact 
on alliance success. However, Judge and Ryman (2001) advise while contractual 
agreements are normally used to identify specific responsibilities and governance 
of alliances, they suffer from a number of shortcomings. A key limitation is that 
contracts cannot anticipate what will be necessary to cover all future contingencies 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Ivens, 2005). Dekker (2004) adds that shortcomings 
also arise as contracts do not normally consider the organisational mechanisms 
employed to control the relationship. As a result, Iberra (1992) argues that inter- 
organisational processes emerge from those originally prescribed by the contract. 
Inter-organisational processes are therefore generally considered a more relevant 
dimension than structure in inter-firm agreements (Geringer and Herbert, 1989; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Dess et al, 1995; Kauser and Shaw, 2004) and these 
are explored below. 
3.4.2 Inter-Organisational Processes 
Arino and de la Torre (1998) argue that procedural issues are of extreme 
importance from the start in collaborative ventures. However, Urban and 
Vendemini (1992) caution that developing and applying appropriate operating 
procedures across organisational boundaries is not easy to do in practice. As 
current research on inter-organisational design does not clearly identify inter- 
organisational processes, thirty-two studies (half of which are empirically tested) 
drawn from the literature on effectiveness and performance have been used to 
identify the key ingredients in successful inter-firm agreements. These ingredients 
are then used to determine relevant inter-organisational processes and inform the 
following discussion. Table 3.4 depicts these ingredients, the inter-organisational 
process they relate to, and the authors whose work supports the criteria. 
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i) Inter-Organisational Processes for Control and Coordination 
Table 3.4 highlights the importance of control processes in inter-firm 
arrangements. Dekker (2004: 31) advises that the primary purpose of control in 
inter-organisational settings is to create the conditions to motivate partners to 
achieve desirable outcomes. He further maintains that it is appropriation concerns 
(as related to risks of dissemination) and the coordination of inter-firm tasks that 
creates this importance. These concerns are well noted in the alliance literature 
(Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Spekman et al, 1998; Mohr 
and Sengupta, 2002). As contracts are known not to be able to cover every 
eventuality, Dekker (2004) argues that the degree to which hierarchical control 
processes are incorporated into inter-firm agreements is therefore related to the 
degree to which any firm has appropriation concerns. Despite this, Spekman et al. 
(1998) report control and authority structures are often ambiguous in alliance 
relationships and Das (1993) argues they are harder to understand. Clarke (2002) 
reports that many alliances fail as a result of the absence of typical control 
systems due to their loosely coupled and non-hierarchical nature. However, Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) warn that control processes that incorporate excessive 
legal structuring and monitoring of the relationship can also be detrimental. 
Finding a balance therefore becomes important and Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
conclude from their research that the way in which control is executed directly 
impacts on alliance success. 
Despite its importance, Kauser and Shaw (2004) report there are few definitions of 
inter-organisational control to be found in the literature. Geringer and Herbert 
(1989: 236-237) however suggest that inter-organisational control is, 
'the process by which one partner influences, to varying 
degrees, the behaviour and output of the other partner, 
through the use of power, authority and a wide range of 
bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms. ' 
While this definition was created for joint ventures, it is arguably applicable to all 
types of inter-firm relationships. Geringer and Herbert (1989) further suggest there 
are three dimensions of inter-organisational control: focus, extent and 
mechanisms. Control focus refers to the scope of activities monitored, extent to 
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the degree to which control is exercised and the mechanisms, the means by which 
it is achieved. Kauser and Shaw (2004) argue that any investigation of inter-firm 
control needs to consider all three elements. Geringer and Herbert's (1989) 
definition also reflects the mixed use of price, authority and culture as within 
traditional organisational boundaries. Furthermore, it highlights the use of outcome 
and behavioural mechanisms. Table 3.4 depicts the support within the literature 
for the importance of measurement against mutually agreed goals and targets 
within inter-firm agreements. Pett and Dibrell (2001) advise that the development 
of processes to measure alliance outcomes is important in virtually every stage of 
an alliance agreement. 
There is general consensus on the importance of behavioural control within inter- 
firm agreements (Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004; 
Kauser and Shaw, 2004). In this context however, behavioural control has a 
broader perspective as it incorporates behaviour by and between individuals and 
partner organisations. Ivens' (2005) investigation of business-to-business 
customer/supplier relationships reveals that this relational behaviour affects the 
outcome of the agreement. On the basis of their study, Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
purport that behavioural controls are more important than structure in inter-firm 
designs. Larsen (1992) argues more explicitly that social controls are the most 
important to manage relational behaviour. While Spekman et al (1998) suggest it 
would be naive to rely solely on these, there is a good deal of support for the use 
of social control processes to engender interpersonal relationships or personal 
networks (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Arino and de 
la Torre, 1997; Lewis, 2000; Child and McGrath, 2001). Buono (1997) notes they 
can add to the development of shared ways of operating to enhance behavioural 
control and better coordinate the activities of different firms. Social processes are 
also reported to remove or break down organisational boundaries to increase the 
permeability between organisations (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Dess et al, 1995) 
and facilitate the development of emergent designs (Iberra, 1992). Table 3.5 
summarises the three different types of control identified and provides examples of 
specific mechanisms used to achieve them drawing on empirical studies. 
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Table 3.5 Control Procedures in Inter-Oraanisational Aareements 
Type of Ex-Ante Ex-Post 
Control (before contract signature) (after contract 
signature) 
Determined through goal setting Performance monitoring 
including: against goals through: 
Outcome " Short term and strategic " Open book 
goals accounting 
" Incentive systems " Cost reductions 
" Alliance fund management " Cost and quality 
" Arbitration clauses control 
" Lawsuit provision 
Rewarding: 
" Sharing benefits of 
alliance outcomes 
Behavioural Structural specifications for any Behaviour monitoring: 
of the following: 
" Review of ideas for 
" Task groups innovation 
" Quality plans " Board monitoring 
" Intellectual property divisions " Quality audits 
" Innovation programs 
" Functional specifications 
" Ordering and supply 
procedures 
" Standard operating 
procedures 
" Conflict dispute procedures 
" Defined functional programs 
and rules 
Social Partner selection: Shared decision making 
" Joint history and goal setting and goals: 
" Joint governance goals " Joint alliance board 
" Reputation " Joint task groups 
" Trustworthiness 
" Long-lasting relationships 
Haapiea Trom uas ana i eng, l UWS; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004. 
Table 3.5 depicts two clear differences in control procedures in inter-firm 
agreements. In the first instance, it depicts the need to consider control before 
contractual agreements are finalised (ex ante) and after contract signature (ex- 
post). It also highlights the differences in the actual mechanisms used at these 
different stages in comparison to designs within single organisations. For 
example, far more attention is given to arbitration and conflict resolution 
procedures in inter-firm agreements. Table 3.5 also suggests that output and 
behavioural control mechanisms are more formalised than those for social control. 
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As such, social control mechanisms can be likened to the coordination processes 
employed within organisations. 
Coordination considerations are extensive in inter-firm arrangements (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). The complexities associated with integrating different firms while 
maintaining sufficient degrees of flexibility have also been noted (Hamel, Doz and 
Prahalad, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Coordination processes must also 
be carefully considered for any inter-firm learning to take place (Mohr and 
Sengupta; 2002). Furthermore, partner firms need to commit to the alliance, yet at 
the same time protect against loss (Hamel et al, 1989) and finding the appropriate 
coordination mechanisms can therefore be a challenge. The type of 
interdependence (pooled, sequential, reciprocal) between firms involved in the 
alliance can help guide the choice of coordination mechanisms used (Grandori, 
1997a; Vetschera, 2000; Dekker, 2004). Sharma (1998) expands on the concept 
of interdependence for inter-firm agreements and argues it is a function of the 
interaction between the different firms according to: 
1. interaction frequency, 
2. interaction surface area: the number of people involved and the number of 
contact points, 
3. interaction variety: the number of people from different functional areas who 
interact and 
4. interaction medium: electronic, written or face-to-face interaction. 
These interactions influence the coordination requirements between firms. Higher 
forms of interdependence require more complex coordination efforts (Dyer, 1996; 
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004; Tuomela and Salonen, 2005). Grandori 
(1997a: 909) reports typical inter-firm coordination mechanisms include partner 
specific communication, routines, rules and procedures, liaison and integration 
roles, inter-firm authorities, group work, planning programming and information 
systems, and forms of property-right sharing. Gittel and Weiss (2004) note from 
their review of the literature that many inter-firm coordination mechanisms include 
shared systems for supervision, selection and staffing, training, incentives and 
information systems. Tuomela and Salonen's (2005) pilot study of networks 
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identifies the use of cross-functional teams, task forces and liaison roles. These 
processes are reported to be more difficult to manage and potentially more costly 
without the benefit of formal control processes implemented through hierarchy 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004). However, Gulati and Singh (1998) 
conclude from their research on buyer-supplier relationships that firms will balance 
the cost of coordination against the risk of dissemination. They report that 
coordination costs in inter-firm arrangements reflect, 
'the anticipated organizational complexity of decomposing 
tasks among partners along with ongoing coordination of 
activities to be completed jointly or individually across 
organisational boundaries and the related extent of 
communication and decisions that would be necessary 
(p782). ' 
The authors also caution that alliance partners are more likely to create a 
hierarchical governance structure when the degree of interdependence between 
firms is considered to create higher coordination costs. These findings suggest 
that some hierarchical control processes are deemed necessary to manage 
dissemination risks and are consistent with those of Dekker (2004). However, 
Gulati and Singh (1998) also identify that repeated ties diminish the use of 
hierarchical controls in buyer-supplier relationships. A number of researchers 
suggest this to be the case in all types of inter-firm relationships (Foss, Mahnke 
and Madhok, 2000; Arino et. al 2001; Dekker, 2004). Over time, there is less 
reliance on formal control and greater use of informal coordination mechanisms. 
It is the development of trust between firms that reportedly drives this change from 
formal mechanisms to more informal self-enforcing safeguards (Dyer, 1996; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Table 3.4 clearly indicates the 
support in the literature about the role of trust in inter-firm arrangements. Trust 
relates to both capability to perform required tasks and goodwill, defined as the 
expectation that a firm will act in the best interest of the agreement (Cullen, 
Johnson and Sakano, 2000; Dekker, 2004). Conduct of organisational members is 
therefore reported to be an important element in the development of trust 
(Cropper, 1996) as it influences the relational atmosphere or the degree of 
closeness perceived in inter-firm relationships (Ellis and Mayer, 2001). Both 
conduct and atmosphere result from shared experiences between the firms and as 
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such, are similar to the concept of relational behaviour discussed above. These 
relational experiences are reported to drive the development of shared norms of 
behaviour (Ahuja, 2000; Ivens, 2005) that serve to control the agreement more 
informally as it develops. Control systems therefore evolve in inter-firm 
agreements as informal cultural mechanisms emerge. 
Researchers have attempted to conceptually link the development of trust to the 
development of inter-firm relationships (Arino et al, 2001; Vosselman and Meer- 
Kooistra, 2006). Kanter's (1994) seminal study of 37 international alliance 
agreements led to the identification of different stages of alliance development. A 
number of researchers have continued to explore the evolutionary nature of 
alliances since (Buono, 1997; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2001; Judge and Ryman, 
2001; Zineldan, 2002; Batonda and Perry, 2003; Poulymenakou and Prasopoulou, 
2004). Connell (1997) also reports on the evolutionary nature of master franchise 
agreements. While these researchers have conceptualised or empirically 
identified different numbers of stages, they nevertheless serve to paint a broad 
picture that alliances go through a life cycle. The key sequential stages identified 
include partner selection and the negotiation process, implementation of the 
contractual agreement and then either dissolution or regeneration. Research has 
also outlined some of the key activities that take place at these different stages 
(Spekman et al, 1998). In addition, some effort has been made to identify the key 
activities that engender the development of trust in alliance evolution. For 
example, Aulakh, Kotabe and Sahay (1996) have identified a positive correlation 
between processes for information exchange and flexibility with the development 
of trust in their study of US Fortune 500 industrial firms. 
However, within the literature there is a continued debate as to whether trust acts 
as a substitute or complement for formal control as it emerges (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Dekker, 2004). According to 
Dekker (2004) the supporters of a substitutive relationship argue that trust and 
formal control are inversely related, therefore more trust results in less 
requirements for formal control and vice versa. On the other hand, a 
complementary relationship sees informal control measures being added to formal 
ones. Das and Teng (1998) report that formal control mechanisms, from this 
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perspective, are seen to enhance trust, through their objectivity and provision of 
track records. As a result of these disparate perspectives, Dekker (2004) 
concludes that the use of formal control mechanisms may be complementary and 
enhancing to trust up to a certain point. As trust is the low-cost option, it will 
substitute for formal controls whenever a sufficient level of control is perceived to 
have been realised. Relational trust will therefore only be damaged when the use 
of formal control exceeds this limit. Dekker (2004) purports therefore that trust 
may have a moderating effect on the relationship between coordination 
requirements and formal control. 
Given these mixed findings on the impact of trust, Arino et al (2001) suggest that a 
more relevant concept is that of relational quality. The authors define relational 
quality as `the extent to which the partners feel comfortable and are willing to rely 
on trust in dealing with one another (p 111). Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott (1999) 
advise it reflects the sense of unity and the balance of power in the relationship. 
Arino et al (2001) identify four elements that underpin relational quality as: 
1. the degree of trustworthiness in initial conditions as defined by reputation, 
inherent characteristics, institutional context and any direct prior 
experiences, 
2. the negotiation process that can enhance or diminish initial perceptions, 
3. experience with each other's behaviour and interpretation of behaviour as a 
function of number, frequency and gravity of interactions and 
4. behaviour outside the inter-organisational relationship that reflects both 
reputation and ethical behaviours. 
As it is a broader concept than trust, relational quality incorporates other relevant 
inter-organisational characteristics identified in Table 3.4 such as degree of 
compatibility of corporate cultures, decision-making styles and communication. 
Parise and Casher (2003) label these relationship levers that enhance partner 
commitment to, and satisfaction with the alliance (Kauser and Shaw, 2004; Ivens, 
2005). Morgan and Hunt (1994: 23) define commitment as 'an exchange partner 
believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant 
maximum efforts at maintaining it'. Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott (1999) also 
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identify the importance of expectations of the future relationship to relational 
quality. Parise and Casher (2003) note however, that relational levers are 
frequently neglected in favour of technical aspects, particularly after contracts 
have been signed. They do however, impact upon processes for decision-making 
and communication as discussed below. 
ii) Inter-Organisational Processes for Decision Making and Communication 
The preceding discussion indicates that decision-making rights can be prescribed 
by the formal contract and whether a distinct governing body is created. It also 
identifies that as interdependency increases there is a greater need for 
coordination and joint decision-making amongst partner firms (Galbraith, 1977; 
Dyer, 1996; Gulati and Singh, 1998). High coordination efforts also require 
continuous communication to inform decision-making (Dekker, 2004). The quality 
of information, information-sharing processes and participation in goal setting are 
considered key communication attributes (Kauser and Shaw, 2004) that support 
decision-making and coordination. Ajami and Khambata (1991) further argue that 
coordination can only be achieved where communication exists. 
Communication is also seen to be a way to nurture relationships (Singer, 2001) 
and there is much support in the literature on the relationship between effective 
communication and alliance success (see Table 3.4). One of the reasons for this 
is that frequent communication can also facilitate problem solving (Singer, 2001). 
It also supports shared decision-making and thus can reduce conflict (Speckman 
et al, 1998). The authors identify that inter-firm conflict arises when: 
1. expectations of partner firms differ, 
2. expectations of partner firms are unrealistic, 
3. levels of commitment by different partners are not perceived as equitable 
and 
4. reward levels are different between partners. 
A breach in performance by one partner can also create conflict. Lorange et at, 
(1992) advise that firms are frequently guilty of creating 'black boxes' of knowledge 
of technologies or markets that they withhold from partner firms in order to 
maintain a stronger bargaining position. Urban and Vendemini (1992) suggest 
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that this may be a result of 'strategic egotism' where individual managers feel the 
autonomy of their organisation is threatened or fear the impact of the Trojan horse 
syndrome. This type of behaviour is reported to create an atmosphere of mutual 
distrust, which jeopardises the stability of the alliance (Perlmutter and Heenan, 
1986). In addition, opportunistic behaviour by one partner might also contribute to 
a breach in performance. The requirement for a perception of fair play by all 
partners has been reported by Lorange et al (1992). Speckman et al (1998) 
identify from their review of the literature that this perception is important to avoid 
conflict. Arino et al (2001) also note the impact of relational quality on conflict 
resolution. 
The importance of partner selection and the negotiation process to clarify these 
expectations and reduce the potential for inter-firm conflict is also recognised. 
Ajami and Khambata (1991) highlight the need to clarify obligations to report, 
rights to initiate proposals, rights of participation in decision-making, the use of 
feedback and openness of information as important aspects of communication to 
clarify during negotiation processes to reduce inter-organisational conflict. They 
also suggest that defensive boundaries should be defined to ensure that only 
legitimate access to resources occurs. However, Judge and Ryman (2001) note 
that unanticipated conflicts often arise after contractual agreements have been 
signed. Therefore in addition to these preventative measures, clear and 
constructive conflict resolution processes become more important in inter- 
organisational designs as suggested in Table 3.4. 
Summary of Inter-Organisational Design 
The preceding discussion sought to determine the relevance of the dimensions of 
organisational design to inter-organisational agreements. The literature suggests 
that inter-organisational processes are more significant dimensions of design than 
inter-organisational structures. Inter-organisational designs have also been 
determined to be prescribed at the start of an agreement, but then evolve or 
emerge throughout the life of the agreement. Gittel and Weiss (2004) note 
however, that it is important to consider both prescribed and emergent designs. 
The studies reviewed have been undertaken either from a relational viewpoint or 
from a more traditional design perspective. However, to date there have been 
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limited attempts to consolidate these two perspectives. As Graen and Hui 
(1996: 64) advise, the two ways of regulating inter-firm agreements are: 
1) through a relationship-based system that relies on relational networks of the 
system and 
2) through a procedural-based system that relies on formalisation and 
institutionalisation of procedures. 
Research investigating the relational nature of inter-firm designs has identified the 
role of trust and relational quality in achieving control. Trust is identified as an 
essential ingredient of relational quality. However, findings are mixed as to 
whether it acts as a complement to, moderator of, or substitute for formal control. 
In any case, inter-organisational processes for coordination and control impact 
upon those for decision-making, communication and conflict resolution and these 
also contribute to relational quality. Figure 3.2 depicts these dimensions of inter- 
organisational design. 
3.5 Design of Diverse Affiliations 
The preceding discussion highlights both similarities and differences in 
organisation design within and across firm boundaries. While the dimensions of 
design are similar, the starting point for organisation design is culture, whereas the 
starting point for inter-organisational design is the contract or formal inter- 
organisational agreement. Another point of differentiation is the importance of 
inter-organisational processes within inter-firm agreements relative to structure. 
The third difference is the evolutionary nature of inter-firm agreements. For 
international service firms that operate both within and across organisational 
boundaries, the differences in design dimensions can pose challenges for 
managers that have not been addressed in the literature. Organisation designs in 
diverse affiliations can therefore be conceptualised as in Figure 3.3. Different parts 
of the affiliation can rely more heavily on formal structures, whereas others may 
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In addition, there appears to be limited research undertaken to date on the 
organisational and inter-organisational processes that impact upon flexibility. It is 
therefore not clear how these different dimensions of design, within and across 
organisational boundaries should be developed for diversely affiliated 
organisations. Galbraith (1977) however, reports that design must be consistent 
with a firm's strategy and this is considered in the following section. 
3.5.1 Models of Design 
Galbraith (1977) concluded after many years of research that there is no best 
approach to organisational design; rather it is a search for coherence between 
firm-specific characteristics, the environment and company strategy. In other 
words, organisation designs are contingent (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chandler 
1962; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969). According to contingency 
theories, changes in the environment lead to changes in strategy and then to 
changes in structure or organisation designs. While researchers within the process 
school report that there is no one best way to design MNCs, there have been 
numerous efforts made to develop alternative typologies of design and Harzing 
(1999) provides a good review of these different efforts. However, Egelhoff (1999) 
argues that these typologies can fit into two broad models of design, traditional or 
change models. 
i) Traditional Models of Design 
Traditional models of design are based on the underlying notion that organisations 
predominantly operate in conditions of environmental stability that are punctuated 
by predictable periods of change. As environmental conditions change, firms alter 
their strategies and then their structures to achieve a state of equilibrium. As 
equilibrium is associated with organisational performance, once achieved, designs 
are not changed unless they can no longer successfully cope with their 
environments (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). As change is a relatively 
infrequent occurrence, these traditional models of design tend to utilise 
mechanistic organisation structures (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Drawing heavily 
on the classical school of management (Louadi, 1998), these designs rely on 
control through centralised decision making. High levels of efficiency are achieved 
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through formal procedures, centralised authority, direct supervision, and 
specialised labour (Pugh, 1996; Tata, Prasad and Thom, 1999; Curado, 2006). 
Control processes are hierarchical, involve vertical coordination and 
communication, and vertical dependency with fixed boundaries (Child and 
McGrath, 2001). Birnberg (1998) reports that tasks are routinised, there is a high 
degree of formality and the issue for control is on adherence to procedures and 
their outcomes. As a result, the role of trust and cooperation is minimal. 
Coordination and problem-resolution occur at senior hierarchical levels. 
Traditional design models include templates based around products, services, 
geographical divisions (Day, 1999) and matrix models (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1993). 
ii) Change Models of Design 
As international business environments became more dynamic", the effectiveness 
of these models began to be questioned. Researchers within the process school in 
particular, highlighted the complexity faced by international firms who employ 
differentiated strategies to suit different national environments (see for instance 
Malnight, 2001). Accordingly, a number of 'change models' of design (Egelhoff, 
1999) were developed including the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1984), the multifocal 
MNC (Doz, 1986), the transnational (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), and the 
horizontal organisation (White and Poynter, 1990). These models were developed 
in order to enable firms to compete more effectively through the simultaneous 
development of global competitiveness, multinational flexibility and worldwide 
learning capabilities. Traditional models of design were not deemed sufficient to 
enable these three goals to be achieved concurrently (Pugh and Hickson, 1990) or 
to deal with differentiated strategies. The built-in boundaries between different 
hierarchical levels, departments, functions and geographical units create barriers 
to communication necessary for flexibility and responsiveness. Hastings (1993) 
suggests traditional models of design frequently suffer from 'organisational 
gridlock' and according to Dess et al (1995) this is due to the fact they focus on the 
maintenance of internal relationships rather than on organisational results. 
" Dynamic environments are volatile or unpredictable (Anderson and Gatignon; 1986) as reflected 
by the frequency of change and turnover of market forces (Brown, Lee, and Dev, 1994a). The 
more dynamic the environment, the greater the level of uncertainty caused by unanticipated 
change. 
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Change models are based on the premise that environmental change is inevitable, 
is frequent and continuous, and is also unpredictable. Whereas traditional models 
rely on contingency theories to create equilibrium through the design of a structure 
that fits its environment and strategy, in the newer models environmental change 
is handled within the same organisational design and there are no predefined 
notions of equilibrium (Egelhoff, 1999). As a result, responses to change come in a 
more unstructured way and Hastings (1996) likens these new designs to 
kaleidoscopes with a constantly changing pattern of relationships. Fluid and 
organic structures are therefore deemed more appropriate for these complex and 
dynamic environments (Burns and Stalker, 1961) where differentiated strategies 
are more likely. Flatter or more horizontal organisational forms are the norm and 
these reduce hierarchical differentiation and the reliance on vertical control 
mechanisms. Child and McGrath (2001) report from their extensive review of the 
literature that authority, power, responsibility and resources are decentralised in 
change models of design. Managerial roles are to provide guidance, manage 
conflict and keep communication open rather than provide top down direction. 
Change models therefore reduce the core activities to a minimum and assign 
responsibilities to semi-independent units. The objective of this is to push decision 
making to where relevant knowledge and information reside. Decision-making 
therefore is decentralised and problems are solved at their source (Tata et al, 
1999). Individual units take local initiative to achieve agreed goals rather than have 
goals imposed from above (Child and McGrath, 2001). In this way flexibility to be 
responsive to local market conditions is achieved. Greater emphasis is placed on 
lateral integration processes and more informal control and coordination 
processes (Curado, 2006). Malnight (2001) suggests characteristics of these new 
models include globally dispersed operations, interdependence and tight coupling 
of subunits, and an emphasis on cross-unit learning and flexibility. Martinez and 
Jarillo's (1991) research identifies that all informal coordination mechanisms must 
be used if a firm is to have enough flexibility to be both locally responsive and 
have enough consistency to take advantage of global opportunities. In these 
designs coherence and motivation are provided by shared vision and culture is 
developed through these coordination processes, not by top down instruction 
(Child and McGrath, 2001). 
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A number of questions about these newer design models are raised in the 
literature. Child and McGrath (2001) report that even though they are more flexible 
and cost effective, they may actually inhibit an organisation's ability to accomplish 
systematic innovations. According to Day (1999), they are reported to be difficult to 
achieve in reality or work in pure form, although Wolf (1997) reports on the 
growing use of heterarchical designs within MNC human resource functions. 
Nonetheless Egelhoff (1999) argues that there is little empirical evidence to 
support the notion that aggregating individual and small group coordinating 
mechanisms can effectively substitute for coordinating mechanisms at corporate 
levels. He purports that these models place greater demands on individuals within 
organisations to work across different countries and cultures. Traditional models 
on the other hand, reconcile global and local views at more senior organisational 
levels and therefore are better able to represent various views of different 
subsidiaries and their members. Child and McGrath (2001) contend that the 
economic effectiveness of traditional models has seldom been in dispute. Ives, 
Jarvenpass and Mason (1993) also report that hierarchical structures have 
frequently typified successful firms. Furthermore, highly formalised and tightly 
controlled, inflexible structures are still deemed appropriate in stable environments 
(Louadi, 1998). In a recent study of MNC design, Kidger (2002) identifies a trend 
towards global integration driven by the need for cost efficiencies. 
iii) Hybrid Models of Design 
Egelhoff (1999) purports that despite the difference in the underlying premise of 
traditional and change models, both recognise the need for more organic and 
flexible designs in dynamic and uncertain environments. In addition, both models 
have distinct and complementary advantages to offer international firms and as 
such, there should be a greater attempt to reconcile these two approaches. While 
change models facilitate innovation, flexibility and responsiveness, traditional 
models allow for global efficiencies to be achieved by enabling consistency in 
organisational behaviour, increased use of best practice and organisational 
knowledge, and the facilitation of co-ordination and control. Egelhoff (1999) further 
suggests that as there are still many elements of stability even in a changing, 
dynamic environment, both models remain relevant to international firms. The 
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author therefore recommends a hybrid approach, where traditional models are 
retained at more macro (firm or corporate) organisational levels' and change 
models at the micro (divisional or functional) level. 
Ashcraft (2001) suggests that hybrid forms are calculated blends of governance 
structures that retain an element of bureaucracy. Similarly Schermerhorn, Hunt 
and Osbom (1994) report they comprise a mixture of organic and mechanistic 
models. Day (1999) adds more specifically that hybrids contain horizontal 
business processes with integrating and vertical specialist functions. These 
designs are based on horizontal processes backed up with vertical functional 
strengths that serve as coordinating mechanisms. Hybrid designs therefore 
encapsulate both the control and flexibility necessary for today's business 
environment and Day (1999) reports a trend towards their use in MNCs. 
Bahrami's (1992) research within technology firms identifies three key building 
blocks of these new design models. He suggests that emergent organisational 
forms are more like federations, with the centre being seen in a support role 
whose purpose is to develop a shared organisational and administrative 
infrastructure and produce the cultural glue that can create synergies and ensure 
unity of mission and purpose. Bahrami (1992: 39) reports these hybrid forms of 
design have dualistic systems with formal or 'bedrock structures' that change 
infrequently, but are overlapped with lateral design processes that use temporary 
teams to increase levels of flexibility. These designs are supported by staff 
functions, such as human resources, that are exposed to the reality of the front 
line. This latter feature, in turn, requires three elements. The first is a 
cosmopolitan mindset throughout the organisation so that individual firm members 
can reconcile global and local views. The second is the ability to get things done 
through capability or competence rather than authority based on a hierarchical 
position. The third feature is semi-permeable boundaries that facilitate information 
flows between different units or firms involved. Bahrami (1992) labels these 
bimodal organisations and concludes that in order to actually be flexible, 
organisations need to identify, and implement appropriate processes and tools to 
manage bimodality. Table 3.6 depicts the features of traditional models, change 
models and bimodal or hybrid models of organisation design. 
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Table 3.6 A Comparison of Desian Models 
Traditional Models Change Models Hybrid Models 
Single centre in home Core centre, location flexible Multiple centres 
country 
Expertise self contained at Expertise self contained at Steeples of expertise 
centre centre but location is flexible throughout organisation 
Independent activities Interdependent units Interdependent units 
Vertically integrated Horizontally integrated Multiple alliances, 
predominantly horizontal 
integration with some vertical 
integration 
Underpinned by mechanistic Underpinned by organic Combine elements of 
structure structure mechanistic and organic 
structures 
Uniform structure Multiple structures possible Diverse structures normal 
Parochial mindset Global mindset Cosmopolitan mindset 
Emphasis on efficiency Emphasis on flexibility Emphasis on flexibility, but 
not at the expense of 
efficiency 
Adapted from Burns and Stalker, 1961; Morgan, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Bahrami, 1992; 
Birnberg, 1998; Egelhoff, 1999; Tata et al, 1999; Ashcraft, 2001; Child and McGrath, 2001; 
Malnight, 2001; Curado, 2006. 
The preceding discussion identifies that current perspectives on organisation 
design reflect the support of hybrid models. Researchers recognise the strength 
and limitations of traditional and change models and argue that hybrid designs 
offer the best of both of these models. Hybrid designs are reported to facilitate 
control to achieve global integration and cost efficiencies as well as flexibility to 
adapt to changing market environments. However, there has been limited 
research conducted on these designs to date to assess their effectiveness or 
whether they are applicable to international diverse affiliations. 
3.6 Chapter Summary and Research Propositions 
This chapter sought to identify `how' the variable risks inherent in diverse 
affiliations can be managed through organisational and inter-organisational design. 
Drawing on the extant literature and key ingredients of alliance success, relevant 
inter-organisational processes for control, coordination and communication have 
been identified. Through the determination of the dimensions of these different 
types of design, further complexities were revealed for diverse affiliations that 
operate within and across organisational borders. While both designs comprise 
formal structural dimensions and those of formal and informal processes, key 
differences include the starting point and the relevance of different design 
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dimensions. Within firm boundaries, the literature suggests that organisation 
culture is the starting point as it influences the structural framework and the 
organisational processes that underpin that structure. In contrast, the inter-firm 
contract is the starting point in inter-organisational designs from which structures 
are prescribed and then processes emerge as the more relevant dimension. 
Culture also emerges in inter-firm designs. Given these fundamental differences, 
an argument has been presented that hybrid designs are the most appropriate for 
diverse affiliations to adopt. Hybrid designs are also considered the most relevant 
for firms that operate within complex and dynamic international environments as 
they are capable of delivering sufficient control to achieve global efficiencies as 
well as the flexibility to achieve local responsiveness. The different degrees of 
control and flexibility afforded within the portfolios of diverse affiliations also points 
to the relevance of hybrid designs. However, the specific structures and 
processes employed within these hybrid designs to manage the variable risks are 
not clear from the current literature. This research therefore seeks to shed further 
insight into 'how' these risks are managed through an investigation of the design of 
diverse affiliations, comprising both organisational and inter-organisational 
structure and process. 
Drawing on the three streams of literature used to inform this study, eight research 
propositions are identified that frame this study as follows: 
1. Ownership modes yield the strongest degree of control through hierarchal 
authority but limit the strategic and product flexibility afforded international 
service firms. 
2. Contractual agreements yield the most strategic, product and volume 
flexibility, but can limit the degree and type of control afforded. 
3. The degrees of control and flexibility afforded through hybrid arrangements 
vary according to the particular type of agreement formed. 
4. In diversely affiliated portfolios, the creation of distinct organisation designs 
for different organisational forms may lead to the emergence of plural 
processes. These serve to enhance the levels of control and flexibility 
achieved. 
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5. Organisation and inter-organisational designs comprise both formal 
structural dimensions and those of formal and informal processes. 
6. The starting point for organisational design is organisation culture. This 
influences formal structures adopted that in turn influence and provide a 
framework for organisational processes. 
7. The starting point for inter-organisational design is the inter-firm contract or 
formal agreement that prescribes the inter-organisational structure. 
However inter-organisational processes and culture emerge as inter-firm 
agreements evolve. Trust and relational quality become important 
mechanisms in their management. 
8. In diversely affiliated organisations designs must be considered within and 
across organisational borders. Hybrid designs may therefore be the most 
appropriate to facilitate the simultaneous achievement of control and 
flexibility. 
The research propositions listed above identify a clear link between the streams of 
literature reviewed for this study. These propositions are used to investigate 'how' 
the variable risks inherent in diverse affiliations are managed through organisation 
and inter-organisational design in order to close the current gaps identified in the 
literature. The following chapter explains and justifies the research approach 
adopted in order to undertake this investigation and close the gaps related to 'how' 
international service firms (post-entry), inter-organisational agreements, diverse 
affiliations and international hotel chains are designed and managed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and justify the research design adopted 
for this study. According to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002: 43) 'research 
designs are about organizing research activity, including the collection of data, in 
ways that are most likely to achieve the research aims. ' While this definition 
suggests justification through an argument of 'fitness for purpose' (Wood, 1999), in 
reality researchers are required to make a number of sequential decisions on the 
most appropriate approach to answer the research questions posed. This chapter 
begins by explaining the research philosophy and approach underpinning this 
study. It then justifies the different strategies and data collection methods used for 
the different phases of the investigation. The chapter concludes by justifying the 
techniques employed to analyse the data. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
Research designs begin with the researcher's view of knowledge and how it is 
gained. These views reflect philosophical beliefs, and their underlying paradigms, 
or'ways of categorising a body of beliefs and world views' (Blaxter et al, 2001: 60). 
These philosophies also reflect the ontological beliefs researchers have about the 
nature of reality (Taylor and Edgar, 1999: 27), epistemological beliefs about the 
best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world (Easterby-Smith et at, 2002), 
and axiological beliefs, which reflect the beliefs about the role of values in 
research (Hannabuss, 2001; Hill and Wright, 2001). Research philosophies are 
therefore the starting point to determine the 'fitness' of research designs. 
Research philosophies are frequently viewed from dichotomous perspectives or as 
Wood (1999: 3) suggests, on the basis of 'simple bipolarities'. The two main 
philosophies are positivism and phenomenology, alternatively known as 
interpretevism (Veal, 1997; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Wood, 1999; Bryman, 
2004). Table 4.1 depicts the polar nature of the two main philosophies. 
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Table 4.1 Research PhilosoDhies12 
Characteristic Positivist Phenomenological or 
Interpretivist 
Underlying Only true knowledge is Depends on who 
Ontological Belief scientific; facts are concrete establishes it 
Underlying External world determines World is socially-constructed 
Epistemological behaviour phenomenon based on 
Belief human beliefs 
Characteristics of Independent to what is studied Involved in what is studied 
researcher 
Characteristics of Objective and unbiased Subjective 
research 
Human Irrelevant, adopts a value-free Main drivers for research, 
Interests/Beliefs approach rarely is value-neutral 
Research Aims Demonstrate causality; Focus on meanings; 
explores interrelationships to Tries to understand what is 
search for laws of causation happening 
Research Approach Hypo deductive Inductive 
Purpose of Data To test theories through To build theories 
Collection application 
Data Collection Predominantly quantitative Predominantly qualitative 
methods Multiple methods employed 
Concepts Need to be operationalised; Should include stakeholder 
Investigated concepts need to be measured perspectives 
to systematically test 
hypothesis 
Unit of Analysis Reduced to simplest terms May include 'whole' complex 
possible situations 
Sample Large, often randomly selected Small and chosen for 
specific characteristics 
Findings Capable of Explanatory generalisation Theoretical abstraction 
through statistical probability 
Validity Proof that concepts are Argument that researcher 
Demonstrated measured accurately and has gained full access to 
through reliably meaning and knowledge of 
informants 
Research Yields Universal truths through Rich understanding of 
verification or falsification phenomenon 
Adapted from Bryman, 1994, Stake, 1995; Veal, 1997; Clark et al, 1998; Wood, 1999; Finn et al, 
2000; Thomas and Brubaker, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 
2003. 
As Table 4.1 identifies, research undertaken by positivists seeks to establish 
relationships between the concepts under study in order to demonstrate causality. 
To be valid, it must therefore be value-free and not shaped by the researcher's 
12 A number of other research paradigms are considered to lie in between the polar extremes 
including the social constructionist perspective (Easterby-Smith et at, 2002), postpositivism 
(Thomas and Brubaker), critical and postmodernism (Blaxter et al, 2001) and realism, 
constructivism and critical theory (Perry, 1998). 
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beliefs (Bryman, 2004). In contrast, phenomenologists' view the world as a socially 
constructed phenomenon (Wood, 1999). As such, reality is determined by human 
beliefs and knowledge and therefore depends on who establishes it. Research 
therefore is rarely value-free and its purpose is to understand meanings rather 
than causality (Clark et al, 1998). In reality, neither philosophy can be considered 
as right or wrong, rather as more or less appropriate to answer particular research 
questions (Robson, 2002). 
In line with the beliefs of this researcher, a phenomenological approach is 
arguably the most appropriate to adopt. The focus of this research is on 
organisations which are viewed as living systems in a constant state of flux and in 
constant contact with their environment' (Patten and Appelbaum, 2003: 63). This 
notion is clearly demonstrated through the literature reviewed in Chapter Three. 
Organisations are made up of people who undertake decisions on what designs to 
adopt and it is therefore essential to include the perspectives of these 
stakeholders to develop a richer understanding of organisation design. This 
research seeks to understand how diverse affiliations are designed and managed 
through an exploration of both structure and process. A phenomenological 
approach will enable the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of formal 
and informal organisational processes for control, decision-making and 
communication that reflect both organisational and inter-organisational design. As 
the majority of the design studies reviewed for this research have adopted a 
positivist and deductive research design (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Kim and Maughborne, 1993; Weir, 1995; Ozsomer et at, 1997; 
Egelhoff, 1998b; Beamish et at, 1998; Tata et at, 1999), there is arguably a 
different contribution to make by examining organisation design from a 
phenomenological perspective. A number of noteworthy studies (for instance 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987,1993; Bahrami, 1992; Malnight, 1995,2001; Golden 
and Powell, 1999; Kidger, 2002) have validated this approach. Furthermore, 
Connell and Lowe (1997: 166) purport that with a phenomenological approach 
researchers are more open minded to what is really happening within the 
phenomenon being researched as they carry fewer preconceived ideas. 
Phenomenological research is also argued to be the most appropriate for inter- 
organisational studies (Das, 1993; Lawrence and uI-Haq; 1998) and this 
105 
contention is well supported through previous research (Kanter, 1994; Buono, 
1997; Sharma, 1998; Harris et at, 2000; Batonda and Perry, 2001; Mandat et at, 
2003; Dekker, 2004; Taylor, 2005). 
4.3 Research Approach 
While there are always exceptions, generally speaking positivists tend towards 
quantitative research approaches, and interpretivists, towards qualitative. There 
are a number of key distinctions between these two approaches as identified in 
Table 4.2 
Table 4.2 Distinctions between Quantitative and nimmmouo Rncnýrrh 
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Seeks facts and causes of phenomenon Seeks understanding of phenomenon from 
those involved 
Assumes stable reality Assumes dynamic reality 
Presents organisational reality of amalgam of 
facts 
Presents organisational reality as socially 
constructed 
Research is objective in nature Research is subjective in nature 
Researcher adopts outsider perspective Research adopts insider perspective 
Theoretical reflection at outset of research Theoretical reflection at different stages 
Researcher imposes view on phenomenon Participants perspective shapes, nderstanding 
of phenomenon 
Little attention given to context Strong sense of context 
Structured approach to research Flexible and fluid approach to research 
Rarely opportunity to change research 
direction 
Enables researcher to capitalise on unexpected 
events or chance remarks 
Research proceeds in discrete stages No clear separation of research stages 
Particularistic approach, considerable 
attention to refinement of operational 
definitions 
Holistic approach 
Outcome oriented Process oriented 
Obtrusive and controlled measurement Uncontrolled and naturalistic observation 
Single method of data collection Multiple methods of data collection 
Generates hard and replicable data Generates real, rich and deep data 
Interpretation based on numerical and 
statistical analysis 
Interpretation by participants in their own 
language 
Verification oriented; confirming theory Grounded, exploratory and inductive; generating 
theory 
Findings can be generalised Findings cannot be generalised 
r1udptCU iiuiii vvai, u i, VldrK dt al, iaaa; iviarsnau ano iwssman, 1999; tsiaxter et al, 2000; Finn 
et al, 2000; Bryman, 2001; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002; Saunders et al, 2003. 
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According to Stake (1995) the major difference between the two approaches is 
that the quantitative researcher seeks a collection of instances, expecting that, 
from the aggregate, relevant meanings will emerge, whereas the qualitative 
researcher concentrates on instance, trying to pull it apart and put it back together 
again more meaningfully. Qualitative research 'embodies a view of social reality 
as a constantly shifting emergent property of an individual's creation' (Bryman, 
2001: 20) and is 'grounded in the lived experiences of people' (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999: 2). This approach to research is more appropriate when the 
frequency of the phenomenon is not the issue and when the explanatory power 
behind it does not rely on statistical techniques, but rather on emergent meanings 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999). As such, a qualitative approach is deemed most 
appropriate for this study. 
Qualitative research genres have become increasingly important modes of inquiry 
for management research (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). The historical tradition 
for quantitative studies in management is reported to have created 'a huge gap 
between theory and business reality' as it removes the 'flesh and bones' of 
everyday life from the substance of the research itself (Patten and Appelbaum, 
2003: 62). Many of the empirical studies on organisation design and structure in 
the hotel industry have also employed a quantitative approach (Schaffer, 1984; 
Clark, 1987; Dev and Brown, 1990). While considered valid for assessing formal 
structures, this approach has also been criticised as being too far removed to 
understand the subtle nuances of organisational life (Mullins, 1999; Stacey, 2000). 
Qualitative research on the other hand, enables the researcher to get closer to 
participants (Shaw, 1999) in order to explain organisations through the very people 
that make them up (Hamel, Dufour and Fortin, 1993). Through a qualitative 
approach, this study should therefore yield richer insight into the design and 
management of diversely affiliated organisations. While many perceive qualitative 
research to be subject to researcher bias, it is consistent with an 
phenomenological belief that research is rarely value neutral. Furthermore, Patten 
and Appelbaum (2003) contend that quantitative research has been shown 
repeatedly to be affected by the bias of the researcher and participants. 
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4.4 Research Strategy 
The next step is to determine the most appropriate strategy to implement. 
Research strategies are general plans to answer the research question and 
Saunders et al (2003: 92) identify a number of strategies including grounded 
theory, action research, case studies, surveys, and longitudinal, exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory studies. Robson (2002) advises that within any 
individual study different strategies may be appropriate at different points in the 
research process and can help to reduce inappropriate uncertainty. In this 
exploratory study, the research was conducted in three different phases, each of 
which adopted a different research strategy. This approach enabled the 
researcher to start with broad issues and funnel down into more detailed elements 
of organisation and inter-organisational design. Figure 4.1 depicts the overall 
research design adopted. Each research phase, its purpose and the data 
collection methods employed are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Phase One: Verifying the Extent of the Phenomena 
i) Purpose and Strategy 
This phase of the research sought to assess the extent to which international hotel 
chains are diversely affiliated with their portfolio of hotels and verify the existence 
of the phenomena under study. Its purpose was to 'portray an accurate profile of 
persons, events or situations' and demonstrate the research was worth pursuing 
(Robson, 2002: 59). This phase required the researcher to identify the key industry 
players, the size of their portfolio, and the different types of market entry methods 
used across their international portfolios. As such, a descriptive research strategy 
that enables that researcher to build a composite profile of international hotel 
chains that are diversely affiliated with their portfolio is considered 'fit' for this 
purpose (Wood, 1999). 
ii) Data Collection 
Yin (1994) argues that data are the sources of evidence the researcher will use to 
support answers given to the research question. During this phase of the study, 
only secondary data was used. Clark et al (1998: 109) define secondary data as 
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Figure 4.1 The Research Design 
Phase One: 
establishing extent of phenomena; 
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`that which has been collected, collated and analysed by others. ' While this data 
can be either quantitative or qualitative, the potential for secondary analysis of 
qualitative data is increasingly being realised (Blaxter et al, 2001). Litteljohn and 
Roper (1999) highlight the value of conducting research from the outside in 
organisational studies. The authors suggest that there is a wealth of information 
produced by commercial organisations, by the public sector and by trade or 
professional associations suitable for this purpose. 
However, a number of authors (Bryman, 1992; Litteljohn and Roper, 1999; 
Marshall and Rossman, 1999) warn that researchers must be vigilant to the 
reliability and validity of secondary data. Marshall and Rossman (1999) further 
caution that the researcher must be resourceful, systematic and honest when 
utilising secondary data collection methods. They also advise that the data is 
open to multiple interpretations. Heeding this advice, desk research was 
undertaken to collect and corroborate secondary data from a wide range of 
sources including company Internet sites, company annual and interim accounts 
and reports, articles in trade magazines, press and hospitality analyst reports and 
corporate property guides. In addition, two commercial databases, Hoovers 
Online and Hospitality Browser were purchased to supplement the data available 
in the public domain. 
Beginning with the definitive list of the 'Corporate 300' (Dela Cruz and Wolchuk, 
2000), the largest industry players were first identified. Using data from the 
different secondary sources, a composite profile for each hotel chain was created 
comprising the country of headquarters, ownership, the number of countries of 
operation, the number of. hotels, hotel rooms and brands in the portfolio and the 
different market entry strategies used. Many of the data sources provided 
incomplete information and this process proved to be quite time-consuming. 
However, the multiple data sources used enabled the research to triangulate 
evidence and over the course of six months a profile was completed for 35 
international hotel chains. Of the original 300 chains, it was not possible to find 
sufficient information published on 159 of them through the research strategy 
employed. Interestingly enough, 103 of these (65%) were American. Of the 141 
hotel chains remaining, those that only utilised one type of business format and 
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operated in less than five countries were eliminated. Five countries were chosen 
as the cut off point as this was the minimal number of countries of operation in 
Todd and Mather's (1999) publication of global hotel brands. What remained was 
a list of 35 international hotel chains that operate in at least five countries and 
utilise more than one type of business format. 
4.4.2 Phase Two: Exploring Organisation Design 
i) Purpose and Strategy 
This phase sought to explore organisation designs in international hotel firms and 
the key issues in their management using a case study strategy. Various authors 
describe a case study alternatively as a strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley, 1994; 
Robson, 2002), a research approach (Blaxter et al, 2001), or a research method 
(Smith, 1991). However, Yin (2003), one of the foremost experts on case study 
research, argues it is a research strategy as it deals with the logic of design 
incorporating specific approaches to data collection and analysis. 
Mitchell (1983) argues that a case can be defined simply as the documentation of 
a particular phenomenon. Brotherton's (1999: 119) comprehensive review of the 
literature suggests it is `a discrete, bounded entity within which the phenomenon 
and context are inseparable facets of the study'. However, Guercini (2004: 464) 
distinguishes between the concept of a case study, which is the actual product 
achieved, and case analysis, which pertains to the research process. This 
distinction is consistent with the concept of a case study as a research strategy 
that encapsulates both data collection and analysis. Yin (1994: 13) suggests that 
a more appropriate definition would be, 
`an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident. ' 
This definition not only reflects both elements of a research strategy, but also 
indicates when it might be an appropriate strategy to adopt. 
111 
Case Study Classifications 
There are a number of case study strategies identified in the literature. When used 
for research purposes, Yin (1994) contends that case studies can be exploratory, 
descriptive, or explanatory. Exploratory studies are designed to tackle new 
problems or issues (Phillips and Pugh, 1994). They seek to shed new light on 
'little understood phenomena' and answer 'what' questions (Yin, 1994). Marshall 
and Rossman (1999) suggest that they can also identify salient themes, patterns, 
or categories of meaning for participants. 
Descriptive case studies, on the other hand, try to establish a factual 'picture of the 
object of study' and are 'essentially informational in character' (Clark et al, 1998: 9). 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1999: 33) they document phenomena and 
can help identify 'salient actions, events, beliefs, attitudes, and social structures 
and processes occurring in [the] phenomenon'. The authors further suggest that 
many qualitative studies are descriptive and exploratory as they build rich 
descriptions of complex circumstances that are unexplored in the literature. 
Finally, explanatory case studies attempt to explain the patterns of observed 
behaviour usually by establishing a causal relationship between concepts and 
phenomena (Clark et at, 1998; Veal, 1997) and are therefore not appropriate for 
this study. 
In addition to these classifications, Yin (2003) identifies four distinct types of case 
study based on the criteria of number of cases and unit of analysis; the single 
holistic case, the single embedded case, the multiple holistic case, and the 
multiple embedded case. Determining which type of case study is appropriate 
requires the researcher to bound the collection of data or define the sample, as 
well as bound the territory or define the case (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Multiple case studies are often considered to be more robust studies as the 
evidence produced is considered to be more generalisable (Wisker, 2001). 
However, they are not without their disadvantages, particularly when studying a 
little explored phenomenon. In multiple case studies the underlying logic is based 
upon replication. According to Yin (2003: 47) each case must therefore be 
selected so that it either predicts similar results (literal replication) or contrasting 
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results (theoretical replication). A key step in this process is to develop a rich 
theoretical framework that states conditions under which the phenomenon is to be 
found. This framework then becomes the vehicle for generalising to new cases. 
Case studies are also classified as to whether they are holistic or embedded. A 
holistic case study is one that 'effectively conceptualises the case and the unit of 
analysis as the same entity' (Brotherton, 1999: 121). By contrast, Rowley (2002) 
reports that embedded case study designs identify a number of subunits, each of 
which is explored individually. Yin (2003) advises the difference between these 
two is dependent on whether there is more than one unit of analysis within the 
case. Bounding the territory or defining the case requires the researcher to clearly 
determine the unit of analysis, although this is not always easy to do (Rowley, 
2002). Miles and Huberman (1994) report that researchers often struggle to 
determine what their case actually is. They argue that any case has a heart as well 
as vague or indeterminate boundaries that define the edges of a case. By defining 
the unit of analysis, or bounding the territory, the researcher determines what will 
and what will not be studied. Yin (1994) argues that the unit of analysis must be 
related to the initial research question. It is important, therefore, to identify the unit 
of analysis to determine whether a holistic or embedded approach is more 
suitable. 
a) Adopting a case study strategy 
Case studies have been widely used across different research communities (Yin, 
1994) and in particular within management and organisational studies (Bryman, 
2001). One of the reasons for this adoption is proffered by Yin (1994) who claims 
that case studies can offer a unique contribution to our knowledge of 
organisational phenomenon. Case studies have the capacity to explore social 
processes as they unfold in organisations and allow the researcher to understand 
these processes in their organisational context (Finn et al, 2000) and from different 
perspectives (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001). As the data is drawn from people's 
experiences and practices within organisations, Blaxter et al (2002) argue they are 
seen to be strong in reality. Yin (1994: 3) argues that a case study strategy 'allows 
an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events, such as organisational and managerial processes'. Rowley (2002: 25) 
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purports that it is the 'multi-facetted perspective' of case studies that is responsible 
for the rich data that is generated. 
There is ample evidence to support the justification of a case study strategy for 
this phase of the research. Firstly, case studies are frequently associated with 
qualitative research designs that are exploratory and inductive in nature 
(Brotherton, 1999; Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001). Yin (1994) also suggests that 
this strategy has a distinct advantage when: 
" the research attempts to answer 'how' or 'why' questions, 
" when behavioural events cannot be manipulated and 
" the focus of the research is on contemporary events over which the 
investigator has little or no control. 
Hartley (1994) adds to this argument and reports a case study strategy is 
appropriate when: 
" satisfactory answers to questions are contingent upon developing an 
understanding of the context, 
" the phenomenon is new or little understood, 
" the intention is to explore a typical incidence of the phenomena and/or its 
emergent properties and 
" the dynamics of the phenomena need to be incorporated. 
In line with the purpose of this phase of the research, a case study is a suitable 
research strategy to adopt. Guercini (2004: 466) argues a case is 'an important tool 
to pinpoint aspects concerning the evolution of corporate processes which are 
otherwise difficult to grasp in their entire complexity'. Furthermore, the researcher 
cannot manipulate organisational players, their chain affiliations, their managers, 
or behavioural events. The suitability of case study strategies to investigate 
organisation design is also supported through several notable studies (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1993; Malnight, 1995,2001; Golden and Powell, 1999; Kidger, 2002). 
In order to increase the generalisability of the study, a multiple case study strategy 
was adopted for this phase. Given the complex nature of international hotel 
chains, the unit of analysis at this stage was a hotel firm. In order to ensure 
comparability across the research findings, the international hotel firm is defined 
as a discrete organisational entity with responsibility for developing, operating and 
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supporting single or multiple branded portfolios. This definition enables the 
territory of the case to be bounded within the boundaries of a single organisation. 
For example, when franchising is employed, this definition includes the corporate 
and regional support for franchised properties within the hotel firm, but not the 
units where direct operational control is undertaken by the franchisee. Where the 
hotel firm is part of a larger diversified conglomerate, the discrete entity is defined 
as the hotel division. 
Using these definitions, a multiple but holistic case study strategy was employed 
drawing from the list of hotel chains identified in phase one. However, as this 
research sought to investigate firms that use multiple affiliations, only those firms 
that employed at least three different market entry methods were considered for 
selection. As such, it reflects a purposive sampling approach, considered 
appropriate for this type of research (Shaw, 1999; Hill, McGowan and Drummond, 
1999; Hill and Wright, 2001; O'Donnell, 2004; Alam, 2005). According to Shaw 
(1999: 63) the power of purposive sampling lies in the selection of cases rich in 
information about the research problem. 
Given the exploratory nature of this study, it was deemed important to gather data 
across as large a sample as possible. However, determining the appropriate 
number of cases is recognised as a difficult task (Yin, 1994). The desire for a 
comprehensive approach has to be considered in relation to the financial and time 
considerations of the researcher, and the danger of being overwhelmed by the 
amount of secondary and primary data collected. The sample at this phase 
comprised six hotel firms and this size is within the recommended range for 
multiple case studies (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shaw, 1999; 
Batonda and Perry, 2001). However, as the following section indicates, there are a 
number of limitations to case study research that must be addressed. 
b) Limitations of case study research 
Despite their potential, case study research strategies are not without critics. 
Perry (1998: 785) reports on the argument that one way to rectify the 'mindless 
empiricism of many doctoral dissertations would be to simply eliminate case study 
dissertations'. While this might be an extreme view, five main criticisms or 
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limitations of case study research are reported in the literature as researcher bias, 
generalisability, lack of rigour or reliability, validity and difficulty. 
The lack of objectivity of researchers is a recurring argument put forth by critics 
who insist that researcher bias may influence the direction of findings and the 
conclusions drawn (Bryman, 1992; Patten and Appelbaum, 2003; Guercini, 2004). 
However, the phenomenological paradigm reflects the belief that research is rarely 
value free and there are a number of ways to reduce bias. For example, multiple 
sources of evidence can be used to encourage convergent lines of enquiry (Yin, 
1994). Researchers are also advised to look for negative instances in the data 
and to check for possible alternative explanations during the analysis stage (Yin, 
1994; Stake, 1995; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Both of these approaches 
were adopted in this study to reduce bias. 
The lack of generalisability in case study research is perhaps one of the biggest 
criticisms (Hamel et al, 1993; Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995; Patten and Appelbaum, 
2003). However, Bryman (1992: 173) notes that 'the aim is not to infer findings 
from a sample to a population, but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical 
importance'. Finn et al (2001) support this notion and suggest that the aim of a 
case study is to understand particular and unique features of the case as well as 
to draw out analysis that has a wider applicability. Yin (1994) argues that this can 
be achieved through analytical, rather than statistical generalisation. Analytical 
generalisation is achieved through the comparison of empirical results to 
previously developed theory, as theory is built during the case study and not in 
advance (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001). Hartley (1994) argues that the 
researcher should also be able to untangle case-specific conditions from those of 
a more generic nature where the phenomenon will be theoretically expected to 
occur in the same way. In addition, Patten and Appelbaum (2003) report that the 
generalisability of the case study is determined by the strength of the description 
of the context. 
Lack of rigour in case study strategy is another noted criticism (Yin, 1994; Rowley, 
2002; Patten and Appelbaum, 2003) that relates to the reliability of the research 
and whether subsequent studies would arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions (Yin, 2003). This limitation however, is easy to overcome through the 
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use of a case study protocol to guide data collection (Yin, 1994; Perry, 1998; De 
Weerd-Nederhof, 2001; Rowley, 2002; Alam, 2005). Alam (2005) advises that 
protocols consist of details of informants, interview schedules, ethical 
considerations and research instruments. Yin (1994) also argues that making the 
steps as operational as possible is a good way to deal with the problem of 
reliability. He advises on creating a chain of evidence so that the reader can 
follow from research question to the conclusions drawn. Patten and Appelbaum 
(2003: 66) recommend that reliability can be increased by13, 
`analysing data in different spaces, at different times and in 
different contexts; ... and using different data sources to 
study the same object.. . all serve to attain triangulation and increase confidence in conclusions. ' 
Reige (2003) claims that critics are also concerned with the validity of case study 
research which addresses the issue of whether what is measured is actually what 
the researcher intends to measure. Reige (2003) contends that few scientific 
techniques have been developed to test validity and reliability in qualitative case 
studies in particular. Drawing on the works of Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), Yin (1994) and Marshall and Rossman (1999), he identifies a 
number of techniques to increase construct, internal and external validity as well 
as reliability. 
Yin (1994) defines construct validity as the establishment of appropriate 
operational measures, internal validity as the establishment of causal relationships 
and external validity as establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be 
generalised. Yin (1994) advises however, that internal validity is only relevant for 
explanatory case studies, and not for descriptive or exploratory ones. Reige (2003) 
proposes various techniques that are appropriate to achieve validity and reliability 
in case study research. For example, multiple sources of data and chains of 
evidence can increase construct validity and in qualitative studies these sources of 
evidence can be triangulated. This technique is 'the act of bringing more than one 
source of data to bear on a single point' (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 94) and is 
discussed in further detail below. External validity can be increased by comparing 
13 Appelbaum (2003) also suggests using different researchers from different backgrounds during 
the analysis phase, but this approach is obviously not suitable for this study. 
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findings with the extant literature and reliability increased by the development of 
case study protocols and databases. Table 4.3 depicts the different techniques to 
overcome the limitations of case study research and the phase of the research in 
which they should occur. 
The final limitation perceived with a case study strategy is its difficulty (Hartley, 
1994; Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001; Rowley, 2002). Hartley (1994) counsels that 
the researcher is often faced with an overwhelming amount of data to try to sort 
and analyse. As a result, it is a labour-intensive strategy and researchers have a 
tendency to be overly descriptive when writing up (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 
2001). However, these final limitations can also be overcome through careful 
planning and the application of specific analytical techniques. 
The preceding argument identifies that a case study research strategy can 
produce valuable organisational studies as long as the researcher builds 
measures into the research design to overcome potential limitations. This study 
adopted a number of measures as marked in Table 4.3, including the use of a 
case study protocol, multiple sources of evidence, triangulation, comparing 
evidence with extant literature and the creation of a case study database. 
Specified procedures were also followed through the data collection process as 
identified below. 
ii) Data Collection 
This phase of the research involved the collection of both primary and secondary 
data, a common practice in case study research. Blaxter et al (2001) argue that 
secondary data can complement primary data as it can help confirm, modify or 
contradict findings. Yin (1994) identifies three types of secondary data collection 
techniques available as document review, archival analysis and physical artefacts. 
While the latter technique is normally associated with ethnographic studies, the 
first two are appropriate for this study. Collecting documents from external sources 
such as journals, newspapers and Internet sites enabled the researcher to build a 
background to the case prior to primary data collection. Marshall and Rossman 
(1999) report that document review is useful for describing complex interactions, 
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inhibit researcher bias. Archival analysis, or internal data collection was also 
deemed suitable for this research. Yin (1994) categorises organisation charts 
within the domain of archival records. As one of the objectives of this research is 
to determine the formal structure of international hotel chains these records were 
considered essential to inform this study. The suitability of document review and 
archival analysis in case study research is supported by a number of studies 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Kanter, 1994; Malnight, 1995; Golden and Powell, 
1999; Kidger, 2002). Secondary data collection is also deemed a good way of 
supplementing research interviews (Bryman, 1992; Marshall and Rossman, 1999) 
and as the following section explains, this was the primary data collection 
technique employed in this study. 
Primary Data Collection 
Interviews are well recognised as appropriate for social science research (Lucas, 
1999; Wood, 1999) and in particular, organisational case studies (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1993; Kanter, 1994; Malnight, 1995). Clark et al (1998: 32) suggest the 
reason for this is because the interview 'is most useful when it gives insight into 
how individuals and groups think about their world. ' Easterby-Smith et al (2002) 
add that they are appropriate when it is necessary to understand the constructs 
that the interviewee uses as a basis for opinions and beliefs to develop an 
understanding of the respondent's world. Interviews are therefore an appropriate 
data collection method to determine how international hotel chains are designed 
and in particular, to develop a clear understanding of the organisational processes 
used within these designs that may not be formally documented. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) identify a number of advantages of interviews 
including their flexibility, their ability to foster face-to-face interaction, provide 
contextual information, facilitate immediate follow-up for clarification, and their 
utility in describing complex interactions. Interviews are also purported to be 
useful for obtaining data on nonverbal behaviour that enable researchers to 
assess emotions, values and attitudes of informants (Clark et al, 1998; Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999). 
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However, there are also a number of limitations associated with interview 
techniques. For example, its inherent flexibility provides the opportunity for bias to 
seep into the research (Lucas, 1999; Wisker, 2001). Easterby-Smith et al (2002) 
counter argue that if the research is adopting a phenomenological approach there 
is no one objective point of view to be discovered that could be subject to bias. 
However, the authors do concede that the interviewer may inflict their own 
personal frame of reference on the interview, both when asking and interpreting 
questions. In order to overcome this limitation, a number of techniques were 
adopted as advised by the authors. For instance, open-ended questions were 
employed and when drawing out respondent answers either silent probes or the 
respondents own words were used. Lucas (1999) suggests that interviews are 
also time consuming and can be expensive. Other limitations of interviews are 
cited as the need for the researcher to gain cooperation of respondents who may 
have particular reasons for hiding the truth, the potential for volumes of data 
generated, and the difficulty in replication (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). 
However, as the preceding discussion has indicated, replication is not necessarily 
an issue in inductive research, but some degree of consistency to facilitate 
comparability is important and this was provided through the structure of the 
interview. Semi-structured interviews based on defined themes were used. 
Compared to structured interviews, these allow for a greater degree of flexibility to 
pursue emergent lines of enquiry (O'Donnell, 2004), yet they also provide a 
sufficient degree of structure to facilitate comparability of data (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999). 
Interviews conducted with senior or influential organisation members are termed 
key informant (Bryman, 1992) or elite (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) interviews. 
This practice is frequently used in organisational studies as it provides an 
economical approach to gaining 'global' data on an organisation (Bryman, 
1992: 49). Marshall and Rossman (1999) advise that while they may be more 
difficult to gain access to, key informants can provide a more holistic overview and 
thus are a valuable source of information. Key informant interviews were therefore 
adopted for this study in order to gain this holistic view of design, an approach 
supported by the studies of Malnight (1995 and 2001), Golden and Powell (1999) 
and Kidger (2002). 
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iii) Designing the Research Instrument 
Even in inductive studies, it is advisable to use the literature to inform the research 
and build a conceptual framework for investigation (Marshall and Rossman, 1999) 
or a map of the territory to be investigated (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Perry 
(1998: 788) recommends that 'starting from scratch with an absolutely clean 
theoretical slate is neither practical nor preferred'. This step enables the 
researcher to formulate a clear research question to better focus research efforts 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and avoid data overload (Hartley, 1994: 217). Determining 
which literature is relevant is aided by the clear definition of the unit of analysis (De 
Weerd-Nederhof, 2003). In this study, the initial review of the literature on 
international market entry, alliance and network management, and organisation 
design enabled the researcher to develop a number of research propositions. 
These propositions formed the starting point in the development of the research 
instrument, as did the identification of the dimensions of organisation and inter- 
organisational design. 
iv) Testing the Research Instrument 
In order to test the validity of this instrument, a pilot study was conducted with one 
hotel firm, identified for this study as Firm A. This firm is affiliated with two of the 
hotel chains identified in phase one, through three different franchise agreements. 
Accessibility and geographical location were used to select this firm; an approach 
Yin (1994) suggests is acceptable for pilot studies. An interview was held with a 
key informant from the corporate level which lasted around one and one-half 
hours, was tape-recorded and transcribed. A copy of the raw transcript is included 
in Appendix A. Immediately following the interview a case study summary sheet 
was written to capture initial impressions, observations and reflections on relevant 
issues as advised by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Perry (1998). Prior to the 
interview, secondary data was gathered on the pilot firm through desk research. 
Company documentation including the organisation chart was requested at the 
time of the interview. After several follow up phone calls, these documents were 
received. 
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A profile of this pilot study firm was written up drawing on and triangulating 
secondary and primary data. This process enabled the researcher to test whether 
the data collection methods and the research instrument provided the necessary 
data to achieve sufficient understanding of 'how' international hotel chains are 
designed and thus the overall aim and objectives of the study. However, it also 
led to a refinement of the research instrument as identified in Appendix B. Using 
this refined research instrument, data collection for phase two of this study got 
underway. 
v) Negotiating Access and Ethical Considerations 
Access was negotiated to six firms from the hotel chains identified in phase one 
using a purposive sampling approach. Access refers to both formal permission 
from senior management to gather data, and more informal access to people and 
documents (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest 
negotiating access is an iterative process and within the study the researcher had 
to undergo a good deal of negotiation with senior managers and their gatekeepers 
to undertake this study. An opportunistic approach using contacts within 
organisations was employed in this study, an approach advocated by Easterby- 
Smith et al (2002) and Robson (2002). 
In order to facilitate access, a project summary was developed. This summary 
was designed for two main reasons; firstly to stimulate interest in the research 
study and secondly to address relevant ethical issues up front. To attract interest 
in the research, the summary sought to clearly explain the purpose of the research 
and its potential value to international hotel chains and to the individuals who 
participated. It therefore sought to establish an element of reciprocity (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 2002). It also set out to clearly explain the commitment required by 
individual informants so that they could determine the trade-off between their time 
and the potential value of the research. Finally, in order to reassure the 
participants and their organisations, it also aimed to establish the credibility of the 
researcher to enhance the perceived value of the research. The summary sheet 
was provided to the initial contacts within the case study organisations and then 
provided to each key informant in advance of the interview. In some instances, it 
was also sent to gatekeepers of the informants. If further information about the 
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nature of the research interview was requested, the prospective participants were 
sent a copy of the indicative themes for discussion drawn from the research 
instrument. 
The project summary also proved useful in addressing a number of ethical 
concerns in organisational studies. Veal (1997) reports that ethics address issues 
of the rights of individuals and the reporting of results. Robson (2002: 65) advises 
more simply that ethics refers 'to rules of conduct'. The summary used in this 
research sought to address both of these issues. It requested individuals to 
participate in the study and advised their identity and that of their organisation 
would be kept confidential, as recommended by de Weerd-Nederhof (2001). While 
ownership of the data collected is another ethical issue for consideration, the 
summary sheet did not specifically address this issue and nor was it raised 
subsequently by any informants or made a condition of access. However, a 
number of steps were undertaken subsequent to data collection in line with ethical 
practice and these are discussed below. A copy of the project summary can be 
found in Appendix C. 
v) Conducting the Interviews 
Using this research instrument, semi-structured interviews were held with a key 
informant from each of the six cases. The interviews were held with corporate 
level informants in the home country of each firm. The one exception is Firm D 
where the informant had regional responsibility. Each interview lasted 
approximately one and one half to two hours (eleven hours in total) and was tape- 
recorded for accuracy. As familiar surroundings are conducive to relaxed and 
open discussions (Hill et al, 1999), interviews were conducted in the informants' 
office. Table 4.4 contains a list of the interviews conducted, the sample firms, their 
key characteristics and the position occupied by the key informant. 
During the interviews, care was taken to follow the procedures identified above to 
avoid introducing bias. Each interviewee was offered the completed transcripts for 
validation; however, none of the informants were willing to undertake this process. 
In one instance an informant contacted the researcher following the interview and 
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Table 4.4 Research Interviews in Phase Two 
Hotel Characteristics Key Informant 
Firm 
Firm A UK plc that is affiliated with two firms identified IA: Director of Marketing 
(pilot) in phase one 
Firm B European operator of 5 global brands; part of IB: Vice President Strategy and 
a lar, er, multi-division is Development 
Firm C North American operator of 5 brands; part of a IC: Vice President Human 
larger, multi-division privately-owned company Resources 
Firm D North American plc that operates 2 brands, ID: Regional Director Operations 
one in the home country and one 
internationally 
Firm E Asia Pacific plc that operates 2 hotel brands IE: Chief Operating Officer 
Firm F North American plc that operates 2 hotel IF: Vice President Operations 
brands 
Firm G European operator of 2 brands; part of a IG: Vice President Distribution 
larger, multi-division pic Services 
this was to double-check the anonymity of responses. When offered a copy of the 
transcript again, it was once more declined. The reason given by most informants 
was that they were confident that the tape-recording process would ensure 
accuracy. However, the researcher suspects in reality, it was the reluctance to 
commit further time to this project. Repeated efforts were made to ensure that 
transcripts were recorded accurately and the primary data was triangulated with 
secondary data to overcome this potential limitation. Immediately following each 
interview, a case summary overview sheet was written to record observations 
about the interview. An example is included in Appendix D. 
vi) Triangulating the Evidence 
The concept of triangulation was introduced previously in this chapter. Yin (1994) 
argues that the value of triangulation is in corroboration, elaboration and 
illumination of data and possible interpretations of that data. As such, it increases 
the validity of the findings (Clark et al, 1998; Reige, 2003). As access was granted 
to only one informant from each of these firms, other data sources were 
considered essential for triangulation purposes. Brotherton (1999) suggests that a 
research study can be likened to a jigsaw puzzle where the use of multiple data 
sources ensures the researcher can complete the full puzzle and see the whole 
picture. Nonetheless, Clark et al (1998) caution that the generation of a greater 
range of data can also lead to a loss of focus by the researcher. Marshall and 
Rossman (1999) therefore recommend that research considerations at this stage 
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should include practicality, efficiency and feasibility. Rowley (2003) advises 
however, that in case study research the actual data or evidence to be gathered is 
defined as it is collected. 
As with the pilot study, documents were collected from external sources prior and 
subsequent to the interviews taking place. These documents included corporate 
press releases, annual and interim accounts and reports, hospitality analyst and 
investor reports and academic and trade journal articles. This secondary data 
served to enable to the researcher to update the profile developed during phase 
one as well as provide insight into the development and growth of the firm, recent 
design changes and organisational practices. During the interview internal 
company documents, including the organisation chart, employee magazines, 
company newsletters and brochures, internal memos, job descriptions, brand 
standards and operating procedures were requested. These documents served to 
provide detailed insight into the organisational processes of the different firms and 
to corroborate informant responses. For instance, organisation charts identified 
the degree of complexity and differentiation within the firms and the reporting lines 
between the different layers. Brand and operating standards and job descriptions 
revealed the extent to which formalisation was used within the firms to retain 
centralised control. A list of external and internal documents collected is included 
in Table 4.5. While not all of the documents listed in the table were available for all 
firms, at least eight types of documentation were collected for each case, including 
the organisation chart. All documents obtained, the tape recordings and their 
transcripts were stored securely in a case study database for ethical reasons. 
Summary of Phase Two 
As only a single interview was conducted within each firm at this stage, it could be 
argued that these cases were rather limited. However, they do constitute a case 
according to the definitions provided earlier in this chapter. In addition, care was 
taken to triangulate the data. This strategy yielded a number of key findings and 
these are reported in detail in the following chapter. However it is important to 
note at this point that the diversity in organisation structures and processes 
employed for different brands within the portfolios of the sample firms clearly 
indicated the complexity of organisational design within international hotel chains. 
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Table 4.5 Secondary Document Collection 
Data Source Type of Document 
Internal Brand Standards 
Internal Brand Operating Procedures 
Internal Company Newsletters 
Internal Corporate Brochures and Directories 
Internal Employee Magazines 
Internal Organisation Charts 
Internal Job Descriptions 
Internal Memos 
Internal/external* Annual Accounts and Reports 
Internal/external* Interim Accounts and Reports 
Internal/external* Corporate Press Releases 
Internal/external* Corporate Web Site 
External Analyst Reports 
External Investor Reports 
External Articles Trade Magazines 
External Articles Academic Journals 
Internal/external': this data is published by the company but was accessed through external 
sources. 
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In order to develop a clearer understanding of design issues, the unit of analysis 
was redefined for phase three of the research. 
4.4.3 Phase Three: Investigating Inter-Organisational Design 
i) Purpose and Strategy 
The final phase of the research sought to explore designs across organisational 
boundaries. A case study strategy was again deemed the most appropriate, 
however this phase employed an in-depth embedded case study. Yin (2003) 
purports that single case studies are appropriate for typical or representative case 
studies and for revelatory case studies where the phenomenon has not been 
observed before. The case adopted for this phase is one international hotel brand 
operated by Firm C. Phase two of this study identified this to be a typical case of a 
diversely affiliated hotel firm. -, Firm C wholly owns this brand and individual hotels 
are operated through ownership, management agreements, strategic alliances and 
different types of franchise agreements that provide various levels of support. A 
brand was adopted as-the unit of analysis as the territory bound within the case 
included the owner of the hotel brand and its affiliated partners. In this way, inter- 
organisational designs could be explored. In addition, this approach enabled 
multiple perspectives on design and management to be gathered in order to 
increase the validity of the findings. The territory bounded for this case study 
therefore is Brand C1 and its hotels. Within this territory are two affiliated firms that 
have operated hotels under franchise agreements with the owner of the brand for 
over ten years. This case also allowed for further research into the design issues 
identified in phase two. The case represents an exploratory single embedded 
case study (Yin, 2003) as there are two dyadic agreements explored between the 
Brand Owner and each affiliated firm. 
ii) Primary Data Collection 
Using the project summary sheet further access was negotiated to key informants 
within the three affiliated firms. Multiple interviews were held in each firm to 
provide cross-checking opportunities and increase the accuracy of the findings 
(Bryman, 1992). Ten interviews were conducted over a period of three years with 
respondents in three continents and four different countries of operation, totalling 
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approximately fifteen hours. These interviews are in addition to that conducted 
with Firm C in phase two of the research. While seven of the interviews were 
conducted in person following the processes employed in phase two, three were 
conducted by telephone. Two instances were as a result of the key informants 
being called away at the last minute, despite the researcher having flown to the 
corporate headquarters. The third telephone interview was planned. Given the 
distance and expense involved, it was not considered feasible to travel to one 
regional division of the Brand Owner. While there are limitations associated with 
telephone interviews, Bryman (1992) reports on their feasibility. Lucas (1999: 80) 
argues that telephone research may increase respondents' feelings of relative 
anonymity and this reduced intimacy may make it easier to elicit sensitive 
information. However, many researchers recognise that telephone interviewing 
does not allow the researcher to pick up on nonverbal clues, although Clark et al 
(1998: 132) suggest that the loss of non-verbal clues gained through direct 
observation can be overcome by listening to the 'silences' and a 'paralanguage of 
humphs and grunts'. 
All individual respondents identified were working within the corporate level of their 
respective firms with different responsibility for brand development. While one of 
the informants was at the regional level, this region is operated under a joint 
venture agreement and the informant works within the corporate level of the firm 
created to run the joint venture. While this agreement potentially creates a third 
dyadic relationship for exploration, insufficient data was obtained about this 
particular agreement to include within the findings. In each of the three firms 
included in this study, at least two respondents had been involved in the original 
development of the affiliation between the firms thereby providing longitudinal 
perspectives that are considered important in alliance research (Buono, 1997; 
Arino et at, 1998; Ahuja, 2000; Perks and Halliday, 2003; Wagner, 2003; Lavie, 
2004). For each of the affiliated firms, two interviews were held within a relatively 
short space of time and one further interview conducted some time later. This 
process enabled the researcher to look for gaps in the data collected and to 
identify issues that needed further clarification. It also enabled the researcher to 
overcome potential limitations on verifying the data experienced in phase two by 
providing an additional cross checking opportunity. The interviews were tape 
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recorded and transcribed following the same procedures as the previous phase. 
In addition, a case summary sheet was written immediately following each 
interview. Care was taken to follow the case study protocol to facilitate 
comparability, increase accuracy and address ethical issues. However, further 
refinement of the research instrument was required at this phase as indicated in 
Appendix E. The details of the interviews conducted are included in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Research Interviews in Phase Thrpp 
Hotel Characteristics Key Informants 
Firm Labelled in order undertaken) 
Brand North American owner of " IBO1: Executive Vice President 
Owner international brand that Development 
(Firm uses diverse market entry C)" methods " IB02: Vice President of Marketing 
" IB03: Executive Director Operations 
(one geographic subsidiary run as a joint 
venture) 
" IB04: CEO of Brand 
Affiliate European Owner of " IAffA1: Director of Marketing and Sales A domestic brand that 
operates its portfolio under " IAffA2: Director of Marketing 
a franchise agreement with 
the Brand Owner " IAffA3: Commercial Development Director 
Affiliate European Owner of " IAffB1: Director of Marketing B international brands that 
operates one brand under a " lAffB2: Director of Development franchise agreement with the 
Brand Owner but also uses " lAffB3: Chief Financial Officer diverse market entry methods 
within its portfolio 
iii) Secondary Data Collection 
As with phase two, documents were collected from external sources prior and 
subsequent to the interviews taking place. Company documents, including the 
organisation chart, were requested during the interviews. This secondary data was 
used for triangulation purposes in the same manner as in phase two of the 
research The internal and external secondary sources used to triangulate the 
findings for this case study are listed in Table 4.5. For each partner firm, at least 
eight data sources were collected, including the organisation chart. All documents 
were stored together in a case study database (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) that 
remained restricted to the researcher according to the ethical procedures 
discussed above. 
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Summary of Phase Three 
This final phase of the research sought to explore inter-organisational design 
through an in-depth, embedded and typical case study. In order to do this, it 
followed the protocol adopted in phase two. This phase also signified the end of 
the data collection. The following section explains how the data was analysed. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
Within qualitative research studies, data collection and data analysis frequently 
overlap (Mintzberg, 1979; Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt, 2001; Gibbs, 2004). Gibbs 
(2004: 2) suggests that the process of qualitative data analysis is 'commonly 
iterative, recursive and dynamic' and as a result, researchers do not feel 
constrained to keep data analysis as a separate phase of the research. In this 
study there was considerable overlap between data collection and analysis and 
this was viewed as a way of continually refining the research and exploring issues 
that emerged. 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 16) identify 'three concurrent flows of activity' in data 
analysis as data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing. The authors 
explain that these steps help the reader to 'follow how a researcher got from 3600 
pages of field notes to the final conclusions. ' The steps undertaken for data 
analysis during phase two and three of this study are explained below according to 
these three activities. 
4.5.1 Data Reduction 
Miles and Huberman (1994) define data reduction as a process for selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming data. Brotherton (1999) 
advises that the first step involves scanning and initial coding of data for 
organisation purposes. Bryman (2004) notes that given the unstructured nature of 
qualitative data, a great deal of thought must go into the process of reduction. 
In this study, the researcher first went through a process of familiarisation with the 
data generated (Altinay, 2001). For the primary data, this involved listening to 
audiotapes several times to understand their content. The transcripts were then 
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read through repeatedly in order to start to establish key concepts contained within 
them. The secondary data was next examined to identify key concepts that 
matched those within the primary data. Rowley (2002) notes that good qualitative 
analysis makes use of all relevant evidence and this process was essential to 
triangulating the primary and secondary data. 
The primary data, including interview transcripts and case study memos were then 
entered into NVivo, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) programme. Bryman (2004) argues that CAQDAS facilitates the 
operation of the key steps involved in analysis. Gibbs (2004: 11) presents a 
stronger argument that this software makes data analysis easier, more accurate, 
more reliable and more transparent. Lee and Esterhauizen (2000) suggest these 
programmes facilitate data management, enhance the researcher's grasp of the 
data and control tendencies towards superficiality. This software also facilitated 
the initial coding of the data. In the first instance, descriptive coding (Gibbs, 2002) 
was undertaken using the themes contained within the research instrument. The 
codes used at this stage therefore included: 
" Informant background 
" Organisation history 
" Organisation culture 
" Growth strategy 
" Organisation structure 
" Control 
" Communication 
" Decision Making 
According to Bryman (2004: xix) this step helps the researcher to 'boil down and 
conceptualise' the data. A second stage of descriptive coding was then 
undertaken related to the different market entry methods employed by the sample 
firms using the following codes: 
" Ownership 
" Leasehold 





This process enabled the researcher to compare and contrast the data generated 
through these different codes. In addition, for each data set a process of constant 
comparison (Gibbs, 2004) was undertaken, involving repeated reviews of the 
transcripts and the codes to ensure accuracy and consistency. 
Using NVivo, all data coded under a particular construct heading is stored under a 
node. The data stored under each node was then further coded according to 
emergent concepts or themes. This represents interpretive coding (Gibbs, 2004) 
and can be undertaken using either the researcher's or the informant's views or a 
pre-existing theory or framework. For example, informants in phase three of the 
research frequently used the term 'relationship' and this became an interpretive 
code. 
NVivo enables the researcher to create different types of nodes; case, 
freestanding and tree nodes. Case nodes refer to any data belonging to an 
individual case. In this study, each firm in phase two is treated as an individual 
case for the purpose of this analysis. In addition, in line with the unit of analysis of 
phase three, each dyadic inter-firm agreement is also a case. Free nodes are not 
linked in any way to any other nodes created, but can be traced to individual 
cases. For example, informant background is a free node that links to each hotel 
firm, but not necessarily to any other node. Tree nodes enable the researcher to 
identify themes that emerge within codes, creating a hierarchy of nodes that are 
interrelated. For instance, the codes for control, decision-making and 
communication were each broken down into nodes related to formal and informal 
processes. Informal control processes were then categorised as coordination. The 
interpretive code of relationships was subsequently broken down into a number of 
categories from partner selection to relationship management. In a similar 
manner, this round of coding enabled the researcher to break down nodes for the 
different market entry methods into sub nodes for structure, control, 
communication and decision-making. This process is referred to as In-Vivo coding 
(Gibbs, 2004). An example of how these coding relationships work is contained in 
Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Codina with NVivo 
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Different colour codes were used to identify the different stages of analysis for the 
data sets. Each node had a full description to ensure consistency in the coding 
process and linked memos (Shaw, 1999) were created to record details on the 
coding process. An example of a memo is included in Appendix F. This coding 
process was repeated for all the different nodes until there were no further 
emergent themes. A similar coding process was also undertaken for secondary 
data collected. However, given the diverse nature of the documentation collected 
this was undertaken manually. 
4.5.2 Data Display 
Miles and Huberman (1994) define data display as the organised and compressed 
assembly of information. Using the coded data contained within the different free 
and tree nodes, documents were created within NVivo to start to record the 
findings. The data was therefore split in a number of different ways. In the first 
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instance, the data was written up as a profile for each firm using the original codes 
in the research instrument and the emergent codes. This within-case analysis 
helps the researcher to gain familiarity with data and allows patterns to emerge 
before generalisation is undertaken (Eisenhardt, 1989; Rowley, 2002). An example 
of a case profile is included in Appendix G. 
In the second instance, the data was written up for display according to the 
different market entry methods employed but according to the original codes. This 
process resulted in the creation of documents related to owned and leased hotels, 
hotels operated under management agreements and franchised hotels. Appendix 
H contains a sample of this data display. Both types of data display were used for 
comparative purposes, and a number of themes emerged through this process. 
This procedure enabled the researcher to cross check the findings from a number 
of different angles, check for negative cases and ensure that data was exhausted 
(Gibbs, 2004) in order to increase the reliability and validity of the findings. Rowley 
(2002: 540) notes the cross case comparisons are important to reduce the dangers 
of leaping to conclusions, being overly influenced by some data or respondents, or 
inadvertently dropping disconfirming evidence. The author argues that the way to 
counteract these tendencies is to look at the data in divergent ways. The 
approach adopted in this study sought to `go beyond initial impressions through 
structured and diverse lenses on the data to improve the likelihood of accurate and 
reliable theory' (Rowley, 2002: 540). This process also enabled the researcher to 
reach a point of closure (Eisenhardt, 2000; Hartley, 1994; Yin, 1994). Eisenhardt 
(2000) reports that this is the stage when the iteration process stops, as the 
incremental improvement to the theory is minimal. 
4.5.3 Conclusion Drawing 
The final activity identified by Miles and Huberman (1994) concerns the induction 
of meaning from data and testing for validity. Patten and Appelbaum (2003: 67) 
argue that creating links back to the literature is one way of determining the validity 
of the research so that conclusions can be drawn. There is much support in the 
literature for the use of this process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perry, 1998). Eisenhardt 
(1989) further advises that both confirming and conflicting literature is important to 
raise theoretical levels. While the comparison with conflicting literature sharpens 
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construct definition, the comparison with similar literature sharpens generalisability 
and improves construct definition. The final stage of the research design therefore 
sought to relate the themes that emerged from the research back to the extant 
literature so that conclusions could be drawn. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter sought to explain and justify the research design adopted for this 
study. An inductive and qualitative approach to the study has been argued to be 
the most appropriate to provide a detailed picture of all the dimensions of 
organisational and inter-organisational design and achieve the research aim and 
objectives. This chapter also justified the need for different research phases in 
order to verify the extent of the phenomena and then to determine organisational 
and inter-organisational designs employed in diverse affiliations. The research 
process is summarised in Figure 4.3. The following chapter presents the findings 
from these different phases according to emergent themes. Chapter Six then 
relates these back to the extant literature before conclusions are drawn in the final 
chapter. 
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Figure 4.3 The Research Process 
initial literature review conducted 
I 
PHASE ONE: VERFICATION OF PHENOMONA 
descriptive research strategy 
identification of potential cases 
I 
PHASE TWO: EXPLORING ORGANISATION DESIGN 
development of research instrument 
pilot study 
in-depth interview with Firm A 
secondary data collection (pre and post interview) 
data input, coding and analysis 
development of profile Firm A 
I 
redevelopment of research instrument (appendix B) 
I 
access negotiated to multiple cases 
semi-structured interviews Firm B, C, D, E, F&G 
secondary data collection (before, during and post interview) 
data input, coding and analysis 
development of firm profiles (Appendix G) 
development of profiles by market entry (Appendix H) 
I 
adaptation of research design to brand level 
I 
PHASE THREE: EXPLORING INTER-ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN 
main case study with three affiliated firms (single embedded case study) 
I 
refinement of research interview (Appendix E) 
access negotiated to key informants 
semi-structured interviews (10 interviews with Brand Owner, Affiliate A& B) 
secondary data collection (before, during and post interview) 
data input, coding and analysis 
data reduction and display 
development of affiliate profiles (Appendix I& J) 
I 





5. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the findings from the three different research phases. It 
begins by presenting the findings generated from the secondary data collected for 
phase one. The findings from phase two and three that draw on both primary and 
secondary data are then presented according to emergent themes. 
5.2 Phase One: The Extent of the Phenomenon 
As previously identified, this phase of the research served to verify the extent of 
the phenomenon under study. The secondary data sources used enabled the 
researcher to identify 35 international hotel chains that operate in at least five 
countries and use more than one market entry method. These diversely affiliated 
hotel chains are representative of the largest industry players as identified through 
the Hotels Magazine annual research survey in 2000. In total, the hotel chains 
operate 5,176,528 rooms or 64% of the `Corporate 300' (Dela Cruz and Wolchuk, 
2000) global room stock between them. They comprise 42,130 hotels or 58% of 
the corporate hotel stock. Table 5.1 displays these international hotel chains and 
their operating characteristics. 
As Table 5.1 indicates, the hotel chains are drawn from three main geographical 
regions; 17 from the EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa), 12 from the 
Americas, and 6 from the Asia Pacific. Ownership and management contracts are 
the most popular type of affiliation across the sample, followed by franchising and 
then by joint ventures and alliances. However, the data does not reveal how joint 
ventures are distinguished from alliance agreements within these chains and to 
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Table 5.1 reveals that all the chains from the USA use franchising. However, 
there are no clear geographical patterns depicted with other types of affiliation. 
Hotel chains from all geographical regions use ownership, management contracts, 
joint ventures and alliance agreements. What the findings do reveal however, is 
that those chains that utilise the most types of affiliations are also the most 
geographically diverse. For example, the three firms that use all five types of 
affiliation all operate in over 50 countries. Of the 35 chains listed, 27 employ at 
least three distinct market entry methods. Given the international market locations 
of the individual hotel units within the chains, these findings support the 
contingency perspective for modal choice decisions (Contractor and Kundu, 
1998a; 1998b). Secondary data reinforces this finding. For example, the CEO of 
the hotel division of Firm C revealed as far back as 1995 that expansion was, 'not 
restricted by geographical boundaries, not limited by narrow strategies. ' Company 
and investment reports reveal that Firm C continues to employ different entry 
modes for different brands in different regions to take advantage of opportunities 
available. Similarly, the CEO for Firm B reports in their 2000 Annual Review that 
'in building brands we adopt different operating and ownership models as 
appropriate' and the CEO of Firm D reported in 2001 that its growth strategy would 
rely on diverse market entry modes. 
Table 5.1 also reveals that the majority of the chains operate more than one 
brand. However, what is not clearly depicted in Table 5.1 is whether these brands 
are proprietal. For example, Choice Hotels of the USA owns eight different 
brands, but Friendly Hotels of the UK operates its entire portfolio under one of 
these Choice brands. Similarly, Scandic Hotels of Sweden operates some of its 
portfolio under another Choice brand label. Wyndham Hotels of the USA operates 
some of its portfolio under the Wyndham brand name but also manages some 
other properties for other hotels as different brands. While this provides evidence 
of chains of affiliation, it also means that some hotel stock may be double counted 
in this annual survey, as the authors themselves recognise. Until recently, the list 
compiled by Hotels Magazine has always included a separate category for hotel 
management companies to prevent this double counting. However, as more and 
more affiliations are formed between different hotel chains, this task of separating 
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out different hotel firms and their portfolios becomes increasingly difficult. The 
current approach to ranking hotel chains is arguably far more reflective of the 
growing trend towards diverse affiliation and the use of inter-firm agreements 
within the industry. As Todd and Mather (1999: 22) point out, 
'the picture of consolidation, merger and acquisition has 
meant that the dividing lines of real estate hotel companies, 
management companies, and corporate chains either 
managing or franchising branded hotel properties have 
become ever more blurred. ' 
These findings clearly illustrate the complexity of many international hotel chains. 
The growing use of multiple methods of market entry, inter-firm alliances and the 
operation of both propriety and non-propriety brands demonstrates that traditional 
organisational boundaries between individual hotel chains are becoming harder to 
distinguish. These findings also indicate that international hotel chains provide a 
suitable context for the study of diverse affiliations. The potential complexity 
involved in designing and managing these chains is investigated in phase two of 
this study. 
5.3 Phase Two: Designing International Hotel Firms 
This phase sought to investigate the organisation design and management of 
international hotel chains but within the boundaries of individual firms. By focusing 
on the hotel firm as the unit of analysis, a clear line of distinction is drawn between 
different organisations involved in operating hotel portfolios. As many of the hotel 
chains identified in Table 5.1 are also part of larger, diversified conglomerates, the 
unit of analysis is defined as the hotel firm or hotel divisional level. This section 
begins with a brief introduction to the sample before presenting the findings 
according to three key themes that emerge from the data. 
5.3.1 The Research Sample 
The sample comprised six cases of international hotel firms from the list identified 
in Table 5.1. Using a purposive sampling approach the firms that were deemed 
suitable cases were those having at least three types of affiliations with their 
portfolio as identified in the research design. The operating characteristics of the 
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case firms are displayed in Table 5.2. However, as Table 5.2 indicates, during the 
course of undertaking primary research, Firm F began to reduce the types of 
marketing entry methods it employed. The case firms all operate multi-branded 
portfolios with headquarters in the Americas, EMEA, or Asia-Pacific. They vary in 
both size and extent of internationalisation, or the number of hotel rooms outside 
the home country. Organisation cultures (as described by informants) are also 
quite different yet all informants identify a link between the historical origins of their 
firm and the current organisation culture. Despite these differences, the analysis 
reveals three key themes associated with the design and management of these 
international hotel firms. 
5.3.2 Key Themes in Designing International Hotel Firms 
The three emergent themes comprise the changing nature of organisational 
designs, the reliance on traditional organisation designs, and the use of different 
designs within a firm's portfolio. Both primary and secondary data were used for 
triangulation purposes and within case and cross case analysis conducted to 
identify these themes. Where direct quotes are used for illustration, these are 
attributed to the relevant informant immediately following the quote using the 
coding scheme depicted in Table 4.4. 
i) Theme 1: The Nature of Change in Organisational Designs 
The data identifies that formal organisation structures of international hotel firms 
are subject to change. According to informants, structural adaptations are made in 
line with changes in international growth strategy. Two different adaptation 
patterns are depicted in this study and these reflect firm size and extent of 
internationalisation. The growth patterns of firms in early stages of 
internationalisation, such as Firm D and E, depict the first adaptation pattern. For 
these firms, structural changes amounted to an increase in international divisions 
and hierarchical positions to accommodate this growth. For example, the 
informant from Firm D reported that new management positions were recently 
created at corporate and country level for new international markets. This was 
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'a new development structure that is intended to accelerate 
growth through future acquisitions, joint ventures and new 
development opportunities. ' 
Informants identified a number of factors that influence the creation of new 
international divisions including: 
" the size or number of hotels in the geographical area, 
" the level of competence of individuals responsible for the area, 
" the economic climate in that region, 
" desired or key target markets and 
" the nature of ownership relationships. 
The first two factors are fairly self-explanatory. Once a certain number of hotels 
are developed in a geographical area, a new division is created. The specific 
number of hotels however, is dependent upon the other factors listed above. New 
divisions may be created more quickly if there is difficulty finding individuals 
deemed competent to run the hotels. This second factor is also related to the 
market level of the brand. For instance, informants considered upmarket and 
luxury properties to be more complex to manage and require a greater degree of 
competence. Economic stability of different areas also impacts positively on the 
willingness of firms to invest further resources to create new divisions. In addition, 
when target markets are global customers, informants identify a greater urgency to 
create divisions with appropriate hierarchal levels to enhance degrees of control 
afforded to the corporate office. This desire is driven by the need to ensure brand 
consistency for these homogenous customers. 
The nature of ownership relationships refers to the specific market entry methods 
employed. Informants suggested there is a preference for additional hierarchical 
layers of control in geographic regions with owned, leased and managed (OLM) 
properties. This preference is reported to be particularly important when corporate 
managers perceive the need to manage particularly difficult relationships with 
owners of hotels operated under management contract. One informant summed 
up this situation accordingly: 
'You've got arguably different priorities where you've got an 
owner to look after, to cosy up to all the time or a wholly-owned 
hotel where you sort of get on with things. ' (IG) 
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The second pattern of structural adaptation is somewhat different for firms with 
higher levels of intemationalisation, either with predominantly single brand (Firm F) 
or mutlibranded portfolios (Firm B or C). Growth strategies for these firms reflect 
the desire to further increase the size of their portfolios as well as achieve growth 
through higher financial returns. Structural changes have been designed to drive 
greater economic growth through better economies of scale. With this adaptation 
pattern, firms have sought to consolidate divisions in order to share functional 
support across different brands (Firm B and C) or different geographic regions 
(Firm G). Corporate downsizing was also reported within these adaptation 
patterns, for example in the new management structure reported to be recently 
adopted by Firm G. These changes were often described as more radical than 
those in the first adaptation pattern and quite frequent in some firms. For 
example, in Firm B, both primary and secondary data identify the latest structural 
change to be 'the third in four years' (IB). Similarly, Firm C was reported to, 
'... constantly evaluate, re-evaluate, change to meet the 
needs and the strategy, which is designed to meet the needs 
of the customers. So we are very flexible and fluid in the way 
that we do change organisational structure fairly often. That 
is we change the structure, because the strategy has 
changed. ' (IC) 
Structural changes to the case study firms therefore appear to be driven by 
organisational growth strategies and vary according to the stage of international 
development. In the early stages of internationalisation, they depict growth through 
additional divisions and hierarchical layers and in later stages, they reflect efforts 
to achieve a higher degree of integration. Despite these design adaptations, the 
data revealed a continued reliance on traditional design models. 
ii) Theme 2: Reliance on Traditional Design Models 
Three different organisation structures were used within the cases. Some firms 
employed a brand management structure with responsibilities further divided on a 
geographic basis whilst other firms used a geographic structure with responsibility 
further divided by brand or brand cluster. Only one firm was reported to use a 
third type of structure, a matrix structure, where different geographic subdivisions 
had dotted lines of reporting to different functional units at the corporate level. 
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Simplified versions of these structures drawn from the organisation charts 
collected are depicted in Figure 5.1. These structures are generally associated 
with traditional models of organisation design. The data also reveals that two key 
structural dimensions, centralisation and formalisation, feature prominently in 
these firms. 
Centralisation and Underpinning Organisational Processes 
Company organisation charts depict clearly defined organisational layers of 
authority and the reporting lines between them. While the exact number of 
organisational layers varied across the sample, the informants perceived these 
structures to be 'hierarchical' (IC), 'highly centralised' (ID), and even 'bureaucratic' 
(IB). Two main reasons were reported for using these types of structures. For 
one firm it was perceived as a type of motivational tool to enable employees to 
accelerate through the organisation. It was suggested that, 
'there is a lot of perceived value at the bottom where someone 
can go from being a Receptionist to a Senior Receptionist to 
whatever they would go to next. In this society there is quite a 
lot of value in a title. ' (IE) 
The other key reason for using a centralised structure however appears to be 
related to retaining control. The evidence of this is predominantly found in the 
decision-making procedures reported by informants. It was suggested that much 
decision-making power remains at the corporate level, even if 'much of the 
legwork' (IG) or the 'crunching of numbers' (IF) is undertaken at regional levels. 
While these decision-making processes were reported to frequently create a 
'bottleneck' (IB) at the corporate level and slow down the decision-making 
process, these were perceived necessary to retain organisational control. 
However, it was recognised that there needed to be a trade off between financial 
gains and customer satisfaction. One informant summed this up by suggesting, 
'the key factors to try and consider is the degree to which 
centralisation creates financial benefits versus the impact 
that it could have in terms of customer requirements. ' (IG) 
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Figure 5.1 Organisation Structures in Phase Two Firms 
1) Brand Structure Adopted by Firms B, C, D 
CEO & Board of 
Directors 
Brand A Brand B 
2) Geographic Structure Adopted by Firms E, G 







Americas EMEA L Asia Pacific 
Brand AII Brand B Brand AII Brand B Brand AII Brand B 
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Figure 5.1 continued 
3) Structure Adopted by Firm F* 
CEO & Board of I 
Directors 











The structures above have been adapted from the actual company organisation charts 
collected. 
*While the informants indicated there were dotted reporting lines from corporate functional 
areas to the regional subdivisions indicative of a matrix structure, these were not depicted on 
the organisation chart. 
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However, within this trade-off, the general perception of informants was 
reflected in the following comments related to the fact that it was 
impossible to create a structure, 
'in the belief that you are going to win the game by simply 
finding 250 good GMs [general mangers] at any one time. I 
mean that isn't going to happen for a start so you need some 
sort of regional management structure. ' (IG) 
Centralised decision-making appears to be one of the key ways to ensure that 
control is maintained. Ironically, informants perceived that there was a good deal 
of decision-making autonomy given to GMs of individual hotels. However, this 
perception is not fully supported by the data, particularly within marketing and 
finance functions. All informants emphasised the need to control the marketing of 
branded hotel products centrally. The data suggests that centralised control over 
customer databases, distribution systems and brand collateral are particularly 
important. Welcome key booklets given to guests when they check in provide a 
good example of control over brand collateral: 
'There is a certain amount of information that they [the 
booklets] all have to have inside them. And they can't deviate 
from that.... And the design of it, it will be this size, it will 
have this message here, you can choose the picture, but this 
is the format of how it will be. ' (IE) 
It was also reported that when it comes to new marketing initiatives, 
'much of what comes from "corporate" is a directive of how to 
disseminate information or how to deal with it. Here's how 
you process it, not a lot of questions like do you want to 
participate! We've decided to do this, here's how you process 
it operationally, make sure everybody knows about it. ' (ID) 
This centralisation of the marketing function was reported to be critical to 
maintaining brand integrity and thus the value of brands within the portfolio. 
Within the financial function, informants reported that there is autonomy to manage 
the budget at unit level. However, within the entire sample the budgeting process 
reflects a 'bottom-up' approach requiring approval at successive hierarchical 
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levels. One informant summed up the autonomy within this functional area 
accordingly: 
'If they want to do a promotion for XYZ then that is up to 
them. As long as it makes money, as far as we're concerned. 
That's all for that hotel General Manager to make a decision 
on. ' (IE) 
However, informants identified clear parameters to decision making at unit level for 
decisions regarding pricing structures, pay levels for hourly employees, hiring or 
firing at assistant or department head level, and capital expenditures. Minor 
considerations like the opening hours of staff support services were also reported 
to need corporate-level approval in some firms. Even if this formal approval wasn't 
technically required, one informant suggested that: 
'They [the GMs] usually refer the majority of decisions to the 
regional level. ' (ID) 
This approach was seen as a way of `keeping people in the loop' (ID) in order to 
maintain good working relationships. This is also perceived as a way of [GMs] 
avoiding any repercussions if things go wrong. The exact degree of autonomy 
therefore varies somewhat by functional area. One informant summed this up by 
reporting that GMs get, 
' appropriate autonomy so, they get no autonomy in the way 
that the property is displayed in electronic [marketing 
distribution] systems for instance, that's the [brand] standard, 
that's something that I enforce. They get significant 
autonomy in terms of running their food and beverage 
outlets, in terms of introducing a local flavour into the hotel. ' 
(IG) 
Formalisation and Underpinning Organisational Processes 
High levels of formalisation were used to support centralised control and the case 
study firms all employed a comprehensive range of formalised documentation. The 
data reveals the use of the following types of documentation within the sample 
firms: 
" corporate policy manuals that specify correct functional procedures to follow 
at unit level, 
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" standard operating procedures for each functional area, 
" brand standards broken down into individual units and functional areas at unit 
level, 
" detailed opening and closing procedures for food and beverage outlets, 
" formalised interview templates/questions (including psychometric testing) for 
specific hierarchical job roles, 
" detailed job descriptions, 
" pro forma documents to facilitate decision making for budgets and 
determining merit increases and 
" pro forma documents for reporting, including operating reports, budgets, 
employee turnover and health and safety reports. 
Informants emphasised the role of detailed brand specifications or brand 
standards in controlling quality. Brand specifications reflect the technical or 
tangible aspects of brands such as room standards, finishing standards, staffing 
levels and amenities, whereas brand standards incorporate both tangible and 
softer or more intangible elements. Documentation from the case study firms 
relating to brand standards identifies minimal acceptable levels of service that 
reflect employee attitude, body and verbal language. For example food and 
beverage brand standards in Firm D identify when the hostess should make eye 
contact and when employees must use scripted dialogue. Many of these 
documents even provide explicit detail on how to 'wow' guests by exceeding the 
brand standards. For example in Firm G, banqueting employees can achieve this 
higher level attainment by offering a welcome drink to function organisers or giving 
them a bottle of champagne or flowers to take away with them. 
Brand standards were likened to the company 'bible' (IB) and were reported to be 
'rigidly applied' (IE), 'pretty inviolate' (IB) or 'not to be violated' (IC). However, 
there does appear to be some leeway as to how rigidly these were applied in 
franchise agreements and management contracts. In the more upmarket and 
softer brands there was generally some room for negotiation. However informants 
were clear that it was the hard or technical standards of the brand that were 
negotiable, particularly if they reflected local market standards or cultures. 
Informants were also adamant that within these same brands, softer issues that 
reflect service quality standards were generally non-negotiable. 
Brand standards were monitored through well-documented and formalised 
procedures. While there was some variation reported in the specific organisational 
152 
processes, there was generally a reliance on external firms to monitor both hard 
and soft elements of brand standards. Customer satisfaction levels were also 
monitored through external agencies to gauge perceptions of brand and service 
quality. Informants described these processes as 'fairly sophisticated' (IG) and 
quite granular (IB). Informants also report that feedback was passed down from 
corporate level to the unit level where the responsibility to identify problem areas 
and appropriate corrective measures lay. These were then reported back up to 
the corporate level within a specified time period deemed appropriate for the 
circumstances. 
One firm reported that GM's had to self-assess their properties twice a year 
according to how they adhered to the processes identified in the formalised 
documents. This self-assessment was reported to involve a five-page checklist 
developed at the corporate level. Any items not adhering to the corporate 
standards had to be identified and the appropriate approval documentation 
attached to these checklists and sent to the corporate level. These documents 
were reported to be scrutinised and, 
'obviously if we go down and we find something that has not 
been correctly documented, we will obviously go back to the 
General Manager and say "look, you need to let us know if 
you want to make this change and we will tell you if you can 
or you can't". ' (IE) 
These high levels of formalisation were also perceived by informants as essential 
to maintain 'control of the brand' or 'brand integrity' (IB). According to one 
informant: 
'A brand is a promise. When somebody goes in to a [Brand 
C], we've made certain promises that we market and we 
can't have people who are abusive of that and don't 
prescribe to it. ' (IC) 
The preceding discussion identifies high levels of centralisation and formalisation 
within the case firms. Organisational frameworks, such as formalised documents 
and templates, reinforce clearly defined parameters for decision-making and 
support the hierarchy and centralisation reported by informants. Informants 
perceive that these processes and structures are important to maintaining control 
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over their hotel brands. However, the findings also reveal that there are design 
differences within the case study firms. 
iii) Theme 3: Design Differences 
Design differences within individual firms were apparent in both formal structures 
and organisation processes and these are discussed below. 
Structural Differences 
In the multi-branded firms, informants reported distinct differences in their 
organisation structures. One informant suggested: 
'I think we have three or four organisational structures within 
the same organisation. But it's very confusing to run. Its very 
complicated and I have to say that this is one of the more 
complicated business directives, everything is run a little 
different, and every structure is a little different.... and it is 
very confusing. ' (IC) 
Further probing of the informant revealed that these differences are based upon 
how particular brands are affiliated with their portfolio of hotels. The designs used 
therefore depend on the market entry method employed with the biggest 
difference depicted between OLM hotels and franchised elements of the portfolio. 
As one informant explained: 
'The franchise operation is still very much separate and there 
is almost two divisions. There is one which is owned and 
managed and they look after all the ones we have an interest 
in and we actually operate those hotels. And then the other 
is franchising... so it's more of a sales and marketing outlet. 
Those two haven't really been pushed together particularly 
well-' (113) 
Organisation charts clearly depict the differences in these structures through the 
number of hierarchical layers and the different spans of control granted to 
managers within these separate divisions. One informant identified: 
`In the managed hotels we have three VPs of Operations, the 
Executive Vice President, rooms representations, technical 
experts, and they of course are more involved to the bottom 
line. The other ones are interfacing on brand issues, on sales 
issues, we also have the regional sales people, the world- 
154 
wide accounts people all of those people are out there 
working to help those hotels get more business. ' (IC) 
As a result, 
'the standard control in the managed chain is much tighter. 
Each Vice-President is only going to have seven hotels, 
whereas each Vice-President of a franchised chain has 90 
hotels. ' (IC) 
These different structures are reported to add complexity to the decision-making 
process, particularly to those at the corporate level. As one informant explained: 
'It doesn't really cause the regions themselves much 
confusion on a day-to-day basis. I think it causes problems 
from a decision-making point of view at the top level. ' (IB) 
There were also some minor structural differences reported in different 
geographical markets. For instance, different positions or functions were added as 
senior managers felt necessary to cope with the environmental and cultural 
differences and demands of the different markets. 
These findings suggest that major structural differences within the portfolios of the 
multi-branded firms are driven by the nature of the affiliation with the unit level 
hotel. Clear structural distinctions have been identified between OLM units and 
those operated under franchise agreements. There were also variances reported 
in the organisation processes that underpin these formal structures as identified in 
the following section. 
Process Differences 
Further design differences can be depicted between these two elements of hotel 
portfolios in the processes employed for control, co-ordination, decision-making, 
and communication as discussed, in turn, below. 
a) Control and coordination processes 
The data reveals both similarities and differences within quality control processes 
employed in the different structural designs identified. For instance, actual 
processes for establishing and monitoring quality standards are the same across 
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franchised and OLM divisions. There are however, distinctive differences reported 
in the action undertaken in response to performance measurement ratings. 
Informants reported corporate level willingness to undertake punitive action when 
individual hotels do not adhere to brand standards within the franchised divisions. 
For instance, in one case, 160 franchised hotels were reported to have been 
forcibly removed from the system over the course of five years. One informant 
from another firm explained, 
`One of the reasons that we are starting to cannibalise some 
of our weaker franchises and take over their operations is 
because we just can't afford to have that much inconsistency 
in the brand anymore. Because the consumer has a lot of 
choices and once you damage the trust between the brand 
and the consumer, it is very hard to get that back. So we 
have stepped up our aggression, if you will, or stepped up 
our compliance to standards and are much more focussed 
on making sure people do the right thing and do things right. ' (IC) 
Punitive action is therefore deemed necessary to maintain the control of brand 
integrity and compensate for the greater autonomy within franchised hotels. This 
control is perceived necessary not only from a consumer perspective, but also 
from the perspective of being able to continue to grow the brand through 
franchising. One informant summed up this situation accordingly: 
'As I understand it, you have got to give the franchisee the 
confidence that they are buying into something virtually 
unchangeable so they can see what is to happen to their 
money. And that level of commitment and certainty is what 
makes people sign up. It's I am buying a [Brand], I know 
what they are, I know how they perform, I know what they 
look like and I know as soon as I have signed up for this in a 
couple of years time they are not going to change all the 
standards. ' (IB) 
This punitive action is taken more readily against failure to adhere to the hard or 
technical brand standards. The softer elements of the brand standards that are 
more reflective of service quality were reportedly given more leeway. For 
instance, 
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'it would be highly unlikely to terminate a franchisee contract 
on the basis of service quality. Historically, it is on quality as 
audited by the company according to the brand manual. ' (IB) 
In contrast, a greater emphasis on the softer elements of the brand standards was 
reported within the OLM quality control processes. These softer elements of the 
brand standards were reflected in customer perceptions of service quality and 
were reported to be of great interest to corporate level members. One example of 
this type of involvement was given in relation to customer feedback on employee 
behaviour. 
'And we had a glitch earlier in the year, and the President of 
the company... he noticed out of the blue that suddenly we 
had two or three rude employee comments [made by 
customers at one unit]. So he called [the GM] and said 
what's going on? So he monitors it and when the President 
calls you know you have to do something. ' (ID) 
In addition, the data identified that there is also more support offered to the unit 
level to rectify any problems highlighted through these control processes. This 
support is provided through the smaller spans of control for the OLM divisions. 
The general perception by respondents was that, 
'the management services side, those people really are 
totally responsible for the day-to-day operations. Not that 
they are doing them, but they have to intimately know the 
details. Because we have so much money at risk we are 
asking them to perform at a much different level. On the 
managed side you always have that responsibility because 
you are in charge of the asset. ' (IC) 
Because of the responsibility for managing these risks, there is one final difference 
in the quality control processes utilised. Whereas punitive action is threatened 
against poor adherence to standards in the franchised division, in the OLM 
estates, managers are incentivised through bonus payments to achieve high 
scores. These differences suggest a 'carrot 'approach for OLM managers, but a 
`stick' approach to franchised properties. 
There were a number of differences also reported in financial control processes 
between franchised and OLM elements of the portfolio. These differences appear 
to be related to accessibility of data at the unit level and this again, is reflected in 
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the autonomy granted through the contractual agreement. Within the franchised 
estates, the corporate level is reported to, 
'have access to a lot of data, not profit and loss, but the 
contribution to the system from the member hotels. 
Occupancy, contribution to revenue, revenue per available 
room, all of those kind of standards, we watch those very 
carefully. ' (IC) 
In other words, the corporate level only has access to revenue figures. It was 
reported that, 
'there is definitely the split between the two again [franchised 
vs. OLM] in terms of what we can get and what we can't. The 
[franchisees] are not interested in showing us how much 
money they are making. ' (IB) 
The informant further explained that franchisees might fear that the franchisor 
would try to buy back their hotel if they were seen to be profitable. While 
contractual agreements do not require franchisees to divulge financial figures 
beyond revenue, within OLM divisions financial control procedures measure both 
revenue and profitability. These measures are reported to be necessary to reflect 
the financial commitment and risk involved in operating through these types of 
affiliation. 
These findings reveal a clear distinction between organisational processes for both 
quality and financial control between franchised and OLM elements of the 
portfolio. These differences appear to be reflective of the degree to which decision 
making can be centralised and the structural differences in their design. One 
informant summed up the control process differences as follows: 
'So it is, it's a different set of drivers, you know its, [for 
franchised properties] how many locations, of what quality 
and what loyalty rates versus [for OLM properties] are we 
really making the most of this hotel's location? Are we 
making the departments run effectively? ' (IB) 
It was recognised that this approach may result in some potentially good ideas 
being missed but that these would be highly unlikely to impact on the overall 
success of the hotel firm. Nonetheless, these 'drivers' may also influence the 
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coordination processes employed in the different portfolio elements. In the OLM 
divisions, there was a wide variety of coordination mechanisms employed across 
the case firms. However, the degree to which coordination processes are used 
appears to be related to the extent of a firm's internationalisation. Each case 
study firm has an annual or bi-annual general manager conference as well as a 
number of functional meetings organised on a geographical basis. It is the firms 
that are the most international, for instance Firms B, C, F and H that also make 
use of further coordination mechanisms. Informants identified the use of task 
groups, functional work teams, project teams, corporate universities and electronic 
chat rooms. 
In contrast, within franchised divisions, the data revealed that fewer coordination 
processes are employed. The informants reported the use of franchise forums 
and/or annual conferences as the key coordination mechanisms used. In addition, 
informants reported that the conferences were essentially a tool to make the 
franchisees feel involved. One informant revealed: 
`Franchisees can go and have a chat .... and we listen to their concerns and share current thinking with them, they 
are made to feel included. ' (IB) 
These remarks suggest that conferences were used predominantly for 
dissemination purposes. 
b) Decision-making processes 
Organisational processes for decision-making appear to reflect the degree to 
which the corporate level has the ability to use hierarchy of authority to centralise 
the decision-making process. As a result, within the franchised elements of the 
portfolio, informants reported that the corporate level can 'only advise on many of 
the issues and offer guidelines for the franchisees to work within' (IC) as 
contractual agreements provide a greater degree of autonomy at the unit level. 
Evidence of this greater level of autonomy is most clearly demonstrated through 
the implementation process of new corporate or brand initiatives. Informants 
reported the need to persuade franchisees to adopt any new initiatives that were 
technically outside their contractual obligations. As a result, senior organisational 
159 
members adopted different organisation processes in order to get 'buy-in'. As one 
informant summarised, 'it's very much done through relationships and showing 
what the benefits will be and encouraging them' (IC). Financial benefits were 
reported to be the most effective. In order to demonstrate financial benefits, many 
initiatives were tried and tested within owned and operated hotels in order to prove 
their viability before attempting to roll them out across the different types of 
affiliates. One informant summed up the process as follows: 
'We would prototype it in a few of our own hotels and see if it 
works first. If it does we would start to roll it out across our 
own hotels and if it is beneficial we will start to spread it to 
the master franchises and management contracts first. We 
will go and see the owners and say, "we want to do this, it 
works in our hotel and we will put the money in behind it" So 
we put our money where our mouth is effectively and gain 
credibility. ' (IB) 
New initiatives were therefore reported to trickle down through the different types 
of affiliations. Interestingly, informants also reported there was a need to use this 
buy-in process within units operated under management agreements as well as 
franchised properties, even though there were no structural differences between 
OLM properties. The reason for this was identified as the greater level of 
involvement of hotel owners in the decision-making process. It was suggested that 
the reason for this is because the, 
'owner profile has changed in the last 10 years. They are 
just much more knowledgeable than they used to be. And 
they are no longer prepared to just hand it [the hotel 
property] over like in the old days, and give it to the operator. 
It's no longer the case. ' (IF) 
Another informant suggested 'we get things like the owner now wanting to make 
decisions' (ID). The owners of hotels operated under management contract were 
reported to now have greater input into decision making in relation to hotel 
budgets, operating expenses charged back to the owner, and the hiring decisions 
of senior executives at the unit level. Hotel operators are spending increasing 
amounts of time managing the relationships with hotel owners as a result of this 
input. One informant suggested this 'occupied almost 50%' (IF) of his time and 
another that there frequently were 'considerations about stroking owners fur (IG). 
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With master franchise arrangements the degree to which there is autonomy to 
adopt new initiatives appears to be related to particular functional areas. For 
example, informants reported more leeway in human resource initiatives than for 
those within marketing. In addition, how these initiatives are rolled out through the 
master franchisees' portfolio is reported to be dependent on the master franchisee. 
It was suggested that this approach sometimes resulted in programmes for 
different brands running in some geographical regions but not others. 
These findings suggest that decision-making processes do vary according to the 
type of affiliation and also by functional area. Decisions within the function of 
marketing appear to be the most centralised in order to protect brand integrity. 
While this is important in both divisions of the portfolio, it is reportedly more difficult 
to achieve in franchised estates. 
c) Communication processes 
According to the data, informal communication processes also reflect these 
organisational divisions. For instance, within OLM elements of the portfolio, 
communication is reported to be 'frequent', 'informal', 'on a first name basis' and 
'multi-directional' across the sample. One informant summed up this situation 
accordingly: 
'I don't feel that I can't talk to a GM, just because he doesn't 
report to me. I will call him and ask him how he's doing and 
chat about his business and whatever; and then I would 
probably call his regional vice president and say, 'oh, by the 
way, I've chatted to so and so', and if anything of note came 
up I would tell his boss. The nature of us as people is that 
we don't get territorial about that stuff. ' (IF) 
Similarly, informants identified that informal communication can be initiated at the 
unit level in order to discuss issues and share ideas with more senior 
organisational members. This type of communication is reported to be based on 
'who you know' (ID), but is supported through formal communication vehicles that 
encourage networking opportunities. These vehicles include those identified 
above as coordination processes. 
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In contrast, there does not appear to be this informal communication between the 
corporate or senior organisational levels and the franchised properties. One 
informant suggested: 
'But it is not, you know, we don't pick up the phone to them, 
to franchisees, absolutely not. But I might pick up the phone 
to speak to a GM of an owner-managed hotel. ' (IB) 
The rationale for this practice is the clear organisational boundaries between the 
owners of the brands and the franchisees. The situation was described as one 
where 'franchisees are definitely on the other side of the wall, it is a commercial 
agreement' (IB). This lack of informal communication appears to reinforce the 
distinction between franchised and OLM elements of the portfolio. As previously 
identified, vehicles such as franchise forums and associations encourage 
communication between franchisees to a certain extent, but formal vehicles that 
support networking across franchised and OLM estates are more limited. While 
franchisees are included in the annual conferences, other formal vehicles tend to 
be restricted to franchise representatives. For example, in regional marketing 
planning meetings, only an elected franchisee representative is likely to be invited 
to attend. In some cases franchisees are entitled to participate in these formal 
vehicles if they reach a predetermined size (e. g. 20 or 30 hotels). These 
communication practices help to maintain perceptual distinctions between these 
organisational divisions and one informant suggested that as a result of these 
distinctions, 'never the twain shall meet' (ID). 
5.3.3 Summary and Emergent Themes from Phase Two 
Three key themes have been identified through this phase of the research. In 
diversely affiliated firms, organisation designs are subject to change in response to 
changes in organisational growth strategies. Despite these changes, international 
hotel chains still appear to rely on traditional design models where high degrees of 
centralisation and formalisation are used to maintain tight control. There are 
however, differences in design that relate to the type of affiliation between the 
corporate and unit level of the firm. The most profound variations are between 
franchised and OLM elements of portfolios. These differences are evident in 
structures and the processes used to support them. Table 5.3 summarises these 
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differences for these two elements of the portfolio. However, there are also some 
further differences in organisational processes depicted for management contracts 
and for master franchise elements of the portfolio. 
Table 5.3 Variations in Organisation Design 
OLM Hotels Franchised Hotels 
Structure " Hierarchical with small spans of " Hierarchical with large 
control (6 to 8 hotels) spans of control (60+ 
hotels not unusual 
Decision " Centralised " More decentralised 
Making " Within clearly defined " Greater autonomy at unit 
parameters at unit level level 
" Some input from owners in " Functional marketing 
units run under management decisions centralised as 
contracts much as possible 
Financial " Focus on bottom line " Focus on contribution to 
Control " Supported by structure revenue (top line) 
" Reflective of perceived risk " Access below that line 
restricted 
Quality Control " Adherence to brand standards " Adherence to brand 
and customer satisfaction levels standards and customer 
" Focus on both hard and soft satisfaction levels 
elements of service quality " Punitive action taken but 
" Corporate level involvement at against adherence to 
unit level technical or hard 
" Corrective measures and clear elements of quality only 
feedback loops 
Coordination " Use of coordination " Limited use of 
mechanisms increases with coordination mechanisms 
extent of internationalisation " Franchise forums and/or 
" Conferences, tasks groups, annual conferences most 
project teams, corporate commonly used 
universities and electronic chat mechanisms 
rooms reported 
Communication " Frequent and informal " Mostly formal by way of 
" Multi directional across different reporting 
organisational levels " Uncommon between 
" Based on personal networks corporate and unit level of 
" Formal vehicles support the franchised hotels 
development of personal " More common between 
networks franchisees 
" Formal vehicles support 
communication between 
franchisees, but limited 
support for 
communication with OLM 
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The findings from this phase suggest that design variations occur when the 
operation of hotels crosses traditional organisational boundaries. The next phase 
of the research therefore sought to explore these inter-organisational designs in 
further detail. 
5.4 Phase Three: Inter-Organisational Design 
This phase of the research sought to build on the findings from phase two through 
an in-depth case study. The unit of analysis adopted for this phase was the hotel 
brand as it enabled the researcher to investigate inter-firm designs from the 
perspectives of all firms involved in the agreement. This section begins with a brief 
background on each of the firms that comprise the case and how they are affiliated 
with each other. It then presents the findings under one further emergent theme. 
5.4.1 Background to Case Study Firms 
This 'typical' case study incorporates three separate hotel firms and was drawn 
from the phase two sample. These three firms all operate one international hotel 
brand that belongs to Firm C. For the purposes of clarity, these firms will be 
referred to from this point on as the Brand Owner, Affiliate A and Affiliate B. A 
brief background to each of these firms is given below. 
i) Brand Owner 
The Brand Owner has ultimate responsibility for the portfolio of approximately 450 
up-scale full service hotels. The portfolio is located in airport, city centre and resort 
locations in 60 countries targeting international and domestic, and business and 
leisure travellers. This brand was developed predominantly through single and 
multiple franchise agreements in the home country. International expansion has 
taken place through a mixture of ownership, management contracts and through 
master franchise agreements held with local firms in several geographical areas. 
Through this expansion, the Brand Owner became affiliated with A and B. The 
brand headquarters and functional support are located in the home country and 
responsibility is then divided geographically as depicted in Figure 5.2. A full profile 
of the Brand Owner (Firm C) is contained in Appendix G. 
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ii) Affiliate A 
Affiliate A is a privately-owned firm whose main business interest is a small 
portfolio of luxury hotels in prime locations in its European home country. The key 
target markets are international business and leisure guests. Affiliate A fully owns 
and operates all the hotels within its portfolio. A franchise agreement was signed 
with the Brand Owner over ten years ago that resulted in the co-branding of 
Affiliate A's entire portfolio. This agreement does not include any territorial rights 
and is therefore what Connell (1999) identifies as a corporate franchise 
agreement. However, press releases issued by Affiliate A refer to this inter-firm 
arrangement as a strategic alliance. As Affiliate A operates in one country only, its 
organisation structure is not as complex as other firms within this study and is 
depicted in Figure 5.2. A profile of Affiliate A is included in Appendix I. 
iii) Affiliate B 
Over ten years ago, a long-term franchise agreement was also signed between 
the Brand Owner and Affiliate B. While the press refers to this agreement as a 
strategic alliance, in reality it is a master franchise agreement that grants Affiliate B 
the right to develop the brand within a defined geographical territory. This 
development has taken place rapidly through ownership, leasehold, management 
and sub-franchise agreements. As the CEO reported in the 2002 annual report, 
'Starting out as a small and unknown operator, the only way 
to achieve fast growth without massive investment of funds, 
was to accept a higher financial risk level in the contract 
portfolio of hotels. ' 
In other words a trade-off has been made between financial risk and rapid growth. 
This strategy to employ multiple market entry methods has resulted in a portfolio 
that comprises 110 co-branded upmarket hotel properties located in 38 countries 
in city centre, airport and resort locations. Affiliate B targets domestic and 
international, business and leisure travellers and supports each segment with its 
own brand loyalty programmes. Its portfolio is supported through a geographically 
divided organisation structure as depicted in Figure 5.2. A profile of Affiliate B is 
included in Appendix J. 
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Figure 5.2 Organisation Structure of Phase Three Firms 
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Figure 5.2 continued 
2) Organisation Structure of Affiliate B* 
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This brief review serves to highlight the disparities in the operating characteristics 
of the firms embedded within the case and these are displayed in Table 5.4. Each 
affiliate has a separate contractual agreement with the Brand Owner and it these 
dyadic relationships that are explored at this phase. However, the data revealed a 
great deal of similarity in the inter-firm designs. The following discussion is 
therefore written from a comprehensive perspective rather than through a 
comparison of the embedded cases. 
Tahla cA nneratina Characteristics of Phase Three Firms 
Firm Brand Owner Affiliate A Affiliate B 
Ownership Private Private Public 
Owner Part of multi- Hotel firm with Part of a multi- 
divisional some diverse divisional 
conglomerate interests reported conglomerate 
No. Countries 60 1 38 
No. Hotels 450 10 +2 in 110 
development 
No. of Rooms 99,246 1926 29,000 
Market Level Mostly 3-star 4- and 5-star Mostly 4-star 
properties properties properties 
Affiliated with Majority franchise All owner-operated, Majority management 
Portfolio through agreements plus expansion planned contracts with varying 
master-franchise through leasing and degrees of equity 
agreements, management involvement, owner- 




Affiliation with Ownership and Corporate " Master franchisee of 
Brand through master franchisor franchise Brand Owner with 
for Affiliate A&B agreement with development rights 
Brand Owner with for defined 
defined geographic territory 
geographical scope 
Organisation Informal, Informal, Entrepreneurial, 
Culture Described accessible, entrepreneurial, idiosyncratic, 
As: classless non political family-run 
As at year end, 2003. 
5.4.2 Inter-Organisational Design 
During the data collection, it became increasingly apparent that the inter- 
organisational designs within the case study were best understood through inter- 
organisational processes rather than formal inter-organisational structures. 
Furthermore, none of the organisational charts collected depicted the inter- 
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organisational agreements. When questioned directly about the structure of the 
inter-firm arrangements, informants from all three firms referred only to the 
technical nature of the contracts as franchise agreements. The contracts 
however, only broadly defined the inter-firm structure in relation to the hierarchy of 
authority and the levels of formalisation. The Brand Owner, as the franchisor had 
the ultimate authority. At the next level Affiliate A and B had authority over their 
defined geographic territories. As a master franchisee, Affiliate B had further 
authority over its sub franchisees. Formalisation was also depicted in the contract 
but again, only at the broadest level. The contracts were reported to contain 
minimal requirements for standardisation and these related to marketing 
communication activities and basic brand standards. These standards were 
already met within the portfolios of Affiliate A and B at the time of contract 
signature. The broad design parameters in the contract therefore do little to aid in 
the understanding of how these inter-firm agreements are designed and managed. 
Thus, inter-organisational processes for control and coordination, decision-making 
and communication were the dominant design dimensions. However, the data 
revealed that these processes changed over the lifetime of the inter-firm 
agreements. This finding forms the basis of the fourth theme identified in this 
research and that is the nature of change in inter-organisational designs. As with 
the previous phase, both primary and secondary data were used for triangulation 
purposes and analysed according to the processes described in Chapter Four. 
Where direct quotes are used, these are attributed to the informant with the 
labelling scheme presented in Table 4.6. For example, IBO2 refers to the 
interview conducted with the second Brand Owner informant. 
i) Theme 4: The Nature of Change in Inter-Organisational Designs 
The findings highlight the evolutionary nature of inter-organisational designs 
through three distinct stages. The first stage began with the identification of the 
need for a partner and lasted throughout the negotiation process. This stage 
ended when the contracts were signed and the inter-firm affiliations were officially 
formed. The second stage began with the implementation or operationalisation of 
the agreement. The third and final stage began when the different affiliated firms 
began to work collectively for the good of the brand and were reported to have 
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reached a stage of maturity. Within each of these stages, a number of factors 
influenced the actual inter-firm designs and thus the inter-organisational processes 
for managing the affiliations and these are discussed below. 
Stage One: Affiliation Formation 
Three key factors influenced the development of inter-firm design in the affiliation 
formation stage. The first of these was the actual purpose of seeking an 
agreement with another firm. This purpose then informed the specific partner 
selection criteria used by the different firms. Both of these factors were then used 
in the negotiation process and used to define the affiliation. Each of these factors 
and how they influenced the design of inter-organisational processes are 
discussed below. 
a) Purpose of affiliation 
All three firms had a clearly defined purpose for seeking an affiliation. The Brand 
Owner was seeking to enter a new geographic market and in line with its preferred 
market entry strategy, was looking for local partners to achieve this goal. Affiliate 
A was also seeking organisational growth by accessing new markets but in this 
instance, senior managers, 
`were not looking for growth in terms of numbers of hotels, 
but needed to drive revenue and one way of achieving that 
goal was perceived to be through international markets and 
international travellers. ' (IAffAI ) 
Accordingly, Affiliate A decided it `needed a big brother (IAffA3) to gain access to 
global distribution channels. Affiliate B was also seeking organisational expansion 
outside its home market. As one informant explained: 
`The reason why this came up there in the early 90's is 
because we started on a path of developing the chain 
outside of [the home market] and then we realised very fast 
that the [proprietal] brand name which is very strong in [the 
home market] was very weak outside of [the home market]. 
We needed to have a different brand in order to be able to 
grow market share and brand awareness. ' (IAffB3) 
In addition to gaining access to a brand name, Affiliate B also required, 
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`a catalyst for growth because there was a sense that [our 
firm] was not big enough, strong enough or well recognised 
enough to be able to go out and do it on their own. ' (IAffB1) 
Over the previous thirty years, Affiliate B had only grown its portfolio by one hotel a 
year. The `catalyst' was deemed essential to achieve a more global reach in the 
distribution of their hotels. 
All three firms were therefore seeking an affiliation with another hotel firm in order 
to realise their- organisational growth strategies. However, particular goals for 
growth varied for the different firms. Growth was to be achieved through brand 
development for the Brand Owner, through market development for Affiliate A and 
through portfolio development for Affiliate B. All three firms required access to 
different types of resources therefore in order to realise these goals. These 
specific purposes then informed the particular partner selection criteria used by the 
different affiliates. 
b) Partner selection criteria 
All three affiliates used specific criteria to identify potential partners and to inform 
the negotiation process. These criteria are listed in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Partner Selection Criteria 
Brand Owner Affiliate A Affiliate B 
Ability to retain control Ability to retain control of Ability to retain control of 
through ownership portfolio portfolio 
structure 
Perception of mutual Ability to retain identity Ability to retain identity 
value/risk 
Chemistry between Perception of mutual Perception of mutual 
individuals value/risk value/risk 
Similarity of organisation Chemistry between Similarity of organisation 
vision/ oats/values individuals values 
Local expertise Similarity of organisation Similarity of organisation 
values culture 
Reputation/credibility Similarity of organisation Resources to achieve 
culture objectives 
Credit worthiness Resources to achieve Perception of a fair deal 
objectives 
Reputation 
Perception of fair deal 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, there was a great deal of similarity in the criteria 
used by the different firms. It must be pointed out however, that despite the way 
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the criteria are listed in the table, informants were not willing to prioritise the 
criteria used. However, the data did reveal which of the criteria were deemed 
more important than others and how the criteria were used in different ways 
throughout the negotiation process. 
Both the Brand Owner and Affiliate A identified that reputation or credibility of 
different hotel firms was a criterion used. One informant suggested that `who your 
cousins are is as important as having cousins' (IB04). This criterion was used as a 
pre-selection tool to identify potential firms that would make suitable affiliates. It 
was assessed through what individual organisational members knew, heard or had 
read about the different potential affiliates, rather than through formalised 
procedures. In this way an initial assessment was made as to whether the 
potential affiliate had the necessary resources to achieve the objectives of the 
affiliation and whether the potential affiliate would be appropriate to build a 
business partnership with. 
Once the negotiation process began between the firms, the most important 
criterion identified by informants from all three firms was the need to maintain 
control of their own portfolios and in the case of the Brand Owner, over the brand 
as well. One informant summed up the situation accordingly: 
'In the back of the head was only one thing that we wanted, 
to keep our own independence with backing. ' (IAffB2) 
All three affiliates had previous inter firm experiences, and not all of these were 
deemed successful. Affiliate B had the most publicised negative experience and 
as a result was somewhat more cautious in the negotiation process. As one 
informant reported: 
'From our experience with [previous affiliated hotel chain] 
which we were almost in the way of disappearing basically, 
we wanted to be in the driver's seat and actually control the 
thing. ' (lAffB2) 
Closely related to this was the requirement for both Affiliate A and B to retain their 
own sense of identity. What both affiliates wanted therefore was a co-branding 
relationship with the Brand Owner. Both Affiliate A and B had been successful in 
their own right and had been operating for over 30 and 40 years respectively. For 
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Affiliate A, the firm had grown under the sole directorship of the current chairman. 
As a result, there was reported to be a lot of personal pride and emotion attached 
to the brand. As one informant summarised, 'we wanted to have a brand that we 
would be in charge of in our geographical areas' (lAffB2). 
Another closely related criterion was recognition of the mutual value brought to the 
affiliation. Informants within the case study were quick to point out the value that 
they brought to the agreement. For example, informants from both Affiliate A and 
B identified their local market knowledge as a key resource and it was important to 
each of these affiliates that the Brand Owner recognised the value of this 
resource. Similarly the recognition of the mutual risk each firm was undertaking 
was also identified as important. Informants from Affiliate A and B were keen to 
point out that they were taking a risk by entering into the agreement with the Brand 
Owner and that they wanted this to be duly recognised. One informant suggested: 
`We took a huge risk. We were taking on faith that their 
vision of growing the brand, their vision of asserting the 
synergies from [their] chain of families, their vision for 
technological leadership, that's the risk. Would that all come 
to bear? ' (IAffA3) 
Both Affiliate A and B also noted the risk that the Brand Owner was undertaking by 
allowing them to retain control of their own portfolios and through a co-branding 
agreement. Co-branding within the international hotel industry was 'virtually 
unheard of (lAffB3) at the time, and there was clear recognition of the risk with this 
untested branding strategy. 
Whether this risk was deemed acceptable or not was down to another criterion 
listed in Table 5.5 and this was the personal chemistry between those individuals 
involved in the negotiation process. Informants reported that negotiations with 
other potential partner firms had broken down, as 'there really wasn't chemistry 
between the individuals' (lAffA3). This chemistry was perceived as an essential 
ingredient to keep communication channels open between the members of the 
different firms. It facilitated the communication between these individuals that was 
reported to be 'frequent', 'informal' and 'face-to-face' by informants from all three 
affiliated firms. Furthermore both personal chemistry and communication were 
instrumental in enabling the individuals involved in the negotiation process to 
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develop perceptions of similarities in organisational goals, values and cultures, 
further criteria identified in Table 5.5. 
All the criteria identified by the different affiliates were therefore used in different 
ways in the relationship formation stage. Reputation and perceived ability to 
deliver resources required were used as pre-selection tools prior to negotiations 
taking place. The three criteria that were important early in the negotiation 
process were the ability to retain control of portfolios, retaining individual firm 
identity, and recognition of mutual value and risk. Personal chemistry and 
perceptions of similar organisation cultures and values were important in drawing 
the negotiation process to a successful conclusion. While all the criteria were 
used throughout the negotiation process, the ability to retain control of portfolios, 
retain own identity, and recognition of mutual value and risk were considered to be 
the non-negotiable criteria. Informants reported that negotiations continued 
because 'we are not bound by any manuals' (IAffB2) but also of 'walking away 
from the table' (IAffA3) during other negotiations driven by operating manuals and 
the requirement to adhere to brand owner regulations. These three criteria were 
also instrumental in defining the inter-firm affiliations as discussed below. 
c) Affiliation definition 
The non-negotiable criteria discussed above also appeared to be influential in 
defining the affiliations between the case study firms. Despite the fact that both 
Affiliate A and B operate under franchise agreements with the Brand Owner, this 
term was only used by informants when questioned directly about the inter-firm 
structure. At all other times throughout the interviews, informants referred to each 
-affiliation as a strategic 'alliance' or 'partnership' between the organisations. None 
of the corporate press releases collected by the researcher used the term 
franchise. Nor did any of the internal documentation collected, such as employee 
newsletters and magazines. The interview transcripts also identified that 
informants avoided the term franchise when discussing the inter-firm agreements. 
When questioned about this, informants reported that strategic alliance was 
probably a more accurate descriptor. As one informant explained: 
'It's strategic in the extent that it is global and in terms of 
having a global strategy as opposed to localised.... It's an 
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alliance also in the sense that they [the Brand Owner] don't 
dictate. They have no control over us whatsoever. ' (IAffA2) 
Defining the inter-firm arrangements in this manner reflected the control that was 
important for each affiliate to retain. In addition, it recognised the value that each 
affiliate brought to the agreement. This was further reflected in the co-branding 
arrangements that also enabled each firm to maintain a sense of identity. 
The preceding discussion identifies that three inter-related factors, purpose of 
affiliation, partner selection criteria, and affiliation definition were critical factors 
during the negotiation process. The purpose of the affiliation informed the 
selection criteria, which in turn influenced the affiliation definition. These three 
factors were also instrumental in shaping the original design of the inter-firm 
affiliation. The affiliation definition clearly reflected the autonomy that all members 
wanted out of the relationship. It represented a decentralised organisation design 
with much autonomy for decision-making resting with each affiliate. As one 
informant commented: 
`For us it was more that we felt that we could basically 
develop our business the way we thought it should be done 
without interference or any big hurdles which we have to 
jump in the relationship. ' (IAffB3) 
The negotiation process allowed each firm to retain a good deal of independence 
in decision making within their own portfolio. For example, while each new hotel 
project was subject to Brand Owner approval, the decisions about which 
geographic markets to enter and by which market entry strategy were left to the 
discretion of Affiliate B. Both Affiliate A and B maintained a high degree of 
decision-making authority over operations, marketing, human resource, and 
financial functions. As one informant summed up: 
We retained total operational control of our product; ...... nobody would be throwing any manuals at us. ' (IAffA3) 
While the contracts dictated the requirement for adherence to the brand standards 
as an inter-organisational quality control process, affiliates were not subjected to 
operating and brand manuals that dictated formalised inter-firm policies and 
procedures. 
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In terms of the overall brand however, the agreement identified that each affiliate 
participated in decision making through a number of formal inter-organisational 
vehicles. A good example of this is the Global Brand Council. This was a formal 
decision-making vehicle that involved all global partners of the brand and was 
used for both marketing and human resource decisions. The secondary data 
revealed that this was created as a vehicle that enabled decisions to be shaped 
together by global partners. 
Inter-firm processes for financial control were really rather limited as Affiliate A and 
B maintained complete control over their capital and operating budgets. The 
Brand Owner, as franchisor, was entitled to access to revenue figures, as is the 
norm in franchise agreements. The contracts also dictated the fee structure 
between the Brand Owner and each affiliated firm. In addition, the Brand Owner 
set annual revenue targets for each affiliate to achieve. Within the master 
franchise contract of Affiliate B, the Brand Owner also relied on development 
targets as an inter-firm control mechanism. 
Some inter-organisational processes to achieve both financial and quality control 
of the brand were therefore incorporated into the inter-firm designs through the 
contractual agreement. However informants reported that these were 'minimal' in 
the formation stage. The inter-firm processes designed at this stage reflected a 
high degree of decentralisation with much decision-making and control devolved to 
the affiliated firms. The limited degree of formalisation also supported this 
decentralised approach that reflected the control that both Affiliate A and B 
maintained over their own portfolios. Once these design decisions were agreed, 
the contractual agreements were signed. According to informants, the 
implementation of the agreement was the starting point for the second stage. 
Stage Two: Affiliation Development 
One informant referred to this stage of the affiliation as 'the honeymoon period', 
which was 'painfully slow, hugely lacking in trust, and there was limited dialogue' 
(IAffA3). In the early stages of implementing the contract, a number of problems 
materialised. The data revealed that these problems were brought about by the 
more tangible differences in the affiliated firms, despite the perceptions of inter- 
176 
firm similarities in the formation stage. When implementing the agreement the 
actual differences in the portfolios, administrative and technological systems were 
realised. Cultural differences also became increasingly apparent, as did the 
differences in the priorities of the affiliates. These differences created a number of 
'territorial issues, cultural issues, technology issues and priority issues' (IAffA3). 
The way in which the Brand Owner tried to deal with these issues however, only 
served to exacerbate them. It was reported that the Brand Owner began to use 
the contract to govern the agreements. Despite the efforts undertaken to create 
decentralised inter-firm designs in the negotiation phase, the contracts between 
the affiliated firms clearly depicted that the balance of the power lay with the Brand 
Owner. The Brand Owner began to use its authority to increase the degree of 
centralised decision-making and the degrees of formalisation across the portfolios 
of the three firms. As such, organisational processes for control and coordination, 
decision-making and communication were somewhat different than those 
suggested in the previous stage. 
a) Inter-organisational control and coordination processes 
The contractual agreements between the Brand Owner and its affiliates clearly 
dictated the requirement to adhere to brand standards. In the formation stage, this 
was not considered to be an issue as it was perceived by informants that each firm 
would be responsible for ensuring adherence to these standards within its own 
portfolio. However, in this stage, the Brand Owner wanted to adopt a more 
centralised inter-organisational process for monitoring quality. It was suggested 
that the Brand Owner, 
'had a sense of we must control the brand everywhere in 
what they do.... if you own a brand you really want to have 
as much control centrally as possible to ensure that there is 
consistency. ' (IAffB1) 
When this process was proposed, the differences in the portfolios of all three firms, 
as illustrated in Table 5.4, became far more readily apparent. It was reported that 
this approach led to feelings of resentment amongst members of Affiliate A and B 
that someone with an inferior product should dictate and monitor brand quality. It 
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also did not reflect the appropriate level of control that the affiliated organisations 
had negotiated. 
There were also financial issues that arose at this stage. The contracts clearly 
indicated the affiliate's contribution to revenue targets and the Brand Owner's 
access to revenue performance data. One measure of contribution to revenue was 
through the Brand Owner's electronic distribution channels. The data revealed 
that this particular measure led to affiliates also monitoring the performance of the 
Brand Owner and whether the Brand Owner's fees were justified through the 
number of reservations derived through these distribution channels. This situation 
was most apparent in Affiliate A where one informant summed up the situation as 
follows: 
'You spend a lot of your time trying to get the host 
organisation to prove that the business they gave you was 
incremental, which is an object lesson in futility. ' (IAffA3) 
As a result, members of the organisation tried to avoid paying fees to the Brand 
Owner as, 
'we were still thinking me, you, us, prove your incrementality! 
You are not good on this or that, all this sort of thing. So 
there was an opportunity and the heart and the reason 
companies think about that is that every time you have to pay 
a separate reservation fee, it focuses their mind that if they 
could bypass the system and send the business directly to 
the hotel, they would get out of the fee. ' (IAffA3) 
The informant added: 
I know it is not logical and you don't see it in those terms at 
the time, but essentially, having joined the club, you behave 
very badly'. ... which is; they don't really want to play by the 
rules of the club. So you spend all your time trying to make 
an exception. ' (lAffA3) 
This focus on incremental revenue served to further emphasise the differences 
between the affiliated firms and the organisational boundaries that separated 
them. This issue was complicated further by the need for both affiliated firms to 
maintain their own sales force in the Brand Owner's home country. Affiliates did 
not consider the Brand Owner's sales team to be qualified to sell their products as 
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they did not know enough about the different country markets and the affiliates' 
portfolios to adequately sell these on their behalf. However, informants from 
Affiliate A and B suggested that their own sales members sold a good deal of the 
Brand Owner's hotels in their respective markets. One informant summed up the 
situation accordingly: 
'We sell globally, and our sales people are conditioned to sell 
globally because we have hotels in 38 countries that we 
control, versus a US sales person who has hotels in one 
country in one language, and is suffering from a 3-star 
product. ' (IAffB1) 
This example serves to illustrate a lack of integration between the affiliated firms 
and the need for further coordination mechanisms at this stage of the agreement. 
Mechanisms employed at this stage were the Global Brand Council and a number 
of functional task forces as discussed in the following section. 
b) Inter-organisational decision making processes 
As previously identified, the Global Brand Council was a formal vehicle set up for 
the purposes of participative marketing and human resource decision-making. 
While the Brand Owner's rhetoric was that this vehicle enabled decisions to be 
shaped together by global partners, when it came to sorting out the issues 
identified above, it was reported that 'nobody was under any illusions, it was led by 
[the Brand Owner]' (lAffA3). In other words, the Brand Owner used its ultimate 
authority and the power within the contract to influence or steer the decisions that 
were made. For example, one informant reported that within marketing 'the 
development of new initiatives [were] on a global basis and [so was] their 
execution' (1802). This centralised approach was also reported to be adopted 
within other formal inter-firm decision making vehicles. For instance, a marketing 
forum known as SMART group was also run in a centralised and hierarchical 
manner. Affiliates perceived this to be, 
'quite a problem, because from a cultural point, the head of 
the SMART group of America, ... who had never really travelled internationally, arrived at [our] SMART group to tell 
us all how to do it. ' (IAffA3) 
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In addition, informants from Affiliate A and B considered that the Brand Owner 
didn't understand the cultural differences to begin with. It was suggested: 
'They saw, and they sort of understood that it was different 
theoretically that it was roughly the size of America, so fine, 
we are very experienced, we have lots of different groups, 
we get Florida together with California. We get Minneapolis 
together with Canada you know, they are two different 
countries even. ' (lAffA3) 
As a result, the Brand Owner was reported to have felt the need to dictate what 
should be done according to home-country practices. However, as one informant 
reported of the European SMART group: 
'It was a big region, lots of different languages, lots of 
different issues. It had resorts, and it had city centre hotels, 
just in this small group of people. So we had just come to 
grips with that. Even I, who was chairing it, said we are not 
going to come up with one solution here. ' (AffB1) 
Nonetheless, the Brand Owner undertook centralised decisions and implemented 
standardised advertising campaigns. They believed they, 
'needed to get all of us advertising in a format that was 
exactly the same, because we were so disparate that we 
didn't have a global voice. So at that time, we actually 
created an advertising format that was exactly the same in 
every part of the world' (1602) 
This centralised approach to decision making was not felt by affiliates to be in their 
best interest. Nor did it reflect the participative decision-making process expected 
by Affiliate A and B and their desire to control their own portfolios. Furthermore, 
the data revealed that it served to highlight the cultural and portfolio differences of 
each firm. Inter-organisational communication processes were reported to help 
solve these issues. 
c) Inter-organisational communication processes 
At the start of this affiliation development stage, there was reported to be 'limited 
dialogue' (IAffA3) between the firms. Despite the formal communication vehicles 
that were set up to encourage inter-firm communication, the centralised approach 
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adopted resulted in much of the communication being one way and top down from 
the Brand Owner. In the face of the escalating issues between the firms, senior 
members of the Brand Owner recognised the need to 'step up communication' 
(1B04) practices. One key member of the Brand Owner's organisation took a lead 
role in developing more effective communication practices and a number of 
informants reported this becoming more 'frequent, informal, verbal and frequently 
face-to-face' between senior management (1604, IAffA2, IAffB2, IAffB3). 
Through these inter-organisational communication processes, the Brand Owner 
gained a better understanding of the differences in the markets served by the 
affiliated firms. The Brand Owner was also reported to have fully recognised that 
they needed to draw on the strong local market knowledge that the affiliated 
organisations had in order to achieve the goals set for the development of the 
brand. A senior member of the Brand Owner added that, 
'it wasn't necessarily a re-negotiation, it was a realisation you 
know what? Europe isn't America, and Asia isn't America 
and we can't deploy the same tactics that we use in America 
in other peoples' cultures because they do business 
differently. ' (1604) 
The communication also led to a recognition by members of Affiliate A and B that 
while the Brand Owner had been taking a centralised approach to decisions, they 
had, in reality, been acting in good faith. As one informant suggested, the 
perception was that of, 
'the obligation that if they are paying fees maybe we should 
come up with some programmes, sort things out for you and 
show leadership. So it was positive, but it wasn't always 
interpreted that way. ' (IAffBI ) 
The preceding discussion identifies that inter-firm communication processes were 
vital in creating a better understanding of the differences between the affiliated 
firms and the markets they served. It was through this communication that things 
started to gradually improve between the firms and the affiliation moved towards 
the final evolutionary stage. However, moving on to the next stage took some time 
and informants reported a prolonged period of tensions between the firms. In the 
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case of Affiliate B, the tensions were reported to have remained between the firms 
for a number of years. However, according to an informant from Affiliate A: 
'We went through a period much like that when there were 
tensions for a year, 18 months, but essentially it was 
working, despite ourselves, it was working! ' (IAffA3) 
It was senior members of the affiliated organisations who were instrumental in 
resolving the issues between the affiliated firms. One informant added: 
'We have agreed to agree that the only way to make this 
work is by face-to-face meetings on a regular basis. ' (1604) 
Personal communication in particular was reported to have shifted the perceptions 
of managers from one of recognising the differences that were a root cause of the 
inter-firm issues, to one of 'accepting the differences' (1604) and learning to work 
around them. 
iii) Stage Three: Affiliation Maturity 
The affiliation was reported to have moved into this final stage when the Brand 
Owner realised that using the contract to manage the inter-firm relationship was 
not the best approach. With hindsight, one informant from the Brand Owner 
reflected that: 
'The implication is the second you define your relationship as 
the terms in your contract, you have a real problem. You 
know you have to have a legal document that defines how 
the relationship works and why, but that almost needs to be 
put in the desk drawer........... If you start pulling out the 
documents and pulling out specific things, sub paragraphs 
you know you are in for a bit of a battle. ' (11304) 
However, it was still recognised at the start of this stage that the relationship 
between the firms hadn't 'quite gelled' and that 'the heart of the problem was we 
were still thinking in terms of 'me' and 'you' and not 'us' (lAffA3). With this 
realisation, a number of changes were made to the inter-organisational processes 
and these are identified below. 
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Inter-organisational Control and Coordination Processes 
Within this third and final stage of evolution, the Brand Owner did try to maintain 
some centralised control over the brand. There were reported to still be 'certain 
core elements that [were] sacred' (IAffBI), particularly within marketing. For 
example, there remained standardised elements that had to be incorporated into 
any advertising campaigns. One informant commented, 'theoretically, they [the 
Brand Owner] could force us to hold the line on how the advertising is projected in 
the marketplace' (IAffA2). However, the Affiliates were given greater freedom to 
run marketing programmes and concepts that were not available in the home 
country of the Brand Owner at this point. 
A further decision undertaken at this stage was to replace the brand standards 
determined in the formation stage with brand values. The brand values were 
wider than the original brand standards and enabled greater degrees of local 
variations that reflected market and portfolio differences. In addition, it was 
determined that monitoring adherence to brand values would be the responsibility 
of each individual affiliate until an appropriate global third party organisation could 
be identified. These findings suggest that inter-organisational quality control 
processes adopted at this stage once more reflected the degree of 
decentralisation that was so important to affiliates in the formation stage. In 
addition, there appeared to be greater levels of reciprocity between the affiliated 
firms. For example, one informant identified 'service concepts' and 'customer 
handling techniques' developed by the affiliates that were adopted by the Brand 
Owner (IB02) at this stage. 
Inter-organisational processes for financial control also underwent some changes. 
In the previous stage, there were reported to be some issues that resulted from 
monitoring contribution to revenue through electronic distribution channels. 
However, it was reported that: 
'We struck a deal by which the reservations became all part 
of the fee, and it didn't matter whether our business was 
coming directly or via them, they got paid on everything. ' 
(IAffA3) 
183 
Informants also identified that while the majority of financial performance 
measures were the responsibility of each individual firm, there was a greater 
willingness to share data beyond contractual requirements. According to one 
informant, if the Brand Owner asked for it, they would willingly send it off. This 
was seen as way of engendering trust between the parties, even if the data 
potentially contained confidential information. While it was perceived as risky, the 
benefits of developing the relationship were believed to outweigh the risks. One 
informant suggested, 'the more open a relationship is the more trust you generate. 
So I just send it to them and take a chance' (IAffA2). This openness was also 
reported between Affiliate A and B as well. For instance, data on room rates were 
readily shared between these firms, even in competing markets. It was suggested 
that the reason for this was 'because it is a strong relationship and we trust them 
and vice versa' (IAffA2). 
In addition, the issues of sales teams became accepted and Affiliates A and B 
developed processes to work within these conditions. As one informant 
suggested: 
'It took me some time to realise that the job of sales person 
in America is very different and that if I didn't invest then I 
would basically be shooting myself in the foot. So now it is 
not an issue. We just ensure that our people have a very 
strong communication and dialogue with the American team 
and there is full support and cooperation so there really is no 
problem. ' (IAffB1) 
Informants identified that the affiliated partners became more 'customer focused' 
(IAffA2), rather than proprietal, in terms of managing key accounts. This now 
means that, 
`whoever is closest to that customer will work with that 
customer. So as an example, Nokia, someone from my team 
in Finland will manage it globally for the brand and handle 
the annual contract and so on... And we support each other 
and reciprocate that way. ' (IAffB1) 
Informants also identified greater use of inter-organisational coordination 
processes at this stage to help achieve this integration. Annual conferences were 
reported to have changed from being 'a bit of a jaunt ' for franchisees to an 
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opportunity to 'share success and best practice' (IAffA2). Members of the different 
affiliated firms reported using the conference to proactively network with members 
of the different firms. Furthermore, at this stage, informants report greater 
movement of staff members between the organisations. While this had occurred 
on an ad hoc basis in the earlier stages, informants from both Affiliate A and B 
reported a more pro-active and strategic approach at this stage. However, one 
informant suggested that this was the planned approach all along (IB04). 
Interlocking directorates were also implemented where senior members of the 
Brand Owner and Affiliate B were invited to sit on the Board of Director's for the 
other firms. The Chairman of Affiliate A was also invited to sit on the Board of the 
Brand Owner. 
Inter-organisation control and coordination processes were therefore adapted to 
reflect a more decentralised approach with greater levels of reciprocity displayed 
between the firms. However, informants also recognised that this decentralised 
approach to control could potentially 'open up anarchy and chaos' (IAffB1) and a 
mature relationship was necessary to make this workable. Comments by 
informants indicated that there had to be 'trust in the relationship' and that 'it is 
about having the integrity to know there is no hidden agenda' (IAffA3). This 
perception facilitated further changes in the decision-making processes. 
Inter-Organisational Decision-Making Processes 
It was suggested by informants from Affiliate A and B that at this stage, the Brand 
Owner 'stopped hitting us over the head with a baseball bat' (AffA2) with regards 
to decision making. One informant reported that: 
'Now when it comes to development, it is joint development. 
It's no longer they go and redevelop and present to the 
world, they would rather get us involved and we co develop. ' 
(IAffB I) 
This approach is perceived to lead to the development of initiatives that are more 
'global' in their orientation as it incorporates that 'the grass root experience from 
multiple markets' (IAffBI). This same informant suggested that this change of 
approach 'was very much due to the maturity and confidence of one key 
individual'. This senior Brand Owner member did not take a proprietary approach 
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to the brand at this stage. Instead this individual began to adopt an approach that 
questioned 'what is best for the brand and what is best for the partners? ' (IAffB3). 
Other informants suggested that the combined size and strength of both Affiliates 
A and B forced this reconsideration by the Brand Owner. One informant recalled, 
'at that point really it was a case of you either listen or have a lot of grief. And they 
did start to listen' (IAffA3). Whatever the reason, the Brand Owner was reported to 
have, 
'shown a great deal of trust and openness, maybe 
pragmatism to go about the strategy. But as a by-product of 
that openness, and involving different regions, they got 
tremendous buy-in, because nobody felt that it was handed 
out on high. ' (IAffA3) 
Feelings of resentment by the members of Affiliate A and B reportedly 
disappeared at this stage. It was felt that new initiatives, particularly within 
marketing became more relevant to all affiliated firms. The decision-making 
process established 'a mutual freedom to interpret the brand and execute the 
brand within our areas of responsibility' and therefore 'local needs are 
accommodated' (IAffB1). As such, decision-making processes also became more 
reflective of the decentralised approach envisaged in the formation stage. One 
Brand Owner informant summed up the situation accordingly: 
We like to feel that we are a strong control company, we 
like to feel that and the reason that I stress this is because 
in truth it is actually the opposite. ' (1601) 
Inter-organisational communication processes 
Changes to decision-making also required changes to be made in inter- 
organisational communication processes. While there was still evidence of formal 
communication vehicles at this stage of the affiliation, these became superseded 
to some extent by more informal communication practices to manage the inter- 
organisational relationships. For instance, the Global Brand Council was reported 
to have 'literally petered out' (IAffBI), 'fell apart' (IAffA1) and become an 
'anachronism' (IAffA2). Informants suggested the reason for this is 'because we 
get things sorted out by a phone call' and through 'face-to-face' meetings' for 'any 
stuff that needs nudging forward' (IAffA2). Informants from all three firms reported 
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this to be the preferred approach. It was suggested that 'our relationships are 
such that we have this ongoing dialogue anyway' (IAffA2). 
Communication channels were reported to have devolved down through different 
organisational levels, but remained rather limited at the unit level. At this stage, an 
inter-organisational communication norm or unwritten code of practice also 
appears to have developed. It was reported that 'people would almost exclusively 
deal with their counterparts on the same organisational level as a courtesy' 
(IAffA1). Another informant elaborated and identified that if there were issues to 
be resolved they preferred to 'deal with it person to person, rather than rely on a 
hierarchical approach' (IAffA2). For example, if there was an issue or query 
concerning new policies or initiatives, it was deemed poor practice to go a 
counterpart's senior manager instead of the counterpart. As one informant 
commented: 
'It would be injudicious of me, to call [X, ] if I had an issue 
because it would be [Y, ] my counterpart, exposed. And I 
would never dream of doing that'. (IAffA2) 
This practice was further reported to be a 'relationship status thing' (IAffA2) as the 
relationships between the counterpart members were considered to have 
developed to such an extent to demand this practice. Furthermore, it was 
perceived that these relationships could be endangered by not dealing directly with 
affiliated counterparts. As this informal communication was reported to support 
the devolved decision-making process, informants were keen not to do anything to 
disturb these relationships. 
Not all formal communication vehicles had been disbanded by this stage and there 
was still a reliance on some to reinforce the informal organisational practices. For 
example, there were a number of other formal meetings that took place across the 
affiliated organisations on a regular basis, especially within sales and marketing. 
As previously identified, the annual general conference began to be utilised by the 
affiliated partners as a means of building their interpersonal relationships through 
networking. The situation was summed up as follows: 
'You can do business face to face and you need that 
personal contact to reinforce relationships. And the better I 
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have got to know these guys face to face, I found that the 
smoother moving business forward by phone becomes. ' 
(IAffA2) 
All informants recognised the benefits of these newer inter-organisational 
communication processes. One suggested that as a result of these processes, 
'we have a healthy debate about how things are done 
and a very good exchange of information. ' (1804) 
However maintaining this level of communication required a good deal of time and 
commitment by individuals across all three affiliated firms. When these changes in 
inter-organisational design processes were implemented, 'a watershed was 
reached' (IAffB1) in the affiliation. According to one informant, this was the point 
'we were seriously able to stop the engagement and get married, really get 
married' (IAffA3). Other informants suggested that this was when the affiliation 
reached a stage of maturity. Reaching this stage had taken between seven and 
eight years. 
The data also revealed that this stage of maturity was defined by when individual 
firms and their members began to work proactively beyond the terms of the initial 
contractual agreements. As one informant identified, 'you no longer think about us 
and them', rather you 'think about the most cost-effective and customer friendly 
way of distributing our product' (lAffA3). Two examples provided by informants of 
such activities were considered to be proactively selling each other's products in 
their own territories and sharing financial data across individual firms. These 
activities were considered to be proof of individual members working towards the 
good of the brand, rather than concentrating predominately on proprietal issues. 
This focus, in turn, required members of the individual organisations to develop a 
'mindset of us', as opposed to the mindset of 'us and them' prevalent in the 
previous stage. One informant further suggested that this required members to 
move beyond 'accepting the differences' between the different firms, to 'valuing 
the differences' (1604) and the strengths it brought to the brand. 
However, informants were clear that they could not lose sight of their own firm's 
interests. There was still a need to make 'sure that on a mercenary business level 
we are getting every bit of return on investment we can' (lAffA2). Nonetheless, at 
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this stage informants became aware of the dangers of focusing on their own 
organisations in the short term at the expense of the brand in the long term. A 
careful balance was perceived to be required and achieving this balance was 
reported to 'boil down to personal trust' and to be, 
'about having the integrity to know there is no hidden 
agenda. OK the fact that we all operate under the same 
brand tag doesn't mean to say we are necessarily working 
towards the same goals, we are each looking after our own 
companies' interests. And are those interests aligned? There 
has to be a level of trust there. ' (IAffA2) 
This informant reported that ensuring that level of trust is there 'hinges on 
nurturing your relationship and leveraging the relationship' (IAffA2) between 
different organisational members. Another reported: 
'Trust is only built because you get to know the people 
and you understand their reaction so you know how to go 
about building the relationship'. (1B04) 
At this stage there were still issues and 'territorial wars' (IBO1) that developed 
between the different firms, but the trust and the relationships developed between 
the different organisational members ensured that communication channels were 
kept open and issues resolved. This situation was summarised accordingly: 
'My counterpart there and my counterpart in (the Brand 
Owner) have a good, it goes beyond good, a very good 
working relationship. So we are not only aware of the issues, 
[that cause conflict] we are now working towards managing 
them well. ' (IAffA2) 
It was suggested that organisational members had learned to 'listen with the intent 
to understand' (1604) these issues from each organisation's perspective, rather 
than listen with the 'intent to reply' (1604) why it was better to do things in one 
particular way. Face-to-face communication was reported to be essential. At this 
stage the affiliation was perceived to be a 'coordinating effort' (1604) based on 
lateral inter-organisational processes rather than one based upon hierarchic 
control and adherence to regulations. 
The findings presented above identified that inter-organisational affiliations evolve 
through a number of stages and three clear stages were depicted in the case 
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study; affiliation formation, affiliation development and affiliation maturity. As they 
evolve through these stages, inter-organisational designs are adapted as reflected 
through the inter-firm processes for control and coordination, decision-making and 
communication. Adaptations are driven by the interaction that occurs between the 
affiliated organisations and their members and serve to enhance the degree of 
flexibility achieved. As such, these designs also become more reflective of 
change models. Table 5.6 summarises the changes in organisational processes 
in the case study. 
5.4.3 Summary of Research Findings 
This chapter presented the findings from the three different phases of the 
research. The first phase verified the use of multiple international market entry 
modes in international hotel chains and thus the creation of diverse affiliations. 
The second phase revealed that control remains a key issue in the management 
of international hotel chains and as a result, there is a reliance on traditional 
models of design where control can be managed through hierarchical authority. 
While both owned, leased and managed (OLM) and franchised elements of hotel 
portfolios employ traditional designs, in franchised portfolios, some processes are 
more decentralised. Despite this, there are limited coordination mechanisms 
employed to support this decentralisation. Phase three of the study identified 
further differences in the design between direct and direct investment franchised, 
and corporate and master franchised portfolios. In the latter, organisation designs 
evolve throughout the life of the inter-firm agreement as depicted through the 
changing nature of inter-organisational processes employed. These processes 
therefore are the dominant dimensions of these inter-organisational designs. 
Three evolutionary stages of inter-organisational design were identified in this 
study as formation, development and maturity. When the stage of maturity is 
reached, flexibility across the portfolios is enhanced and these designs become 
more reflective of change models. This chapter has therefore served to identify 
`how' international hotel chains as diverse affiliations are designed and managed 
through the identification of both organisational and inter-organisational structures 
and processes employed. The implications of these findings are discussed in the 
190 
following chapter in relation to the extant literature and the research propositions 
identified through the literature review. 
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This chapter discusses the findings in relation to the extant literature and the 
objectives of this study. The discussion is structured around two broad and inter- 
related themes that are drawn from the findings from all three phases of the 
research. The first theme considers 'how' diverse affiliations are designed and 
managed. It begins by identifying the design differences within diverse affiliations, 
their relationship to the market entry methods used, and the implications of these 
within the different elements of a firm's portfolio. It then examines these designs in 
relation to hybrid models. The second theme focuses more specifically on 'how' 
inter-organisational agreements are designed. The evolution of these designs is 
examined to identify relevant inter-organisational processes, the key ingredients of 
success, and relational ties in different evolutionary stages. The chapter concludes 
by comparing the key findings from this study with the research propositions 
developed through the literature review. 
6.2 Designs in International Diverse Affiliations 
This study identifies that international hotel chains that use multiple market entry 
methods employ different organisation designs within their portfolios. Three 
different designs have been identified for owned, leased and managed (OLM), 
direct and direct investment franchise, and for corporate and master franchise 
portfolios. International chains such as Firm C, who utilise all these types of 
affiliation, incorporate all three types of design within their portfolios. The following 
discussion compares these different designs and the implications of adopting 
them. 
6.2.1 Understanding Design Differences in Diverse Affiliations 
Traditional models of design are used in OLM portfolios by the case study firms, 
despite the different operating characteristics displayed in Table 5.2. Previous 
studies have identified the impact of firm-specific characteristics on organisation 
194 
structures adopted by both domestic and international firms in different industries 
(Pugh, 1960; Daft and Steers, 1986; Clark, 1987; Calori et al, 1994; Ezzamel and 
Watson, 1993; Egelhoff, 1999). However, all of these previous studies investigated 
specific structural differences using a quantitative research approach. In 
comparison, this study adopts a qualitative approach and the findings reported 
draw on broad design models incorporating both structure and organisation 
processes. Using this approach, this study builds on previous work by identifying 
the reasons why different design models are used. It also builds on Clark's (1987) 
UK study that identified a hotel chain could have different types of relationships 
between the corporate structure and unit level hotels. This research identifies 
these different types of relationships exist in an international context and it 
provides a fuller explanation of the diverse processes for control and coordination 
in the different relationships and the reasons for their adoption. 
The traditional designs identified for OLM elements of the portfolio rely on what 
Burns (1963) identifies as mechanistic formal structures that depict high levels of 
centralisation, formalisation and hierarchical reporting, features also identified by 
Pugh and Hickson (1990), Tata et al (1999) and Curado (2006). Organisational 
processes are shaped by the formal structures and the control systems in place. 
In this study, organisational processes used for output control (as defined by Das, 
1993) rely on diagnostic control mechanisms (as defined by Kimura and 
Mourdoukoutas, 2000) in the form of budgets and quality control inspections. 
These findings provide support for Birnberg's (1998) argument that adherence to 
both procedures and outcomes are key elements of control in mechanistic 
organisation structures. In addition, these diagnostic mechanisms are supported 
by what Kimura and Mourdoukoutas (2000) define as boundary control 
mechanisms. For example, in this study corporate guidelines and reporting 
procedures serve to limit autonomy at the unit level and act to reinforce corporate 
behavioural standards. 
Behavioural control is also achieved through informal coordination processes. 
However, the degree to which these coordination processes are employed 
appears to be related to the extent of a firm's internationalisation. It is the firms 
that are the most international in this study that make use of more coordination 
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mechanisms such as tasks groups, project teams, corporate universities and 
electronic chat rooms. These processes encourage frequent, informal and multi- 
directional communication amongst organisation members. As such, both 
coordination and communication processes serve to act as what Kimura and 
Mourdoukoutas (2000) define as interactive control mechanisms. Organisation 
processes are therefore used to support the mechanistic structures employed and 
enhance control. These findings therefore provide support for the argument that 
integrated control systems are needed, particularly within international 
organisations (Flamholtz, 1996; Birnberg, 1998; Kimura and Mourdoukoutas, 
2000). 
This study reveals that organisation designs in diverse affiliations are subject to 
change. However, even when firms adapt their structures and processes, there is 
still a reliance on traditional design models in OLM portfolios. In both types of 
adaptation identified in this study, organisation structures are changed in line with 
changes in organisational growth strategies, the only strategy investigated in this 
study. Organisation designs remain relatively static but then are punctuated by 
periodic change. Previous studies on hotel chains also identified that structure 
changed in line with a change in strategy (Schaffer, 1984; West and Olsen, 1988; 
Dev and Olsen, 1989; Dev and -Brown, 1990). This study builds on these efforts 
however, by providing richer detail of these changes. In earlier stages of 
internationalisation, change is represented through the development of new 
divisions and hierarchical layers and positions. When target markets are global 
customers, these divisions are created more quickly in order to ensure sufficient 
degrees of centralised control over individual hotel units. In later stages of 
internationalisation, design changes serve to consolidate the organisation 
structure to achieve scale economies, but without relinquishing control. Both 
adaptation patterns are arguably indicative of a contingency approach where 
structure follows strategy. This study therefore provides further support for the 
studies of hotel chains identified above but in an international context and for 
previous studies in other industry sectors (Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1969; Galbraith, 1977). 
196 
In this study, organisation designs in direct and direct investment franchising also 
adopt a contingency approach to change. As with the OLM portfolios, designs 
continue to represent what Egelhoff (1999) determines are traditional models even 
after changes have been implemented. However, there are a number of 
differences in organisational processes within these elements of the portfolio. 
These differences are driven by the degree of control afforded to the franchisor. 
As franchisees retain control over their finances and daily hotel operations, 
franchisors cannot readily employ the same output control mechanisms as in OLM 
portfolios. Contractor and Kundu (1998a, 1998b) also found weak control over 
daily management and quality in international hotel franchises. However, this 
study reveals that it is administrative controls (as defined by Hoffman and Preble, 
1991) that serve as the main control mechanisms, despite a number of 
researchers questioning their effectiveness in international franchise systems 
(Hoffman and Preble, 1991; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996; Elango and Fried, 1997). 
Furthermore, a number of factors are identified that contribute to this reliance on 
administrative controls in international hotel chains. 
In this first instance, economic controls do not appear to be as effective as 
suggested by previous studies (Bradach, 1995; Kauffman and Dant, 1996; 
Bercovitz, 2002; Skalins and Mayer, 2002). The cost associated with brand 
switching for franchisees is no longer deemed prohibitive. Secondly, greater 
levels of competition amongst franchisors also facilitate brand switching by 
franchisees. These economic and competitive forces create greater pressure on 
franchisors to protect the brand image through the control processes implemented. 
In this way they ensure they can continue to grow the brand through future sales 
to new franchisees. Using administrative controls as the key diagnostic tools to 
monitor adherence to brand standards therefore becomes more important. As 
such, these findings provide empirical support to the arguments of Eroglu (1992), 
McGuffie (1996) and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2000) on the importance of quality 
control in relation to brand standards in international franchise systems. However, 
the particular environmental forces driving these changes may be industry specific 
and not as applicable to other service sectors. 
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This study also reveals that protecting brand standards impacts positively on 
franchisor willingness to use contractual controls (as defined by Hoffman and 
Preble, 1991) to remove underperforming hotels from the system. Quinn's (1997) 
study of international retail networks also reveals that the effectiveness of 
contractual controls is positively related to the franchisor's willingness to use them. 
However, Connell (1997) and Quinn (1997) also found that contractual controls 
are used only in extreme situations and this finding is supported to some extent in 
this study. There is evidence of franchisors giving franchisees time to make 
improvements before contracts are enforced. While Hoffman and Preble (2004) 
found contractual controls more difficult to use in international franchise systems, 
informants in this study did not identify this as a particular issue. However, it must 
be pointed out that informants were not asked directly about this potential difficulty. 
Behavioural controls are also restricted in direct and direct investment franchised 
divisions in this study. This finding is inconsistent with that of Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard (1999) who found evidence of high formalisation to control opportunistic 
behaviour in their study of Norwegian oil refinery franchise systems. However, 
these contradictory findings may be explained through industry-specific 
differences, and the fact that in this study, formalisation is judged relative to that 
used within OLM divisions. What formalisation there is in franchised and direct 
investment franchised divisions, is predominantly limited to technical brand 
standards rather than softer elements of customer service. While Contractor and 
Kundu (1998a, 1998b) found there was non-existent control over physical quality 
in franchise systems, this study suggests that formalisation is being used to 
overcome this limitation. This finding may also be applicable across other service 
sectors where physical quality is important to upholding brand image. 
Due to the decentralised nature of operational decision-making, non-coercive 
sources of power and management by persuasion are the key sources of 
behavioural control identified in this study; a finding consistent with previous 
research undertaken by Bradach (1995), Contractor and Kundu (1998b) and 
Quinn (1997). However, decision-making in franchised systems can be viewed 
from both operational and strategic perspectives. When it comes to more strategic 
decisions regarding the brand, the evidence from this study suggests there is very 
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limited input by franchisees and what input there is, is representational. Informal 
practices, such as an invitation by the corporate level to trial new initiatives are 
normally made only to those franchisees considered to have a high achievement 
rate or who play by the rules. This practice could be perceived as a way to 
incentivise franchisees and thereby increase behavioural control over them. 
Coordination and communication processes used within the franchised divisions 
are also limited compared to OLM estates. Much of the communication between 
the franchisor and the franchisee is through formal channels and by way of formal 
reporting. More informal communication is evident only when there is a need to 
persuade franchisees to adopt new initiatives. Communication is restricted 
through high spans of control in the organisation structures and the physical 
distances involved in international franchise systems, factors previously identified 
in retail franchising by Quinn (1998). However, this study suggests that 
management perceptions also impact on the willingness to engage in 
communication between the corporate level and franchised hotels and between 
franchised and OLM elements of the portfolio. This lack of informal coordination 
and communication appears to be inconsistent with the need to manage by 
persuasion. Furthermore Dant and Nasr (1998) identified that communication 
positively impacts on control in franchise systems. These findings suggest that 
informal coordination and communication processes could be used more 
effectively to support mechanistic structures and enhance degrees of control 
attained in these franchised divisions, as they are in OLM portfolios. 
The third and final design identified in this study is within corporate and master 
franchised divisions that employed change models of design (Egelhoff, 1999). In 
these inter-organisational designs, processes take on more importance than 
formal structures as the design evolves. Greater emphasis is placed on lateral 
integration or coordination processes as opposed to vertical control mechanisms, 
a finding that supports Curado's (2006) conceptual argument. These designs are 
characterised by decentralisation with much authority and power devolved to the 
affiliated organisations, characteristics of change models identified by Child and 
McGrath (2001) through their review of design studies. In this study, these 
designs enable the firms to better meet the needs of their different customer 
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markets as they evolve. Affiliated firms are able to take local initiative to achieve 
agreed upon goals rather than have initiatives imposed from above. This study 
therefore adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence of these 
characteristics within change models. Furthermore, it identifies that 
communication within these designs is frequent, informal, multi-directional and 
inter-organisational. This finding is consistent with that of Martinez and Jarillo 
(1991) who found the need for sufficient coordination mechanisms to facilitate 
local responsiveness in MNCs. As such, the organisational and inter- 
organisational processes for control and coordination employed within these firms 
are mutually supportive, a finding that supports the conclusions drawn by Gittel 
(2000) within the airline industry. This study also reveals the dynamic nature of 
organisation designs within change models. However, change is continuous in 
nature, rather than punctuated as in traditional models. As such, this study 
provides empirical evidence to support Egelhoffs (1999) argument, that there are 
no predefined notions of equilibrium in change models of design. 
The preceding discussion reveals that organisation designs are dynamic in 
diverse affiliations, however there are key differences between the designs 
employed in relation to: 
" the design models adopted, 
" the organisation structures used, 
" the organisational or inter-organisational processes employed and 
" the nature of change within the designs. 
Table 6.1 sums up these differences between OLM, direct and direct investment 
franchises, and corporate and master franchised portfolios. 
Table 6.1 identifies that diversely affiliated firms employ designs ranging from 
traditional to change models. It also reveals that organisations designs do not 
relate directly to the market entry method employed, but rather to categories of 
affiliation. These findings demonstrate that design differences are related to the 
degree and type of interdependence created through the international 
market entry method chosen. When the designs identified in this study are 
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along a continuum from traditional to change models as depicted in Figure 6.1. 
The correlation between interdependence and organisation design is well 
supported through previous empirical studies (Thompson, 1967; Martinez and 
Jarillo, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Buono, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Harzing, 1999; 
Dekker, 2004). While these studies have focussed on the relationship between 
degrees of interdependence and control and coordination in different types of 
organisational and inter-organisational agreements, they can be used to examine 
the findings from this study. 
Using Thompson's (1967) classification, three types of interdependence are 
depicted in this study. The OLM elements of the portfolios are arguably reflective 
of pooled interdependence as each hotel unit operates in its own right and makes 
a contribution to the brand or firm. In addition, failure in one hotel and poor quality 
or customer feedback may threaten the reputation of other hotel units in the brand. 
Given the autonomy granted to franchisees through the contract, the designs in 
direct and direct investment franchise portfolios are more decentralised than those 
in OLM portfolios. The franchisor creates and distributes the product concept and 
trademark. The franchisee then delivers the product to the customer. Each 
organisation makes a successive contribution to the development and delivery of 
the brand and they are therefore sequentially interdependent. In corporate and 
master franchise agreements, portfolio development and management of different 
functional responsibilities is divided between the firms involved. The nature of the 
interaction includes more shared resources between firms and is therefore 
reflective of reciprocal interdependence. The literature review reveals which 
control and coordination procedures are deemed appropriate for different types of 
interdependence. Table 6.2 compares the findings from this study with those 
identified through the literature, drawing on both the empirical studies identified 
above and also on conceptual studies reviewed. 
Table 6.2 identifies distinct differences in the control and coordination processes 
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firms within this study employ more coordination processes than previous 
empirical studies have identified or argued are necessary. These differences may 
be a result of the different industry sectors investigated. For example, Martinez 
and Jarillo (1991) conducted their investigation within manufacturing firms, 
suggesting there may be a need for more coordination processes within 
international service firms. In addition, their study investigated firms where 
subsidiary ownership ranged from 50% to 100%, whereas in this study, the 
ownership dynamics are different in OLM portfolios. Furthermore, this study 
reveals that extent of internationalisation may also impact on the number of 
coordination processes employed, a factor not investigated by Martinez and Jarillo 
(1991). This study demonstrates that these coordination processes encourage 
higher levels of informal communication between organisational members across 
different hierarchical levels and geographic regions. They therefore act as useful 
and complementary processes for decision-making and encourage sharing of best 
practice within these firms. As such, they also serve to enhance behavioural 
control. The research undertaken by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987,1989) and 
Golden and Powell (1999) reveals that these communication practices also serve 
to enhance flexibility across organisations. However, this study identifies that in 
reality there is limited autonomy granted to unit level managers in OLM portfolios. 
The focus on centralised output control mechanisms serves to limit any flexibility 
driven at the local level. Where products or services are adapted for local 
markets, these decisions are undertaken centrally at senior organisational levels. 
Chang and Taylor (1999) also found a correlation between the degree of 
ownership and central control exerted in their study of Korean manufacturing 
subsidiaries. 
Table 6.2 highlights that within franchise and direct investment franchising, firms 
within this study adopt less coordination and communication processes than 
advised within the literature for this type of interdependency. Control is most 
readily depicted in this study through monitoring contributions to revenue and 
adherence to technical brand standards by franchisees. However, franchise 
systems were not a specific focus of these previous studies, suggesting that they 
may be unique organisational forms as Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) argue. 
In this study, the franchisor introduces coordination processes only when they are 
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deemed necessary to achieve buy-in or disseminate corporate perspectives. 
Additional coordination and informal communication processes could serve to 
enhance the degree of control afforded as within OLM portfolios. In addition, they 
could potentially enhance flexibility in direct and direct investment franchise 
systems by encouraging greater sharing of best practice. These findings point 
towards what Cardinal et al (2004) have identified as a control imbalance. In this 
study, there appears to be too much emphasis on formal control procedures in 
these divisions at the expense of informal coordination processes. As identified 
above, this emphasis appears to be driven by the need to protect brand image and 
therefore is arguably applicable across a wider sector of service industries. 
In corporate and master franchised agreements, Table 6.2 reveals that the 
coordination and control processes employed by the firms in this study are 
consistent with those advised within the literature for this type of interdependency. 
This study therefore provides support for Grandori's (1997a) and Bark! and 
Pinsonneault's (2005) conceptual research framework on the type of mechanisms 
employed to integrate reciprocally interdependent firms. However, the findings 
from this study differ from those of Gulati and Singh (1998) who found that 
alliances with reciprocal interdependence were more likely to use hierarchical 
forms of control. Gulati and Singh (1998) used secondary data and a quantitative 
approach to identify formal governance structures as defined by the types of 
contractual arrangement formed. The formal governance structures in this study, 
as defined by the master franchise contractual agreement, would also depict a 
hierarchical structure. However, by adopting a qualitative approach, this study 
reveals the reliance on lateral coordination processes within these inter-firm 
agreements despite the formal governance structure employed. Furthermore, this 
study adds to the literature by identifying that the number and type of coordination 
processes utilised increases over the length of the inter-firm agreements. These 
coordination processes also appear to be positively correlated with the extent of 
intemationalisation. This study identifies that they serve to stimulate the levels of 
behavioural control in these inter-firm agreements. Previous empirical studies 
across a range of industrial contexts also identify the importance of behavioural 
control within inter-firm agreements (Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Dekker, 2004; Kauser and Shaw, 2004). Furthermore, the findings from this 
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research reveal these coordination processes serve to stimulate greater flexibility 
across these elements of the portfolio, suggesting that flexibility is not achieved at 
the expense of control. 
This discussion serves to highlight a number of anomalies in coordination 
practices between the literature and the findings within this study. The latter 
suggest that coordination processes can impact positively on degrees of control 
and flexibility achieved. However, this study also reveals that mechanistic 
structures and centralised output control mechanisms that provide the framework 
for organisational processes can serve to limit the flexibility actually achieved. This 
argument suggests that coordination processes must be supported by 
appropriate control procedures and organisation structures in order to 
achieve flexibility. This finding is consistent with that of Gittel (2000) and Gittel 
and Weiss (2004) who identified the need for control and coordination processes 
to be mutually supportive in the airline industry. They also provide support for 
Cardinal et al's (2004) findings of the benefits of balanced control systems. 
6.2.2 Hybrid Designs 
The argument presented thus far has identified the distinct differences within 
designs in diversely affiliated service firms. However, the literature suggests that 
hybrid forms of design might be the most suitable for diversely affiliated 
organisations to adopt. Table 6.3 compares the key characteristics of hybrid 
organisation designs identified in the literature review to the characteristics of the 
differentiated designs identified in this study. 
Table 6.3 reveals that only two characteristics of hybrid and differentiated designs 
are similar. Both contain a mixture of mechanistic and organic structures and 
within both, diverse structures are normal. Other characteristics of hybrid designs 
are only reflected partially in differentiated designs, and when they are, these are 
depicted predominantly in the designs of corporate and master franchise portfolios 
and thus change models of design. For example, these particular designs have 
multiple corporate centres with each contributing different types of expertise about 
their markets, thereby forming what Bahrami (1992) identifies as steeples of 
expertise. Cosmopolitan mindsets also identified by Bahrami (1992) 
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Tahlp R_3 A Comparison of Hybrid and Differentiated Models of Design . Characteristic of Hybrid Models Characteristics of Differentiated Models of 
Identified in the Literature* Design Identified in this Study 
" Contain a mixture of " Contain a mixture of mechanistic and 
mechanistic and organic organic structures 
structures 
" Traditional models at macro " Model employed varies according to the 
(corporate or firm) level type of interdependence rather than at 
" Organic models at micro macro or micro level 
(divisional or functional) level of 
organisations 
" Calculated blends of different " Blend of different governance structures 
governance structures according to different type of 
interdependence 
" Contain bedrock (core) " Bedrock or core systems change 
structures that change infrequently in OLM and franchised 
infrequently and these are elements but not necessarily overlapped by 
overlapped by lateral processes lateral processes 
" Lateral processes in corporate and master 
franchise portfolios, but not underpinned by 
bedrock structure as change is more 
continuous 
" Multiple centres that serve to " Multiple centres only in corporate and 
support the organisation master franchised elements of the portfolio 
" Single centres in OLM and direct and direct 
investment franchise elements of portfolio 
" Steeples of expertise throughout " Steeples of expertise in corporate and 
organisation master franchised elements of the portfolio 
" Expertise in other elements of portfolio 
perceived to lie at the corporate level 
" Interdependent units " Interdependency within different designs 
across portfolio 
" Multiple alliances " Multiple alliances but horizontal integration 
" Predominantly horizontal more prominent in corporate and master 
integration with some vertical franchise agreements 
integration " Vertical integration more prominent in direct 
and direct investment franchised and OLM 
portfolios 
" Diverse structures normal " Diverse structures normal 
" Cosmopolitan mindset " Cosmopolitan mindset more apparent in 
(organisational members can corporate and master franchise 
reconcile global/local views) agreements, but only when reach stage of 
maturity 
" Emphasis on flexibility, but not at " Flexibility more apparent in corporate and 
the expense of efficiency master franchise agreements at later stages 
of evolution 
" In direct and direct investment franchised 
and OLM elements efficiency may be 
achieved at the expense of flexibility 
" Control and flexibility " Control and flexibility simultaneously 
encapsulated across the achieved in corporate and master franchise 
organisation agreements, 
" In direct and direct investment franchised 
and OLM elements control achieved at the 
expense of flexibility 
'Characteristics identified from the work of Bahrami (1992), 5chermerhorn et al (1994), uay (I aaa), 
Egelhoff (1999) and Ashcraft (2001). 
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emerge among members of the different firms as the inter-firm agreements evolve 
towards maturity. This trait is displayed by the members of the different firms 
willingness to reconcile both global and local perspectives when undertaking 
decisions. In addition, this evolution gives rise to the simultaneous achievement of 
both control and flexibility. In this study, there is evidence of the achievement of 
all types of flexibility as identified by Schilling and Steensma (2001), but not at the 
expense of control. However, these characteristics are not evident in all three 
designs identified. There appear to be distinct barriers erected between the 
different elements of the portfolio that hinder the adoption of hybrid designs and 
the realisation of their purported benefits. The shaded areas between the different 
designs in Figure 6.1 depict these barriers. 
This study reveals that the foundation for these barriers is the different designs 
adopted and the distinct control, coordination and communication processes 
employed for, and restricted to, each different design. In addition to the process 
differences identified above, other disparate processes also endorse the barriers 
between the different designs. For example, there is a greater willingness by 
senior managers to get involved at the unit level within OLM portfolios. There is 
also more frequent and informal communication within OLM portfolio members at 
different organisational levels. OLM hotel managers are financially rewarded for 
good performance and sometimes rewarded with additional networking 
opportunities. In contrast, franchisees are punished for poor performance. This 
carrot and stick approach serves to enhance perceptual barriers between these 
divisions. Other perceptual biases also exist amongst organisational members 
within the different designs. OLM members perceive franchisees as the 'poor 
cousins' who offer inferior quality and are not considered to be trustworthy. 
Members of corporate and master franchise organisations consider individual 
franchisees to be of relatively little significance in the overall operation of brands. 
Within direct and direct investment franchise systems, members of the corporate 
organisation representing the franchisor display limited consideration of the 
potential worth of individual franchisees who are considered to be 'on the other 
side of the wall' when it comes to communication. These perceptual biases serve 
to reinforce barriers between the different designs and hinder the interaction 
between them. This study suggests therefore that rather than communities of 
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practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Kimble and Hildreth, 2005) communities of 
design are created and maintained through design differences and 
perceptual barriers in diverse affiliations. 
Communities of practice were first introduced by Lave and Wenger (1991) within 
the context of learning through apprenticeship models. However, their definition 
and application has since been adapted for commercial organisations. Hildreth 
and Kimble (2000) report that communities of practice are informal groups of 
professionals who are bound together by common problems and common pursuit 
of solutions. Ardichvili, Page and Wenting (2003: 65) add that these informal 
groups share areas of interest and are united in action for the good of the whole 
firm. Their value to international organisations and inter-organisational 
agreements lies in their ability to facilitate the integration of new employees, the 
ability to respond to customer needs, the creation and sharing of knowledge, and 
thus the reduction of time spent reinventing the wheel (Wenger and Snyder, 2000; 
Juriado and Gustafsson, 2007; Pastoors, 2007). Communities of practice are 
considered to be particularly effective for disseminating tacit knowledge between 
members (Ardichvili et al, 2003; Dewhurst and Navarro, 2004; Kimble and 
Hildreth, 2005) however, their success is reported to depend on members' 
willingness to participate within the community and to share knowledge (Kimble 
and Hildreth, 2005). Trust between members has been identified as a 
fundamental criterion for success (Ardichvili et al, 2003; Dewhurst and Navarro, 
2004) as it allows members to develop shared understanding, a sense of common 
identity and relationships of mutuality (Mittendorf et al, 2006). Pemberton, Mavin 
and Stalker (2007) highlight the role of members' perceptions in developing these 
relationships. Within the diverse affiliations investigated in this study, perceptual 
barriers have been identified between the different designs and their members. 
These barriers inhibit the development of shared understanding, a sense of 
common identity and relationships of mutuality. As a result, communities of design 
are created rather than communities of practice and these appear to have a 
negative impact on knowledge development and sharing across diverse 
affiliations. 
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Communities of design also serve to inhibit the development of 'plural' processes 
identified by Bradach (1995) as an essential ingredient for the simultaneous 
achievement of control and flexibility. Table 6.4 compares the findings from this 
study with the plural processes identified by Bradach (1995). As multi-unit 
franchisees were not a subject of this study, the modelling process has been 
omitted from this analysis. 
T kf aAA [`mmnarisnn of Plural Processes 
Plural Process* Definition Findings from this Study 
Ratcheting process Comparison of performance Comparisons are not made 
measures serves to across the different elements 
stimulate each division to of the portfolio 
improve performance 
Socialisation Movement of organisation Evidence of movement of 
members between organisation members within 
franchised and corporate- corporate and master 
owned divisions leads to franchise agreements but 
improved control predominantly at later stages 
of evolution 
Mutual learning process Testing of new ideas from Evidence of adoption of ideas 
franchisees by corporate or innovations from corporate 
office for financial viability or master franchisees only, 
degree of testing not 
identified 
* As identified by Gradach (199b). 
Table 6.4 clearly indicates key differences in the findings of this study with those of 
Bradach (1995). While a number of control processes used within OLM and 
franchised divisions are consistent with those identified in Bradach's (1995) study, 
the lack of comparison between performances of the different divisions prohibits 
the development of a 'ratcheting' process to improve organisational performance 
and hence control. However, Bradach (1995) investigated domestic firms and 
ratcheting has questionable relevance in an international setting where diverse 
market conditions could make performance comparisons meaningless. 
There are also differences depicted in this study for socialisation. Bradach's (1995) 
plural process of 'socialisation' can be likened to Goh's (2001) human integration 
across different divisions or firms. This plural process is reported to increase the 
levels of what Ouchi (1979) identifies as behavioural control. The more movement 
of people across organisations, the greater the potential for dissemination, 
particularly of tacit knowledge through personal contact (Kim and Hwang, 1992; 
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Kogut and Zander, 1993; Driscoll and Paliwoda, 1997). The sharing of tacit 
knowledge was identified through the market entry literature to increase control 
afforded within individual organisations and in this study there is evidence of 
socialisation within OLM designs for this purpose. However, the literature also 
highlighted the potential risk of this practice in inter-firm agreements, where 
dissemination and opportunistic behaviour can undermine a firm's competitive 
advantage, particularly in horizontal alliances (Terpstra and Simonin, 1993; 
Clarke-Hill et al, 2003; Klint and Sjoberg, 2003; Vetschera, 2000). This study 
however, provides empirical evidence of socialisation in master and corporate 
franchise divisions. As such it offers support for Todeva and Knoke's (2005) 
argument that risks of dissemination could depend on the inter-organisational 
processes employed. However this study also suggests that it could be dependent 
on the evolutionary stage of an inter-firm agreement. There is evidence of greater 
levels of socialisation in this study at the maturity stage. Furthermore, this 
socialisation takes place across organisational boundaries and was also actively 
encouraged across geographical boundaries due to the perceived benefits of this 
type of behavioural control. Cliquet (2000) and Cliquet and Croizean (2002) also 
found more support for Bradach's plural processes in mature store networks in 
their study. However, they defined maturity according to network size and market 
saturation. The findings from this study also differ from those of Chang and Taylor 
(1999) who identify the limitations of behavioural control mechanisms in 
international manufacturing firms. Socialisation as a behavioural control 
mechanism may therefore be more relevant to international service firms and 
particular types of retail networks. This study adds to the literature however, as it 
also reveals that the socialisation that does take place in diverse affiliations is 
restricted to the different communities of design. This finding provides further 
support for the argument presented above that organisational design processes 
contribute to the development of distinct design communities. 
Flexibility in Bradach's (1995) plural system was derived from 'mutual learning' 
whereby new ideas from corporate employees and franchisees were tested at 
corporate level for financial viability. In this study, there is evidence of this process 
but only within. corporate and master franchise portfolios. There were no 
organisational processes identified in this study to record or test the new product 
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ideas from direct and direct investment franchisees. In fact, informants reported a 
distinct lack of interest in franchisee innovations or best practice. This study 
therefore supports Fladmoe-Lindquist's (2000) argument that collective learning is 
often a under utilised feature of a franchise system. 
There may be a number of factors that contribute to the discrepancy between this 
study and Bradach's. The differences in the industry sector investigated may be 
one factor, as Cliquet (2000) and Cliquet and Croizean (2002) identified through 
their study of plural organisations within three industries. The use of multiple 
brands and the size of the firms involved may also be relevant factors that impact 
on the development of plural processes. While the size of firms investigated in this 
study and the number of geographical markets served may make mutual learning 
a more difficult process, a number of studies do identify that organisational 
learning can be achieved in multinational firms (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Doz 
and Prahalad, 1991; Kim and Mauborgne, 1993). When the discrepancies in the 
findings from this study are considered in conjunction with those related to hybrid 
organisational designs, the barriers erected between the different elements of the 
portfolio appear to inhibit the development of plural processes. While Hastings 
(1996) employs the term organisational gridlock to refer to built in boundaries 
between different hierarchical levels, departments, functions and geographical 
units, this study suggests that this term can also incorporate boundaries between 
different elements of portfolios. It is argued therefore that communities of design 
can inhibit the development of plural processes in diversely affiliated 
organisations. 
Table 6.4 does suggest that Bradach's (1995) findings may have more applicability 
to master and corporate franchising in international service firms where change 
models of design are employed. The traditional boundaries that exist between the 
different affiliated organisations are broken down in the evolution of these inter- 
firm agreements. As a result, Bradach's (1998) plural processes can emerge 
through these designs and serve to enhance levels of control and flexibility 
achieved. The application of Bradach's plural process model therefore serves to 
support the argument presented above that corporate and master franchise 
portfolios exhibit the most characteristics of hybrid designs. As such, change 
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models of design arguably offer more benefits than the other design models 
employed as purported by researchers within the process school (Hedlund, 1984; 
Doz, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987,1989; White and Poynter, 1990). As these 
models are depicted within inter-firm agreements within this study, the following 
section therefore considers the second theme for discussion, the management of 
inter-organisational designs. 
6.3 The Management of Inter-organisational Designs 
Change models are identified in this study in the inter-organisational designs 
within corporate and master franchise portfolios. These inter-firm designs evolved 
within this study, a finding well supported through the empirical studies of Kanter 
(1994), Buono (1997), Batonda and Perry (2003) and Poulymenakou and 
Prasopoulou (2004). Distinct developmental stages have also been identified 
within master franchise agreements (Connell, 1997). Table 6.5 compares the 
findings from this study with those of Kanter's (1994) seminal study on 37 
international alliance agreements and Connell's (1997) study of master franchise 
agreements in international hotel chains. While only two studies are used for 
illustration purposes, the following discussion draws more widely on previous 
research. 
Table 6.5 highlights differences in the number of stages identified and the labels 
applied to these in the different studies. However, it also reveals a number of 
similarities in the findings. For instance, Kanter's stages of 'courtship' and 
'engagement' equate to the 'affiliation formation' stage identified in this study. The 
starting point in both is the initial discussion with potential partners and the signing 
of the inter-firm agreement signifies the end point. Similarly, Connell's (1997) 
'alignment' process ends when the contractual agreement is signed. Comparable 
stages have also been identified in international networks (Batonda and Perry, 
2003) and technology alliances (Poulymenakou and Prasopoulou, 2004). 
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These previous studies have identified the broad activities that take place at 
different stages; however, this study identifies seven sequential but inter-related 
processes in the formation stage (points 1i through 1 vii in Table 6.5). The 
determination of a motive for the formation of an inter-firm agreement is the 
starting point within this study. Kanter (1994) argues that this is a process of self- 
analysis and is a vital activity at this stage. This study also identifies its 
importance as a foundation for determining partner selection criteria and how 
these are then used within the negotiation process. A key outcome of the 
negotiation process is the definition of the inter-firm affiliation or relationship (1v in 
Table 6.5). What this study reveals however is that this definition does not reflect 
the technical nature of the contractual arrangement, but rather the softer nature of 
the inter-firm relationship that is being formed. As previously identified, the 
agreements in this study are corporate and master franchise agreements, but they 
are defined internally and externally as a strategic alliance or partnership. This 
definition, in turn, outlines or prescribes (lberra, 1992) the broad parameters of the 
inter-firm design considered acceptable to the affiliated partners. This is deemed 
to be an important stage in the negotiation process as it reflects the mutual 
contribution of the firms involved in the agreement. Buono (1997) also identifies 
mutuality of inter-firm needs as important in the formation of manufacturing 
networks. Reaching the step of relationship definition however is dependent on 
effective communication taking place between individual members so that goals of 
the individual organisations can be strategically aligned. What underpins the 
effectiveness of the communication at this stage is the ability of individual 
members of the different organisations to form relationships with each other. 
Informants within this study specifically identify chemistry between individuals as a 
selection criterion. Kanter's (1994) study also found personal chemistry relevant at 
this stage and Batonda and Perry (2003) identified social aspects to be important 
in the early stages of networks. These relationships, in turn, form the basis of the 
perceptions of compatibility and the willingness to define the relationship in a way 
that reflects the mutuality of the agreement. This suggests that relationship 
definition is the starting point for inter-organisational designs. 
In the affiliation development stage, the firms in this study went through what could 
be described as teething problems when trying to implement the agreement (point 
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2i in Table 6.5). While neither Batonda and Perry (2003) or Poulymenakou and 
Prasopoulou, (2004) make reference to inter-organisational problems at this stage, 
Table 6.5 highlights the similarities of the findings of this study with Kanter's (1994) 
'setting up housekeeping' stage. In both studies, problems occur Implementing the 
inter-firm agreement due to organisational differences. Kanter (1994) identifies 
strategic, tactical, operational, interpersonal and cultural differences to overcome 
in the inter-firm agreements and these are all supported through this study. 
However, this study also identifies that technological and territorial differences can 
create problems. Furthermore it reveals that these differences become 
increasingly apparent as boundaries between the different organisations start to 
erode. It also adds to these previous studies by identifying that inappropriate 
inter-organisational processes used to overcome the differences can actually 
exacerbate the differences (see points 2ii through 2iv in Table 6.5). For example, 
it was the Brand Owner's attempt to centralise decision-making and control 
procedures that served to emphasise the differences between the case study 
firms. A focus on incremental measures of performance also served to create 
'collaborative inertia' (Huxham, 1996) that prevented the affiliations moving 
forward in a constructive manner and some members even deliberately avoiding 
playing by the rules. While Connell's (1997) study does not focus specifically on 
problems as a result of organisational differences, it does identify that franchisees 
become more selective in what systems and procedures they choose, suggesting 
that there may be differences to overcome. 
In this study, affiliated firms and their members gradually work through these 
problems, learn to compromise and establish more effective inter-organisational 
processes (points 2v through 2viii in Table 6.5). While there are similarities in this 
study and Kanter's (1994) 'learning to collaborate' stage, this study builds on 
previous research and provides detail on the adaptation of inter-organisational 
processes during this stage. Both Batonda and Perry (2003) and Poulymenakou 
and Prasopoulou (2004) suggest there are adaptations to make in later stages of 
inter-firm agreements, but provide no detail as to how or why this takes place. This 
study sheds further light on these problems and identifies they can be overcome 
initially through a change in communication processes (point 2v). Buono (1997) 
also highlights the importance of inter-firm communication at the second stage of 
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network agreements. This requires greater commitment from senior management, 
including their own time and energy, to manage the communication processes and 
to resolve inter-organisational conflicts. Previous empirical studies have also 
identified both senior management commitment and effective communication as 
important ingredients of alliance agreements (Kanter, 1994; Elmuti and Kathawala, 
2001; Finn and McCamey, 2002; Parise and Casher, 2003; Kauser and Shaw, 
2004). This study however, identifies two-way communication is essential so that 
senior members of all organisations can develop a better understanding of the 
perspectives of different organisations and their members. As such, this study 
provides support for Arino and de la Torre's (1998) finding on the importance of 
feedback loops to alliance evolution. 
Communication also served to enhance the development of individual 
relationships at this stage, a criterion identified as important in alliances in 
previous empirical studies (Buono, 1997; Sharma, 1998; Kauser and Shaw; 2004; 
Taylor, 2005). Kanter (1994) and Batonda and Perry (2003) also highlight the 
importance of the development of inter-personal relationships during 
developmental stages and it is because of these relationships that decisions were 
taken to adapt other inter-organisational processes in this study. Adaptations 
were made to decision-making processes to better reflect the mutual value of each 
affiliate. Work systems were aligned to achieve organisational goals, but not 
standardised across the different organisations. In this way conflict over expected 
roles and rewards and the perceived inequalities in the procedures for control was 
able to be resolved in a constructive manner with outcomes acceptable to all, 
parties. These three criteria, aligned work systems, expectations of roles and 
rewards, and constructive conflict resolution have all been identified as ingredients 
of successful alliances through previous empirical studies in different industrial 
settings (Finn and McCamey, 2002; Kauser and Shaw, 2004). 
The final stage of 'affiliation maturity' is characterised by the development of an 
inter-firm culture and the movement beyond the bounds of the original agreement 
(points 3i-3v in Table 6.5). This stage sees the implementation of more 
coordination processes to facilitate greater exchange between firms. These 
processes become more devolved throughout different inter-organisational layers 
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and encourage the sharing of information to support decision-making. These 
characteristics are also depicted in Kanter's (1994) fifth stage of 'changes within' 
where firms borrow ideas and learn more from each other. Connell (1997) notes 
that in the final stage of 'attunement', franchisees reach a point where they reject 
any attempt by the franchisor to impose an agenda that the master franchisee is 
fundamentally opposed to. However, Connell (1997) concludes that franchisor 
and master franchisee relationships at this stage are based on cooperation, 
negotiation and mutual understanding, findings that are not that dissimilar from this 
study. In fact, both studies identify an allowance for greater degrees of flexibility to 
adapt to local market demands in this final stage. By drawing on the alliance and 
network literature however, further insight into the stages of master franchise 
evolution is gained, as suggested by Fladmoe-Lindquist (1995). 
Effective communication remains vital at this stage of the affiliation, a finding 
supported by Kanter's (1994) research. Communication also has an impact on the 
perceived effectiveness of the decisions that are undertaken. However, this 
communication and the sharing of information to make effective decisions remain 
reliant on the relationships built between the different organisational members. 
Informants in this study point out that inter-firm agreements would not reach this 
stage let alone move beyond the scope of the original agreements, if trust had not 
been established through the development of personal relationships. Harris et al, 
(2000) and Perks and Halliday (2003) also found a relationship between trust and 
social structures, in particular that of interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, the 
desire of individual members to maintain these relationships influences norms of 
behaviour within the affiliated firms and shapes the 'way things are done'. As such 
these norms are indicative of what Dyer et al (2004) suggest are self-enforcing 
safeguards. As these processes get embedded within the affiliation, an inter- 
organisational culture gradually emerges that serves to facilitate control across the 
inter-firm agreements. While formal control mechanisms were not abandoned 
completely in this study, they were adapted. As such this study provides support 
for the argument that trust is complementary to formal control mechanisms (Das 
and Teng, 1998). However, it also supports Dekker's (2004) argument that trust 
can have a moderating effect on the relationship between coordination and 
control. For example, in this study, organisational members were willing to share 
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confidential data, despite perceiving this to create risks to the control of their own 
firm. 
This discussion has so far served to highlight the similarity in the evolutionary 
stages identified in the different studies. However it also reveals that different 
numbers of stages are identified in different studies of inter-firm agreements. 
Stages were identified in this study through the perceptions of the individual 
members of the inter-firm agreements and were a result of the interactions that 
took place between individual members and their organisations. However, these 
stages appear to be related to when distinctive changes were made to inter- 
organisational processes and the affiliation was considered to move forward 
positively. For example, stage two began with the implementation of the 
agreement, a change that moved the affiliation forward. In contrast, the inter- 
organisational processes implemented in the early part of this second stage 
hindered the interaction between members and proved counter productive in 
advancing the affiliation. As a result, respondents did not consider the next stage 
of the affiliation to occur until another major step forward was made. In the case 
study, this stage was perceived to be when the inter-organisational processes 
implemented better reflected the original relationship definition prescribed in the 
first stage. However, in other inter-firm agreements, members might perceive 
specific stages differently. These findings suggest that the distinct stages in any 
particular inter-firm agreement are defined by its members and the interactions 
that take place between them. Given that alliance agreements are considered to 
be socially constructed -phenomenon (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997) this finding is 
perhaps not surprising. However is important to draw from this discussion that 
interaction between organisational members impacts on the evolution of 
inter-organisational processes in inter-firm agreements. This finding provides 
further support for the importance of individual relationships within alliances as 
identified by Buono (1997), Arino and de la Torre (1998), Arino et al (2001) and 
Kauser and Shaw (2004). 
The preceding discussion has served to identify the key ingredients that underpin 
the continued evolution of inter-firm agreements. When these are considered in 
relation to the literature, it is possible to establish the importance of the key 
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ingredients of success and inter-organisational processes at different evolutionary 
stages, thereby increasing the understanding of alliance management. Table 6.6 
builds on the studies reviewed to compile Table 3.5 and uses the findings from this 
study to demonstrate the importance of success criteria and inter-organisational 
processes by evolutionary stage. 
A number of findings are highlighted in Table 6.6. In the first instance, it provides 
empirical support for all the success ingredients identified through the literature 
review. It also identifies a further ingredient of success in inter-firm agreements, 
that of affiliation or relationship definition. The preceding discussion highlighted 
that this definition refers to the nature of the relationship between the different 
organisations and not necessarily the technical nature of the contract. In this 
study, the relationship definition reflected the mutuality of the agreement and 
whether this was acceptable to the different organisations. It also helped to 
establish perceptions of cultural compatibility and strategic alignment, also 
identified in Table 6.6 as most relevant in the formation stage. Furthermore, the 
relationship definition helped to establish a degree of trust between individual 
members as a prerequisite to formalising the agreement. Havila, Johanson and 
Thilenius (2004) also found from their study of buyer-seller relationships that trust 
comes before commitment in inter-firm agreements. These ingredients all reflect 
inter-firm coordination processes and identify the significance of these processes 
at the formation stage. 
In the development stage however, it is inter-organisational processes for control 
that become the most critical. Foss et al (2000) also note the greater importance of 
control in early stages of alliances. These inter-organisational control processes 
also appear to be inter-related. For example, the problems encountered over 
defined and planned boundaries for resource sharing led to those related to clear 
and realistic expectations of roles and rewards that encouraged the 
implementation of inappropriate performance measures. In addition, it was the 
control procedures implemented and centralised decision making that served to 
exacerbate the problems in this study. 
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By the maturity stage, inter-organisational coordination processes once again 
become the most relevant. In particular, communication, trust, adaptability and 
culture are identified in this study. Strategic alignment may also become important 
here as the agreement starts to move beyond its original state. This study 
therefore identifies which particular success criteria are important in different 
evolutionary stages and that these can be used to inform the design of 
appropriate inter-organisational processes. It also identifies that some success 
ingredients are relevant at more than one stage and that there are some 
ingredients that are therefore more important to the continued evolution of inter- 
firm agreements. These ingredients become more apparent when the relevant 
success criteria are mapped onto the evolution of inter-organisational processes 
as in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 emphasises the relevance of two of the success ingredients throughout 
the whole of the inter-firm evolution; effective communication processes and the 
management of individual relationships. The preceding discussion reveals that 
these two criteria are closely inter-linked. Effective communication is reliant on the 
management of relationships between the individuals involved in the 
communication process. Effective communication between individuals has been 
shown in this study to aid in the development of effective relationships. When 
viewed from this perspective the relational nature of inter-firm agreements is 
highlighted. Previous empirical studies have identified the importance of relational 
elements to inter-firm agreements in both manufacturing and service industries 
(Kanter, 1994; Buono, 1997; Saxton, 1997; Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Sharma, 
1998; Perks and Halliday, 2003; Havila et al, 2004; Ivens, 2004; Kauser and 
Shaw, 2004; Sengir et al, 2004). The findings presented in Chapter Five support 
the notion that these relationships evolve throughout the life of inter-firm 
agreements. The relational nature of inter-firm agreements and their evolution can 
be better understood through the application of Sharma's (1998) dimensions of 
relational governance and the four types of interactions identified in the literature 
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At the affiliation formation stage a few key individuals within the senior 
management team begin to develop ties between them. These ties become 
strengthened through the processes of negotiating, defining the relationship and 
signing the contractual agreements. Interaction frequency is limited to pre- 
arranged meetings, presentations and visits to each other's organisations. The 
surface area and variety are also limited to a few key corporate members of each 
organisation, although this increases somewhat to include legal representatives 
before contracts are signed. The interaction medium at this stage is predominantly 
face-to-face. Despite this limited interaction, the foundation for the development of 
the inter-organisational relationship is created. At this stage the relationship 
between the organisations is characterised by a 'perception of similarity', in goals, 
cultures and values of the different firms. 
However, these ties between the members of the different organisations are put to 
a test in the development stage. Organisational members implementing the 
agreement hit something of a relational roadblock that is characterised by a 
'perception of difference'. This study reveals that the-use of contractual power can 
impact negatively on the development of relational ties, a finding also identified by 
Brown et al's (1994) empirical study of marketing alliances in the hotel industry. 
Ivens (2004) also identified the importance of restraint of power to relationship 
management in market research firms. However, this study reveals that the 
relationship can progress through effective inter-organisational processes, so that 
by the end of this stage interaction frequency has increased to include more 
formalised decision-making bodies and forums. The surface area and variety are 
also increased as interactions move down organisational levels incorporating more 
and more members of the different organisations. Further interaction media are 
employed, but face-to-face communication continues to play a vital role. These 
findings are supported by the work of Kauser and Shaw (2004) who identify the 
importance of extent of information shared between firms to alliance performance. 
This study adds to their findings however, by identifying that the nurturing of 
relational ties facilitates the change in the perceptions of the relationship from one 
of a 'perception of difference' to that of 'acceptance of difference'. 
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These relationships continue to develop through the final stage of maturity. 
Communication frequency remains vital at this stage however and is encouraged 
through the implementation of further coordination processes. This in turn, helps 
to increase the surface area and variety of interactions. Face-to-face 
communication remains an important media but is supplemented with greater 
amounts of voice, electronic and written communication. Sengir et al (2004) also 
identify the importance of communication to continued relationship development in 
research alliances. Once again, this further nurturing of relationships through the 
inter-organisational processes employed facilitates the removal of the remaining 
boundaries or barriers between the different organisations. The perception of the 
relationship at this stage can be described as one of 'valuing the differences'. This 
study therefore contributes to the understanding of alliances through the 
identification of the evolution of relational ties in inter-firm agreements. Figure 6.2 
depicts this evolutionary process. 
The study identifies that development of relational ties between different 
organisations results from the increased interactions between organisational 
members. It also reveals that management perceptions of the interactions are 
important to the evolution as depicted in Figure 6.2. Four key stages of relational 
evolution in inter-firm agreements have been identified in this study as: 
" perceptions of similarity 
" perceptions of differences 
" acceptance of differences 
" valuing the differences 
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Figure 6.2 The Evolution of Inter-Organisational Relational Ties 
STAGE ONE: AFFILIATION FORMATION 
Interaction frequency, surface area and variety limited 
Interaction medium limited; predominantly face-to-face communication 
Relational ties are formed 
RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISED BY 
PERCEPTIONS OF SIMILARITY 
STAGE TWO: RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
Interaction hits roadblock & relational ties are tested 
RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISED BY 
PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCES 
Interaction frequency, surface area and variety are all increased 
Interaction medium increased but face-to-face communication still plays vital role 
Relational ties are strengthened 
RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISED BY 
ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENCES 
STAGE THREE: RELATIONSHIP MATURITY 
Interaction frequency, surface area and variety increased further 
Interaction medium increased but face-to-face communication remains important 
Relational ties are increased and strengthened 
RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERISED BY 
VALUING THE DIFFERENCES 
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This study therefore identifies that relational ties evolve through stages based 
on perceptions of similarities and differences. This finding provides support 
for Arino et al's (2001) applied argument that in alliance relationships, experience 
with each firm's behaviour and interpretation of behaviour is a function of number, 
frequency and gravity of interactions between organisational members. Kanter 
(1994: 97) also concludes from her investigation that alliances 'cannot be 
controlled by formal systems but require a dense web of interpersonal 
connections. ' Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) argue that emergent patterns of 
relationships are more salient than adopting the traditional views of organisation 
design. However, Arino and de la Torre (1998) found that procedural issues were 
important from the start in alliances. This study builds on these previous works 
and demonstrates that inter-organisational processes and relational ties are 
intertwined, as Green and Hui (1996) found from their research. 
As Table 6.6 highlights, inter-organisational processes for coordination have 
greater relevance in the early stages of affiliation formation. Through the 
coordination processes identified above, perceptions of similarity are developed in 
the members involved in the negotiation process. Control procedures take on 
greater significance in the affiliation development stage and if used 
inappropriately, relational roadblocks occur. When inter-organisational processes 
for control and decision-making are reflective of the underpinning ingredients for 
success identified in Table 6.6, differences are still apparent, but there is an 
acceptance of these by organisational members. Inter-organisational processes 
for coordination and communication become more significant once again in the 
maturity stage of inter-firm agreements. These processes encourage greater 
communication between individual members at different organisational levels, 
increasing the number and strength of relational ties and a better understanding of 
the differences between the organisations. Understanding these differences is a 
prerequisite to perceiving the value of these organisational differences. The 
relational ties developed serve to enhance the level of control in inter- 
organisational agreements through the development of norms of reciprocity and 
perceptions of interconnectedness among alliance participants, a finding identified 
by Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003) in their study of new product alliances. This 
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control is not achieved at the expense of flexibility however. This study 
demonstrates that as relational ties develop so too does the degree of flexibility 
achieved. Flexibility increases in relation to the perception of differences and the 
extent to which they are valued. This argument suggests therefore that relational 
ties can be used to inform the development of inter-organisational design 
processes. Given that these deigns evolve to become change models, this study 
also identifies that relationship management matters in the development of 
change models of inter-organisational design. The following section considers 
these findings in relation to the research propositions identified through the 
literature review. 
6.4 Re-examining the Research Propositions in light of the Findings 
Eight research propositions derived from the literature were used to frame this 
investigation and these are considered below in relation to the findings from this 
study. 
The first proposition suggests that ownership modes yield the strongest degree of 
control through authority but limit the strategic and product flexibility afforded 
international service firms. In this study, the highest degrees of centralised control 
were identified in owned, leased and managed (OLM) elements of portfolios. 
Although these divisions depict three distinct market entry choices, ownership of 
the brand and the responsibility for the daily management of individual units 
remains with the corporate centre. As such, this study suggests that ownership 
does yield the strongest degree of control through authority. In addition, this study 
also revealed that flexibility is limited in these elements of the portfolio. While the 
coordination processes used in these designs could potentially increase the 
degree of flexibility achieved, centralised control procedures and mechanistic 
structures frequently prohibit the achievement of any meaningful flexibility. Any 
product flexibility identified in this study was rather limited and whatever 
adaptations were allowed were usually determined at the corporate level. 
The second proposition suggests that contractual agreements yield the most 
strategic, product and volume flexibility, but can limit the degree and type of 
control afforded. This study suggests that control and flexibility are dependent on 
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the type of contractual agreement used. While designs for management contracts 
exhibited many of the same characteristics as owned and leased elements of the 
portfolio on the surface, there were some differences identified in these contractual 
arrangements. This research did highlight that hotel owners do have a greater say 
in the management of the individual hotel properties, thereby shifting some degree 
of control towards the hotel owners. In addition, the contractual agreements with 
hotel owners also impacted upon the degree of flexibility afforded hotel 
management firms within this study. However, given the distinct nature of 
management contracts within international hotel chains, this finding may have 
limited applicability outside this service sector. Within the different franchise 
contractual agreements investigated in this study, different degrees of both control 
and flexibility have been identified as previously discussed. This study therefore 
suggests that degrees of control and flexibility afforded through contractual 
agreements are dependent on the particular type of agreement and the designs 
adopted to manage them. 
As such this research does support proposition three which identifies that degrees 
of control and flexibility afforded through hybrid arrangements vary according to 
the particular type of agreement formed. This study also identifies that it is the 
degree of interdependence created through market entry methods chosen that 
influences the designs adopted and hence the degrees of control and flexibility 
achieved. 
Proposition four suggests that in diversely affiliated portfolios, the creation of 
distinct organisational processes for different organisational forms can serve to 
enhance the levels of both control and flexibility achieved across portfolios through 
the development of plural processes.. This proposition is supported by the 
research findings but only within change models of design. In these designs the 
development of relational ties can serve to break down organisational and 
perceptual barriers so that these processes emerge. As a result, these designs 
enhance the levels of control and flexibility achieved. However, this study did not 
find support for all the plural processes identified in previous studies. In other 
divisions and across entire portfolios, distinct communities of design built through 
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perceptual and design barriers can prevent the emergence of plural processes and 
their purported benefits. 
The fifth proposition suggests that organisation and inter-organisational designs 
comprise both formal structural dimensions and those of formal and informal 
processes. This study supports this proposition and identifies that organisational 
structure and processes are important and can serve to compliment or hinder each 
other. In inter-organisational arrangements however, processes emerge as the 
dominant dimension of design. 
Proposition six proposes that the starting point for organisational design is 
organisation culture and this influences formal structures and the organisational 
processes adopted. This research suggests that the starting point for 
organisational design is the degree of interdependence created through the 
market entry method adopted. 
Proposition seven suggests that the starting point for inter-organisational design is 
the contract and that inter-organisational structures, processes and culture are 
emergent. This study reveals that if the contractual agreement is used as the 
starting point for inter-organisational design, problems may ensue. Furthermore, it 
identifies a more appropriate starting point as the relationship definition if this 
recognises the mutuality in the inter-firm agreement. Inter-organisational 
processes, rather than structure then emerge from this starting point and also 
influence the relational ties that develop. Inter-firm cultures emerge when a stage 
of maturity is reached. Effective inter-organisational coordination processes assist 
in breaking down both design and perceptual barriers between firms so that this 
stage of maturity is reached. 
Finally, proposition eight proposes that in diversely affiliated organisations, hybrid 
designs may be most appropriate to facilitate the simultaneous achievement of 
control and flexibility. This study identifies that change models can serve the 
same purpose. However, in diverse affiliations communities of design may exist 
that are separated by perceptual and design barriers. These can inhibit both 
control and flexibility achieved. Understanding how these barriers can be broken 
down through the management of relationships and organisational design 
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processes is therefore important in the management of change models of design 
and inter-organisational designs. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This study has demonstrated that diversely affiliated service firms adopt 
differentiated designs. These designs and the nature of change within them are 
influenced by the degree and type of interdependence created by the market entry 
method chosen. However, the research reveals that this approach leads to the 
development of distinct communities of design where perceptual barriers between 
the communities inhibit organisational potential by hindering knowledge sharing 
and the development of plural processes purported to enhance degrees of both 
control and flexibility in diverse affiliations. 
The models of design within these communities range from the traditional to 
change models. In traditional models, coordination processes can serve to 
enhance control and flexibility; however, mechanistic structures and centralised 
diagnostic output control tools inhibit the latter. In inter-firm agreements, designs 
evolve towards change models when the barriers are broken down between 
organisations as relational ties develop. When this occurs, degrees of both 
flexibility and control are enhanced. 
The following chapter draws conclusions from this study in relation to these 
findings. A number of recommendations are made as a result, and the limitations 





The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions from the study in relation to the 
aims and objectives. This chapter begins by demonstrating how the aim and 
objectives have been met. It then identifies the original contributions of this study 
and discusses how these serve to fill the gaps in the literature identified in Chapter 
One. As a result, a number of recommendations are made for the design and 
management of the different organisational forms investigated and for further 
research. The limitations of this study are also identified and the chapter 
concludes by reflecting on the research journey undertaken to complete this 
thesis. 
7.2 Achieving Research Aim and Objectives 
This research sought to identify 'how' international diverse affiliations are designed 
and managed within and across organisational boundaries through a study of 
international hotel chains. To achieve this aim, the research also sought: 
1. To analyse the formal organisation structures of a sample of international 
hotel chains, within and across organisational boundaries, in relation to the 
market entry methods employed. 
2. To evaluate management practices within the sample through the 
exploration of processes for control, decision-making and 
communication within and across organisational boundaries. 
3. To contribute to the knowledge of organisation design in international 
hotel chains, inter-organisational alliances and international diverse 
affiliations. 
4. To make recommendations on organisational design for diverse affiliations 
in order to maximise their potential. 
This study identifies that international hotel chains that employ multiple market 
entry methods comprise differentiated designs across their portfolios that reflect 
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the type of interdependence created through the market entry method selected. 
These designs have been identified through the analysis of both formal structures 
and organisation and inter-organisational processes. This study makes a number 
of contributions to the knowledge of the design and management of international 
hotel chains, inter-organisational alliances, diverse affiliations and international 
service firms and these are discussed in the following section. As a result, 
recommendations are made on the management of these different organisational 
forms and the design of diverse affiliations. 
7.3 Research Contributions 
Four gaps were identified in the literature related to the design and management 
of international service firms, inter-organisational alliances, international diverse 
affiliations and international hotel chains that employ multiple market entry 
methods. This section discusses how this study helps to close these knowledge 
gaps, starting with international hotel chains. It then identifies the contribution 
made to researching organisation design. 
7.3.1 Contributions to Theory 
i) International Hotel Chains 
This study has made a number of contributions to the understanding of the design 
and management of international hotel chains. In the first instance, it has provided 
empirical evidence of the use of multiple market entry modes. It has also identified 
`how' international hotel chains adopt differentiated designs that vary in the formal 
structures employed as well as the processes adopted for control, decision- 
making, and communication. The designs employed range from traditional designs 
with mechanistic structures and hierarchical processes, to change models of 
design with organic structures and more lateral inter-organisational processes. 
These designs reflect the type and degree of interdependence created between 
different links in the chain by the market entry modes selected, rather than the 
market entry method per se. As such, distinct designs were identified for owned, 
leased and managed (OLM), direct and direct investment franchised, and 
corporate and master franchised hotel portfolios. This study therefore adds to the 
238 
work of Clark (1987) by providing a richer explanation of the organisational and 
inter-organisational processes employed within the different types of relationships 
within international hotel chains, particularly those for coordination and control. It 
reveals that there is a correlation between the extent of internationalisation and the 
coordination processes required for an effective control system. The study also 
identifies the potential for a control imbalance in direct and direct investment 
franchised portfolios where the desire for centralised control may in fact, serve to 
limit the extent to which it is achieved. 
The nature of change in differentiated hotel designs is also identified through this 
study. Empirical evidence is provided of the use of a contingency approach 
(Chandler, 1962) in traditional designs, but a more continuous evolution towards 
change models within corporate and master franchise agreements. This research 
supports Connell's (1997) argument of attunement in international master 
franchise agreements. However, it offers further insight into how adaptation 
occurs through the application of alliance concepts, providing empirical support for 
Fladmoe-Lindquist's argument (1995). 
This study also builds on the work of Bradach (1995), Cliquet (2000) and Cliquet 
and Croizean (2002) to fill the gap in the literature on international hotel chains 
that employ multiple market entry methods. It has tested the validity of the plural 
processes identified through their research, but in an international context and 
within firms that are affiliated in at least three ways with their portfolio. It has 
demonstrated that the development of plural processes can be inhibited through 
differentiated designs, and in particular, where communities of design are 
established. These communities are discussed in further detail below. 
ii) Inter-Organisational Alliances 
This research also contributes the alliance literature, where a distinct gap has 
been identified in the 'the practice of alliance management' (Speckman et at, 1988: 
747). Despite the unprecedented growth of inter-firm agreements, their failure rate 
remains high and this is frequently attributed to the complexity of their design and 
a lack of understanding of 'how' they should be managed. Through the literature 
review a comprehensive list of the key ingredients of alliance success was 
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compiled, drawing on studies from a wide range of industry sectors (see Table 
3.4). The relevance of all these ingredients has been verified empirically through 
this study. In addition, one additional success ingredient, that of relationship 
definition, has been identified. This criterion has been acknowledged as the 
appropriate starting point for inter-firm design, rather than the actual contractual 
agreement identified in previous studies. 
This study also builds on previous research that has identified the evolutionary 
nature of alliances. In the first instance, it makes an original contribution by 
determining the relevance of specific success criteria to different evolutionary 
stages. It illustrates how these criteria can be used to inform the design of 
appropriate inter-organisational processes and provides further insight on the 
distinct inter-organisational processes at different evolutionary stages. The study 
adds to the literature on alliance management through the identification of the 
evolutionary stages of relational ties. Furthermore, it builds on the findings of 
Parise and Casher (2003) through the identification of the specific success criteria 
that act as relational levers to support the development of relational ties. As these 
ties develop, management perceptions of the affiliation also evolve and four 
distinct perceptual stages that reflect the nature of the different stages have also 
been identified. 
While the literature review identified that alliances can be considered from an 
organisational design and a relational perspective (Graen and Hui, 1996), there 
have been limited efforts to date to combine these two viewpoints. This research 
furthers our understanding of alliances by drawing these two perspectives 
together. Firstly, it reveals that coordination and control processes at different 
evolutionary stages can serve to enhance or hinder relational ties. It also 
demonstrates how using relational perspectives in conjunction with the 
development of inter-organisational processes can aid in the management of 
alliance agreements as they evolve. A framework for managing alliances has also 
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The two-way arrows shown in Figure 7.1 illustrate how drawing these two 
perspectives together can aid in the evolution of alliances. The figure also 
identifies how relational roadblocks can occur when inter-organisational processes 
are designed or altered without due consideration of relational perspectives (as 
depicted by the one-way arrow). The framework clearly depicts the inter- 
organisational and relational perspectives that contribute to, or inhibit alliance 
evolution. This research therefore serves to fill the gap in the literature on 'how' 
inter-organisational alliances should be designed and managed. 
iii) Diverse Affiliations 
Diverse affiliations have been defined as those firms that employ multiple 
international market entry modes and thus operate within and across 
organisational boundaries. Drawing together previous theoretical perspectives on 
plural organisational forms and diversified MNCs, this study yields a number of 
insights not previously identified in the literature. Prior studies have indicated 
there is no preferred model of design for diversified MNCs (Drucker, 1998) and the 
findings from this research support that contention. However, this study builds on 
this knowledge by identifying that the type and degree of interdependence can 
influence the designs adopted across diversely affiliated portfolios. This study 
therefore builds on the work of researchers who have identified the relationship 
between interdependence and coordination processes (Martin and Jarillo, 1991; 
Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991) by revealing that interdependence has a more 
profound impact on design and can lead to the development of communities of 
design within diversely affiliated portfolios. These communities exist within and 
across organisational boundaries that comprise diverse affiliations and are created 
through the differentiated designs adopted and reinforced by perceptual barriers. 
This research highlights that the communities can prevent the development of a 
shared understanding, a sense of common identity and relationships of mutuality 
across diversely affiliated portfolios. As a result, knowledge development and 
sharing across diverse affiliations may be limited and organisational potential 
reduced. 
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Previous studies (Bradach, 1995; Cliquet, 2000) have also identified that the 
implementation of distinct organisational processes across different types of 
affiliations can lead to the development of plural processes that serve to enhance 
the degrees of control and flexibility achieved. Again, this study builds on this 
knowledge and identifies that perceptual and design barriers between the distinct 
design communities can inhibit the development of plural processes. As such, 
these barriers can serve to inhibit organisation potential. Understanding how to 
break down these barriers or prevent them being erected in the first place is an 
important design consideration. While other researchers have identified the role of 
communication in achieving effective coordination within and across international 
firms (for instance Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Kauser and Shaw, 2004), this study 
builds on that knowledge by identifying how these organisational and inter- 
organisational processes can serve as bridges between design communities. 
These bridges enhance the integration achieved across entire portfolios. In 
addition, they can improve the degrees of organisational flexibility achieved. 
However, whether flexibility is achieved or not is dependent upon formal 
organisational control procedures and organisation structures. Mechanistic 
structures and centralised diagnostic control processes can limit the impact of 
coordination processes and flexibility achieved. This can hold true within and 
across communities of design. The implication of this finding is that adding 
coordination processes without considering the impact of formal control 
procedures could prove to be both expensive and futile. Furthermore, in inter-firm 
agreements, if coordination processes are considered in conjunction with relational 
ties, an opportunity is created to enhance both control and flexibility. In addition, a 
stronger shared identity can be developed. The framework depicted in Figure 7.1 
therefore also has relevance to diverse affiliations that encompass a wide range of 
market entry modes and can be used to further our understanding of 'how' they 
are designed and managed. 
iv) International Service Firms 
The final gap identified was in the market entry literature in relation to the 
internationalisation of services, particular in 'post entry' decisions and 'how' they 
are designed and managed. This study helps to fill this gap as it provides 
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empirical evidence of the importance of relationship management in the 
organisational forms created through franchising and management contracts. 
While this study draws solely on international hotel chains, this finding arguably 
has relevance to different service industry sectors, particularly in franchise 
agreements14. In addition, it might also serve to inform post entry decisions in 
mergers and acquisitions, to overcome the potential incompatibilities identified in 
Table 2.4. Figure 7.1 may also prove beneficial to managers employing these 
international market entry modes. 
This study makes a further contribution to pre market entry decisions as well. 
While previous studies have highlighted the importance of the availability of 
potential franchisees in modal choice decisions (as indicated in Table 2.1), this 
study suggests that there is a need to consider availability from a relational 
perspective in addition to an economic or talent viewpoint, particularly in corporate 
and master franchising where perceived compatibility has been identified as an 
important selection criterion. 
7.3.2 Contributions to Researching Organisational Design 
A further contribution is made to the research literature. Many of the studies on 
organisational design have adopted a deductive and qualitative approach (Patten 
and Appelbaum, 2003). In these studies, environmental and contextual factors 
have been investigated in relation to strategy, structure and organisation 
performance. However, the approach undertaken for this study has endeavoured 
to look at organisational design predominantly from the perspective of those who 
create and work within it. This is not a unique approach and nor has it been 
possible to completely remove environmental and contextual variables from this 
research. However, this study does demonstrate the value of inductive and 
qualitative studies to understand the internal influences that impact on 
organisation design and the implications of these. Had this approach not been 
adopted, the communities of design employed in diverse affiliations would not 
have been identified, as they do not appear on any organisation chart for the firms 
in this sample. This study therefore provides empirical evidence that researching 
"The particular nature of management contracts in international hotel chains may limit the 
relevance of this finding to other service industry sectors as discussed in Chapter Six. 
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organisations from the perspectives of organisational members can increase our 
understanding of their design and management, particularly in the study of 
complex or compound organisations. 
7.4 Recommendations 
On the basis of these contributions, a number of recommendations are made for 
the management of the different organisational forms investigated in this study and 
for further research. 
7.4.1 Recommendations for Management 
i) Managers of international hotel chains are advised to consider the control 
systems employed within different elements of their portfolio to ensure that control 
mechanisms do not serve to inhibit any coordination processes employed. For 
chains that have a high degree of internationalisation, managers should review 
whether they have implemented sufficient coordination processes to ensure 
effective integration of the different parts of the chain. For chains that employ 
multiple market entry methods, managers are advised to also consider the 
recommendation for diversely affiliated organisations below. 
ii) Managers of inter-organisational alliances are advised to recognise the 
importance of the relational nature of these agreements when forming and 
operationalising them. Furthermore, they should consider the relevance of the 
relationship definitions in shaping inter-organisational designs. The framework 
identified in Figure 7.1 should prove useful in informing inter-organisational 
processes adopted throughout the evolution of these agreements. The relevance 
of particular success criteria at the different evolutionary stages should also be 
born in mind to improve the longevity, and therefore potentially the success, of 
inter-firm agreements. 
iii) Managers of diverse affiliations should identify whether the use of differentiated 
designs has given rise to communities of design within their portfolios and whether 
barriers have been erected between them. If they have, managers should consider 
whether bridges need to be developed between the communities to enhance 
organisational potential. However, if further coordination processes are to be 
245 
introduced, these should be done with due consideration to existing control 
mechanisms within firm boundaries and to the relational ties across firm 
boundaries. It is also advisable to consider whether'carrot' and 'stick' approaches 
are being used across the different design communities and the impact these 
might have on reinforcing perceptual barriers. 
iv) In the intemationalisation process of service firms, managers are encouraged 
to apply the framework depicted in Figure 7.1 to different types of inter-firm 
agreements in post entry decisions about design and management. As this study 
suggests, it is likely to have relevance to organisational forms created through a 
variety of different international market entry modes and in other service industry 
sectors. 
7.4.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
On the basis of the findings from this study, a number of recommendations are 
made for further research as follows. 
i) Research that tests that relational/process framework developed through this 
study would prove beneficial in testing its validity and increasing its 
generalisability. A qualitative approach is advised in the first instance to assess 
both relational perceptions and how they influence inter-organisational process 
design. A longitudinal study that draws on the perspectives of multiple informants 
would offer the most insight into current perceptions, how they are developed 
through interactions between members of the different partner firms, and how 
these perceptions influence design changes as the inter-firm agreement evolves. 
ii) An alternative approach to test the relational/process framework could entail a 
multiple case study of firms that have been involved in inter-firm agreements for a 
predefined extended period. To increase the generalisability of the findings, 
multiple case studies drawn from different service industry sectors are 
recommended. The case studies could also involve different types of inter- 
organisational agreements. For instance a range of alliance, network and 
franchise arrangements could be investigated. 
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iii) Further research is also recommended to identify and prioritise partner 
selection criteria across a larger and more diverse sample of firms. This research 
should investigate more specifically how the criteria are used to inform the 
negotiation process and inform the relationship definition. This research would 
prove useful to further develop of our understanding of international franchising as 
well as other inter-organisational arrangements. 
iv) Further research is also advised on the 'relational roadblocks' identified in this 
study. A greater understanding of relational quality could be developed through 
the identification of the specific antecedents to these roadblocks and particular 
conflict resolution processes used to overcome them. A qualitative approach to 
this research is recommended, at least in the first instance. 
v) It would also be beneficial to explore the relationship between organisation 
culture and design in further detail both within and across organisational 
boundaries. The literature identifies the relevance of organisation culture to 
design but it has not been possible to explore this in sufficient detail in this study. 
Further research on the impact of organisation culture to the development of 
relational ties and relational roadblocks is recommended. 
vi) Flexibility in this study was identified through the informants and their ability to 
take local initiative. However, further research is also recommended to investigate 
the three types of flexibility identified through the literature, strategic, product and 
volume. Through a more specific articulation of these constructs, future research 
could identify more specifically the degree and type of flexibility through the 
different evolutionary design stages. 
vii) Additional research into the existence of communities of design is also 
recommended, as it would serve to validate the findings from this study. It would 
also be beneficial to identify more specifically the factors that contribute to the 
development of these. While this study identifies perceptual bias and design 
differences, further research into the factors that underpin these broad categories 
would help to increase our understanding of them. 
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viii) Further research into the development of plural organisational processes 
across international service firms is also recommended. This study has only 
partially supported the findings from previous research that has been undertaken 
in domestic contexts. The applicability of plural processes in international diverse 
affiliations thus warrants further attention. 
7.5 Research Limitations 
There are a number of research limitations within this study and these should be 
taken into account when considering the findings. 
i) In hindsight, the scope of this research was extremely broad. However, as an 
exploratory study it sought to identify key issues in the design and management of 
diverse affiliations. While the overall aim has been achieved, further research 
efforts can focus more narrowly on the issues identified above. 
ii) A further limitation of this study is that it is set solely within the context of 
international hotel chains. Despite providing a suitable context for the study of 
diverse affiliations, the single context may further limit the generalisability of the 
findings. However, it may also be perceived as strength as industry specific 
variables were removed from the study. The literature review identified that a 
number of researchers consider industry-specific and firm-specific contexts to be 
an influential design factor. However, this research focused more specifically on 
understanding design and management through those working within the 
companies and this could be argued to be a further limitation of this research. In 
addition, organisation designs were only considered in relation to international 
market entry strategy. Nonetheless, an approach that considered all the 
environmental and contextual factors and used a wider interpretation of strategy 
would have made this study too large for a single researcher to undertake. 
Furthermore, by adopting the approach taken, it sought to shed a different 
perspective on organisation design than that provided by previous empirical 
research. 
iii) The generalisability of this study may also be limited as the inter-organisational 
agreements investigated in the sample related to different types of franchise 
arrangements. The typical case study selected through purposeful sampling did 
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have a further type of alliance agreement, however the researcher was unable to 
gather sufficient data on this agreement to include it in this study. 
iv) Availability of secondary data sources on a number of companies meant that a 
full picture of diverse affiliation within the industry could not be developed in phase 
one. While the majority of corporate global room stock could be incorporated into 
this study, had there been more financial resources available to purchase access 
to additional commercial databases, a more complete picture may have been 
developed. Furthermore, the time it took to compile the data using secondary 
sources meant that the profiles of firms were constantly changing and had to be 
continually updated. 
v) As Chapter Four identifies, the case study strategy adopted in phase two and 
three of this study, has a number of limitations. However careful attention was 
given to the design of this research study in order to reduce the limitations of 
researcher bias, lack of rigour, reliability and validity. The researcher did struggle 
with the difficulty of determining the appropriate unit of analysis. This difficulty was 
overcome however, by tackling the case study research in the two distinct phases 
with two different units of analysis. Drawing the findings together from the two 
phases meant that a fuller picture of the design and management of diverse 
affiliations was gained through this approach. The limitation of generalisability is 
more difficult to overcome. While a multiple case study served to enhance the 
robustness of the findings in phase two, time and resource limitations meant that 
this approach could not be replicated in phase three. However, using an 
embedded case in phase three meant that there were two units of analysis within 
the single case making the findings somewhat more generalisable. Nonetheless, 
it still must be recognised that as the owner of the brand was the same in both 
affiliations under study, there is a greater likelihood that the inter-firm designs 
identified would be similar. 
vi) Given the evolutionary nature of inter-firm agreements, a longitudinal study that 
enabled the researcher to document the specific factors that influenced the 
evolutionary process as they occurred would have been beneficial. While key 
informants were involved in the agreements since their formation, they were 
required to draw on their memories of the evolutionary process and this approach 
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does have some limitations in terms of accuracy of recall. However, attempts 
were made to overcome this limitation by using multiple informants to verify 
different recollections. 
vii) Upon reflection, this research also suffered from a limited conceptual 
development of the construct of flexibility. Had a clearer distinction been made 
prior to the primary research on the differences between strategic, product and 
volume flexibility and how each of these could be assessed, the research may 
have yielded a greater understanding of how this was increased throughout the 
evolution of the inter-organisational agreement. 
viii) The final limitation of this study is the lack of consideration of organisation and 
inter-organisational processes for conflict resolution. Despite the fact that the 
literature and the pilot study highlighted the importance of this process, key 
informants in the subsequent phases of the study were reluctant to provide 
sufficient detail about conflict resolution. Had further data been gathered on the 
inter-organisational processes for conflict resolution the study would have yielded 
further insight into the relational nature of these arrangements. 
7.6 Reflections on the Research Journey 
A number of lessons have been learned about research through the journey 
undertaken. Interestingly, three parallels can be drawn between these lessons and 
the research design and findings. 
The first parallel is drawn between undertaking inductive and qualitative research 
and the need to balance the demands for control and flexibility in international 
organisations. The researcher was faced with conflicting pressures to ensure that 
the data collected related to the aim and objectives, as well as to be flexible to 
follow emergent lines of enquiry. However, the temptation to gather as much 
primary and secondary data as possible, 'just in case' proved too great. As a 
result, the researcher was faced with a wealth of data that was time consuming to 
analyse. In research, as with international organisations, achieving the balance 
between control and flexibility is reliant on effective design. 
The second parallel is drawn between the nature of inter-disciplinary research and 
the communities of design identified through this study. In both instances, there 
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can be distinct barriers erected between the different communities that can inhibit 
effective practice. Breaking down the disciplinary barriers was important to 
achieving the aim and objectives of this study. This proved to be a challenging 
task until a systematic approach was adopted. Conceptual and empirical studies 
and their key findings were recorded chronologically and according to key themes 
to break down the disciplinary barriers and identify overlapping theoretical 
perspectives. Ironically, the research also identifies the potential benefits of 
breaking down the barriers between the different communities of design. 
The final parallel is drawn between the supervisory process in doctoral research 
and the relational nature of inter-organisational arrangements. In both instances, 
effective communication processes and the management of individual 
relationships is critical to achieving desired goals. For part-time researchers, this 
is particularly important, as it is easy to go for long periods in isolation and without 
any communication. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The overall aim of this research was to identify 'how' international diverse 
affiliations are designed and managed within and across organisational 
boundaries through a study of international hotel chains. This study has achieved 
that aim and in doing so has served to close gaps in the literature on 'post entry 
decisions' in the internationalisation of service firms, and 'how' international 
service firms, inter-organisational alliances, diverse affiliations and international 
hotel chains are designed and managed. 
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Appendix A: Pilot Study Transcript 
(Firm Names have been changed to maintain anonymity) 
INT: Can you start by explaining your role within the company? 
IA: Okay, are we on? 
INT: We're on, we're rolling 
IA: This company was created out of a desire to develop as opposed to operate. The 
strengths of the people who actually created it, were developers, they were entrepreneurs. 
They were architects, um, they were accountants, they were dealers in that sense. So 
they would enjoy buying and selling as opposed to actually trading or operating. Um, and 
the opportunity to actually franchise was an opportunity as opposed to a strategic 
beginning with a blank piece of paper. So when they actually looked at what they should 
do, they were influenced by one hotelier who was more of an entrepreneur. So they 
actually started by talking by thinking about converting one of their own houses into an 
hotel. So they weren't even thinking franchising. When the entrepreneurs met the 
hotelier, that sort of led on to the hotelier saying well Firm B are going to produce this new 
budget product called Brand X. Because of the strengths of the small founding team, they 
went along with it. And if you like, it was opportunistic, it was the right place at the right 
time. Firm B have come up with this concept of Brand X and they were building their own 
model in Strathclyde, their own one hotel for you to sort of buy the sweet shop as they 
have done back in the early 90's with Brand Y at Warrington. And from that they signed 
the development contract for 1,500 bedrooms. So the interesting thing was, it wasn't just 
a single franchising and anything like that, Firm A were given a development right to 1,500 
bedrooms. So they went into that as developers and franchisees secondly. So and 
wonder actually if that is not the tale of most things, I think that franchising is perhaps say 
less mature than it is in the States therefore most people could have arrived at it by 
default from other things, you know how do I move forward, I have this little bit of money, I 
have inherited this, I've got my redundancy payment, um I'm fed up with working for so 
and so as opposed to a mature franchise, you know I am going to sit down and write a 
strategy about franchising. And I think that is something that you might find is a 
characteristic difference between North America and Europe. And perhaps England and 
Britain leading Europe and perhaps you know it's the way it is going say west to east. So, 
they carried on and built these properties, not always in the best place. And I am 
mentioning that not as a criticism, because remember they are developers and they saw 
opportunity, they saw a deal to be done, they saw an entry cost whereas in hindsight and 
obviously I wasn't there then they may have been better off paying more, putting the 
hurdle up and getting a better site. But overall they got it right four out of five times. 
INT: These are Brand X 
IA: Yeah, these are Brand X. Instead of which me as a hotelier, or marketer or a brands 
man would have said oh don't do like Wellingborough. Wellingborough would be a good 
example. Its not in Wellingborough, its on the main Kettering roundabout, Peterborough, 
Nottingham fountain road. And I would have pulled the plug on it because there was no 
urban centre close by. But it's been a phenomenal success. And there are other 
properties where I have turned up and said why on earth would you build here and I was 
right. But I am mentioning that not as a criticism of them but as a question about the 
franchise community. And I just leave it as a question for your dissertation. But the 
question I ask it, should Firm B, as the franchisor, as the parent, you know actually said as 
the hoteliers, should they have actually helped in those early days of Firm A and say do 
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you really think you want to build there. Or they said is this the case of another 
application, pass it through. 
INT: They had the 100% decision of where it was located? 
IA: Firm A did. You know you actually formally applied, but what I am saying, I have 
never seen a situation where the franchisor went back and said, is that really what you 
want and therefore you know there is some issues here about the franchisor and the 
franchisee, and not ethics, I don't know whether it is an ethical issue, but its actually about 
good communications, being a good franchisor and I leave that as a question as that is 
something that should be more factored into the franchisor's relationship with the 
franchisee. And I mention that just sort of as a historical point walking through the history 
of Firm A. So, there was another interesting twist in this. You know I want you to draw 
out of this the franchise principles of this as opposed to the Firm B principles of this. But 
as Firm A were moving towards the 1,500, and I think it was when they got to the 1.000 
rooms. 
INT: 1,000 rooms from the 1,500 agreed for development? 
IA: Yes, they went back to Firm B who by this time had obviously signed other small 
development or one off franchises. And but there were some agreements for three or 
four, or six or seven or eight and single. So two and a half years later they go back when 
they have reached 1,000 rooms and they say oh we are doing well can we have another 
development contract. And at that point, weather it is topical or not, the story goes, yes, 
but they were not going to give you the prime sites as you had a clear view in the early 
days. So some of the better sites in Britain were not then available to us. If we take a 
second tranche. Therefore question, does the franchisor keep them for himself? Or you 
know, does he actually want to make a balanced portfolio of franchisees and not give 
everything to one? What are the commercial experiences behind the franchisor, where 
does he want to grow, where does he want to balance crucially on? So, that in a sense, 
became a bit of a negative to Firm A because they thought they should have some form 
of, not special treatment, but some higher regard, be regarded in a higher way on the 
basis that they had put their head on the block on A new brand. It wasn't as if they were 
1800 Firm B's core brand, and they were just building on those. They had developed and 
have always been the leader, they are the largest franchisee today of Brand X. Therefore 
should they have been given some thought, some courtesy, at that point as they had 
developed the brand. And as that was a sort of no, they thought well here we are, we 
have got a good track record, we are in the budget market, we are a dedicated budget 
hotel company, that's one of the things we actually get over when we are presenting 
franchise opportunities as a franchisor. You know, is that Firm A is nothing but a budget 
hotel company, it does not do anything else. And so, they got on a plane and went to the 
US, went to Firm M, and said look, we have looked at the BDOC hotel survey, and there 
is a 19% prompted awareness of Brand Z in the UK, but there are no Brand Z's in the UK. 
Now Firm M had earlier, as I understand, sold the Brand Z franchise to the UK but nothing 
materialised out of it. This was in the 80's as it were. So it went back to them. So we said 
this is our track record, you know we have done these, and so we know what we are 
doing in that segment. There are no Brand Zs, there are no Brand Qs but there is an 
awareness, from holidays, from watching films, from people on holiday in Florida or 
whatever and so Firm M sold them a 20-year agreement for Brand Z in the UK, Brand Q 
for the UK and as a supplement to that, one month later, 8 further European countries, 
but that one is in a separate territory agreement. So, you know, we do own the territory for 
that and do you want me to stop there? 
INT: Can we just recap there for a moment? 
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IA: Did you see the Caterer two weeks ago? 
INT: No, I am afraid I haven't. 
IA: There was a two-page spread on me in the Caterer. 
A; Oh, was there really? I am sorry to have missed it. 
IA: Yes, there was. I'll send you a copy of it. There is actually a 2-page profile of Firm A. 
INT: To recap then, you are now a hotel group with master franchisees in the UK and 
about to grow outside of Europe? How would you describe the structure of Firm A? 
B. Okay, right. We will keep Brand Q will certainly be for Europe although we have talked 
about taking Brand Z to Europe as well that is because we have a particular opportunity. 
Yes, they will be separate companies for Europe and the UK. I think you have to do that 
given the different employment laws, property laws, company laws, in different countries. 
I think you have to establish something locally, you know in a local marketplace. But, 
there is a slight peculiarity to that, because obviously Firm A is leading on development so 
the first three Brand Q's that we are doing in Germany are all Firm A project. They are not 
franchises, they are not independent hotels converting to, so they are basically switching 
the Brand X build programme and the talent that we have to do that, you know the 
development team, the site finding team, the asset managers from Brand X into the Brand 
Q primarily. So I think we have to actually come back and say, before you get into that 
structure, having got these franchises, what would we then set out as a strategy? So the 
first strategy that I was involved in writing, was with Firm B. But Brand Q we would 
primarily continue to build our, we would create the brand awareness, if you like the 
platform, for that. And from that we would then sell individual franchises. So I have just 
today come from a meeting for putting together the sales collateral. So here we are, 18 
months after buying it, or a year after leaving the US, I haven't proactively identified 500 
hotels to sell a franchise to. What we have been doing is getting on with putting the 
building blocks together to do that. So we have actually been building our own. We have 
been putting the brand standards together with great exactitude and technical details. We 
haven't taken en block from America and say that fits here. We have vigorously 
interrogated the market on how Brand Q and a Brand Z fits in UK and Europe. But today 
we have actually signed off on our first sunbursts for the Brand Z and had to agree on 
quality assurance measures to actually get our sunburst. And we had a frank discussion 
this morning with our leading franchisee on what they should be compared to what they 
are in the States. They are good, compared to the States, but on the other hand, from a 
quality or product issue, to be given 5 sunbursts on a great bedroom product, quality, and 
well-serviced, clean and everything else but there is no swimming pool, and no second 
restaurant, then what is the balance? But these things have all been bedded down, we 
have written the brand standards. 
INT: So you had the latitude to adapt them to the UK environment. 
IA: Oh, absolutely. And I have the right to sign off waivers. I sign the waivers whether 
they are a period waiver or a permanent waiver. But for instance, who at the same time 
would have launched two budget brands and manage a brand as a franchisee. Here we 
are I have to firewall three brands. And you take Glasgow airport, where I am actually 
building at the same time a Brand Z next to a Brand Q. If you think of the airport market, 
where you may arrive at 10 o'clock or you may arrive at 6 and you are there either before 
or after a flight, why should you pay, why should you pay a price differentiator of £10 from 
Brand Q to Brand Z? So, it is very clear that I have to go through curb appeal and 
greenery through to exit, I have to define the price points. And at the same time they were 
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building them. So I have now got 74 price points between a Brand Q and a Brand Z in 
order for you to feel comfortable that you could put an extra £10 into a Brand Q than a 
Brand Z even though you are there for 71/2 hours or whatever. They include for a Brand 
Q bathroom an under floor heated bathroom, pipe closing and a shaving mirror and a 
demist mirror. I am just opening a Brand Q in six weeks in Greenham, I am opening in 
Wembley and therefore I have got to be pragmatic and say that is happening and so the 
development team are already in and they have priced that one therefore the key person 
is the assistant manager who sits on both the franchise board and the development team 
and he is the guy who conveys the brand standards and says Firm A now wants that and 
you will have to find £800 per room. Same as for the Brand Q homework room which are 
business rooms which have about 6 extra things that are not in the original spec as we 
were learning as we are going. It is a journey and we have got to be pragmatic on what 
we've got and say well okay, one day we will put that in but we have just got to move on 
this journey. So when you go from nothing to a brand and a brand to a franchise it is quite 
difficult to do but it is quite exciting. So we haven't been selling franchises, we have been 
getting our act together as a franchisor and whether that is unusual or not I wouldn't have 
thought so and I would have thought McDonalds has its own live Oxford Street sites, 
they've got key sites so would Brand Q and we just swapped the Brand X build 
programme to Brand Q. So when I presented to the first potential franchisee in 
Bayswater, with this is the deal, I could look him in the eye and say we have got three 
Brand Qs in Britain, Firm A owned. So I wasn't talking into a vacuum, would you like to be 
the first Brand Q. 
INT: So are you using these as pilot sites? 
IA: Well, not just pilot sites. They are but they are like an engine on a test bed. You know 
you have it on the test bed, and you are stripping it out and you know you test it and tweak 
it again. I have set up a franchise committee of all the managers attend every time so 
what happens there is now you have written the brand standards, no one can just change 
it. The gatekeeper to the brand standards is the quality assurance manager. So if you as 
the operations director and you as the asset manager or development guy, say, now we 
are running it we need x or we need y or we need to change something, then it goes to 
him and he holds it and every three months we review the manual. In other words we 
don't keep knee jerking every five minutes. So we actually revamp the manual. So when 
I am sitting with the franchisees, there is an integrity in what we are saying and I do not go 
back every five minutes and say oh by the way, its now swipe cards on doors or whatever. 
What we try to do is manage with integrity, the process of franchising and do it ourselves 
and testbed it, before we even sell it. Today, I actually had the first meeting where I met 
with the marketing department to put the franchise sales material together so I can be 
proactive and what I have done there is gone and taken best in class across the Firm M 
company in Canada and have taken best in class practice. I have gone through all their 
materials and said I want a bit of this and a bit of that and a bit of Firm M and a bit of us 
and got the actual process from application to opening. 
INT: And they were happy to stop and share things. 
IA: Yes they were. It is very interesting as I don't know if Firm M were happy about me 
going and talking to Canada and they didn't want me to discuss the details of our own 
franchise territory, franchise agreement with Firm M. But I was interested to look at, you 
know we have a 4% royalty fee and a 2% marketing fee, now obviously they gave me 
more comfort to look at knocking a% royalty fee off the royalty fee for 2 years if it means 
getting someone in. And then phoning Firm M and saying would you share the burden of 
50% because actually of the 4%, I give 1.5% to Firm M, that's there revenue. Of the 2% 
marketing, I give . 5% to Firm M for global marketing, and 1.5% has to be spent in the 
territory. 
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INT: So, as a new venture they would be willing to help out? 
IA: Yes, but I would not see, I would see franchising costing Firm A for at least two years 
before we break even. 
INT: Sorry, can I just recap. You still have the Brand X franchise? 
IA: Yes 
A; And you own and operate them yourself? 
IA: Yes 
INT: You are a multiple franchisee of Firm B? 
IA: Yes. 
INT: But for the Firm M deal, whether Brand Q's or Brand Z, at the moment you are 
developing the franchise as you did with Brand X and at the moment you have some up 
and running. But then you will use independent franchises to further develop the brand? 
IA: Very much so. 
INT: So you will be moving to more of a master franchisee company, but keeping some 
properties and operating them yourself? 
IA: Because we have started with a blank piece of paper, there are certain things that 
happen. For instance, because we are a development company first, that's where we 
were first, and the development team and the build team, are still bigger than operations 
and sales and marketing. But what has changed, and this has been a big mindset issue, 
and we have just about got there is what would happen is, even at the time before I 
actually got my feet under the table. Even as we signed the Firm M agreement, 
development carried on finding sites, the board approved them and they had a brief chat 
about to make this work we really ought to have a Brand Q there. Or to make this work, 
we have to have a Brand Z there. That has now stopped altogether. So what happens 
now is, the development team, find a site, and they immediately email me with a document, giving me what its going to cost, how much they are paying for it, where its 
located. We have a model for how it works, what we call, steady state, you know revpar 
and they say that they need 70% occupancy or £64 to make it pay back on 11 % to the 
overall construction of an 84 bedroom here. This document is in two parts. First of all the 
operations director says yes or no, I can operate this. This is what was not happening in 
the past when they were doing a site and then wondering why it wasn't reaching their 
GOPs that they wanted to actually make a yield on it because it was a good deal. It 
wasn't a question of was it a good deal and would the marketplace sustain it. Now, he 
says yes I can or no I can't. That's fair enough. We can get an 11 % yield on that in a 
steady state. The second part is me and I can veto it. I can say I don't want either a 
Brand Z or a Brand Q's on that site, I am not interested. If I veto it, it won't go ahead. 
INT: This is new sites? 
IA: New sites. Now the director of development, if he wants to, can say Firm A is wrong, 
therefore I am going to sell it to Hilton to make a profit. He has the right to do that, there is 
a profit centre to do that, but he cannot make it a Brand Z or a Brand Qs. I have got the 
right to veto on that. 
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INT: On the brand? 
IA: On the brand. So within Firm AI am not going to labour under something that will not 
turn. So we've actually changed the mindset of the company. Then of course, they were 
building, before I got there, alright they have got the franchise agreement, but they hadn't 
gone through it, to meet the exactitudes of the brand manual. For instance they did not 
know about Work Firm Ms or Homework Centres, they just carried on building the cookie 
cutter that we have been doing. They said that a Brand Q was a Brand X with a cooked 
breakfast or a cafe/bar menu all day. But they didn't think of other things, they didn't go 
into it. Now we have got into that and everyone in the company is aware that things have 
got to be done. So actually it has been a very interesting exercise to make sure that for 
the UK we now understand what a UK Brand Q and a UK Brand Z is. I can now go out to 
franchisees having templated it in Firm A because we haven't gone and taken the 
American equivalent and plopped it down. It just wouldn't have worked. We have gone 
and said what does the marketplace want, is it fit for purpose? We don't want to deny the 
customers who have understood Travel Inn and Travel Lodge. We don't want to deny the 
customer and just because you have historically done it, there is no reason why you have 
to pay on check in, why not pay on check out. What does the customer want? We can 
have direct dial phones. You don't have to go down the corridor to pick up an ironing 
board. All things that deny the customer but at no cost. So these things we've addressed 
as differentiators. We've positioned. Brand Q as an upscale economy and Brand Z as a 
midscale economy. We want to be number three to Travel Inn and Travelodge and we 
want to grow Brand Z in the upper scale against Brand X. There is no budget hotel in 
Britain that is franchised as a brand. Everything is company built and mainly by brewers. 
We have an opportunity to grow, we will never actually have 200 sites because they will 
always have the land bank whether an acre at Little Chef or an acre at Beefeater to do 
Travelodge or Travel Inn. But we will grow through franchising, small pub groups, 
brewers, development companies, restaurant chains. We only need half an acre. 
INT: So you will take on multiple franchisees as well then? 
IA: Back to the strategy. With Brand Q we are building in key locations and we're looking 
for individual franchisees. With Brand Z, we started with a blank piece of paper and we've 
put a Brand Z in the middle of London, a Brand Z in the middle of Birmingham, a Brand Z 
in Glasgow so we've got the backbone of England. What we've done is a great deal with Brand N to convert to the Brand 0, so you we've got the motorway system and we've got the backbone, therefore we've taken a strategic decision, which we may recant on if it doesn't work, to actually look for multiples of 5. Because we have said a Brand Z must be 52 rooms or more and a Brand Q 72, because it is 52 you can either do a 250-room deal 
with us or a5x 52 room deal. What I actually don't want in three years time to have 50 
Brand Zs with 48 franchises so I am trying to go to the strategic heart of it. If you brought 
me a Brand Z at Heathrow, that's a different matter. I am not stupid enough to turn away a 
gateway or strategic site but because we've got the Brand 0 deal which we will have 
another 7 by November in another tranche of conversions, I can afford the slight luxury at 
the moment, to take a rather high ideal. 
INT: Who is going to be operating the ones you have developed with Brand 0? Will Firm 
A be operating those? 
IA: Very good question. Lets go back one step to that which will partially answer your 
previous question. Having got to where we are as a development led company, we have 
now decided to split the company into two, bricks and brand. So plc will still be plc, but 
within that we will have two separate companies. One will be Firm A Development, 
another will be Firm A Management. 
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INT: And Operating arm? 
IA: Operating arm. In that will be the franchise company. 
INT: Is this for all the brands? 
IA: All the brands. And within that we will develop a management company. We will run a 
company that manages our own hotels. It's a bit like Host Marriott. So there is 
management of the franchised hotels within Firm A. You have got to realise that Firm A 
can 100% own and build a hotel. But in the same process that I have just described that I 
can turn it down and they have to build it to the standards, they also have to fill in a 
franchise application form. Just because they are a master franchisor doesn't mean to say 
they don't have to sign. The document of 64 pages and everything that is in there for 
liquidated damages, the guarantees, that I would expect you as a franchisee externally to 
do, within Firm A every hotel has a franchise agreement. I have for the ones we have got 
open, a franchise agreement. That's a requirement of our master franchise with Firm M 
but moreover than that if the parent wants to sell a hotel. 
INT: The parent being Firm A. 
IA: Yes. They have got to sell it with whatever is left of the Firm A franchise. So they 
could sell it to someone who could still run it as a Brand Q or Brand Z franchise, still 
paying me a franchise fee. Or if they do not want to, they have to pay me as the franchise 
company, the exit fees that are in the fee structure. So within Firm A management there 
is a franchise agreement for each hotel and there is a management fee in each of that. 
And then singularly, what happens is that the operations director and I will then try to get 
an agreement for management as well. So I may go and sell a franchise agreement and 
then I will ask them if they want a management contract and we will sell them a 
management contact as well. Similarly, I had a call a couple of weeks ago, for a 
management contract for a new hotel at Heathrow. So, I defer to the operations director 
and then I go along and try to sell the guy to the franchise. So one of us leads the other 
depending on what the enquiry is. So we do have within this, we want to actually take the 
management of our own properties and use the scope we've got to actually offer a 
management contract. 
INT: And will you allow for conversions. 
IA: Oh very much so. 
INT: I would prefer a conversion as I will get revenue streams quicker than a new build. 
But on new build we will also offer you a cookie cutter. We will actually say here is a 52- 
bedroom hotel if you want to build it. Now, what we've got to do on that is balance the 
costs. So I will say to you, I will let you have the cookie cutter design for $15,000 and you 
can pay me back £1,000 per month out of cash flow over the first 15 months of operation. 
And then you do not have to get into any fuss at all. If you've got a pot, if you've got 3 
million, or you want to get 30, or 40% debt equity that you want to raise with your bank 
even more than that, which is what they don't do in Canada, because franchising arms of 
some banks in this country, especially Royal Bank of Scotland and Nat West, because 
they have a dedicated franchise arm I am seriously considering putting the head of Royal 
Bank of Scotland's franchising on my board but also working with him to have a 
mechanism whereby I am sitting with you and you said, I would love to do a Brand Z on 
Chipping Norton Golf Club, and we said 52 bedrooms, 32,000/room we would need 3.8 
million, we need a 70/30 debt equity, we've got 1.2 million, we need 1.6 or whatever it is, 
then I will introduce you to X from the Royal Bank for finance. So introduce you to the' 
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management, I introduce you to the finance and I introduce you to the plans to build the 
cookie cutter. So we are on that journey. We spent the most part of the first 18 months 
just making sure we have got it in house. 
INT: So a you have been developing and introducing different brands under different sort 
of arrangements, what sort of changes have happened at corporate level, within Firm A. 
You have obviously broken down into more divisions, you are going to have the operating 
division, which is the areas I am looking at in my research, so you've got a management 
company, you've got a franchise division, a franchise division within that looking after the 
three brands you have at the moment, but will that then go into the UK, Germany. 
IA: Yes, Germany will come straight out of plc. Whether it is European or whether it is 
country by country will actually be driven more by the opportunities. We already have a 
development partner sitting with us in Germany. 
INT: And they would be like the property arm here? 
IA: Yes. So there is always,,, the early days of development were always joint ventures. 
So there may be HSBC, there may be an individual investor, there may be a senior 
debtor. So what they did when they got to this point was actually collapse all the joint 
ventures, and refinanced it. But all the joint ventures wanted to put their money back in. 
So all the money went back into the company. So there is a number of joint ventures who 
realised their assets and reinvested the second time around. So, that is how it works in 
terms of how it is going to grow. 
INT: So structure will follow strategy? 
IA: Structure, strategy is determined, followed by opportunity, in other words if Spain 
suddenly materialised then Spain would go before Germany. Because there are 
wonderful opportunities and we have strength in personnel because of one of our 
founding fathers being German, one of our major shareholders. Firm A is made up of a lot 
of wealthy individuals, high network individuals and one of those is actually Austrian and 
he is therefore, well it is in his interest to lead the market there. You could say that the 
dynamics are first, followed by the strategy, followed by opportunity, followed by structure. 
I wouldn't say we were normal, we may be normal but if the golden thread of franchising is 
one of an entrepreneurial nature, however may be borne as a franchisor is interesting. I 
would say that I enjoy working with Firm M because they are pure franchisor. Now, there 
is danger in what I am going to say here because it is obvious that I enjoy working with 
Firm M more because they are pure franchisor rather more than with Firm B who have a 
franchising company and one could term them as a 19th century autocratic British. If you 
took the genes of a company like that and than you said well you are also a franchisor 
having spent five or six years of my life being a chairman of Firm X marketing back in 89- 
93, and now coming into Firm A in the first instance as a franchisee to Firm B, what I want 
to say here is about Firm A being sensitive. By being a good franchisee, makes you a 
better franchisor because you know the insensitivities, you know the strength of 
communications, you know the desire to build the relationship, you know the long-term 
commitment you have to make. There is a hotel franchise company in this country today, 
who is not Firm B, where in the last three months I have had four of their franchisees 
come and say they could join us in July. So what sort of long=term commitment is their 
own either side? 
INT: How do you envisage that working for Firm A? How will you for instance, ensure 
control on the one side as the master franchisor and commitment? 
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IA: The first thing is the multiples of five. At this point you've got Brand 0 and your own 
build programme you can be very selective and look for commitment. One of the 
companies I spoke to recently about franchise opportunities wants to actually mirror the 
time left on the Firm M agreement of 18 and 1/2 years. They want the longevity. They 
don't come and say what is the least number of years we can have a franchise 
agreement. Warning lights must go off on that on the basis of are we building this 
together. Are we a community? I've sat in a franchise workshop recently and listened to 
this whole thing of this is not a partnership. Franchising is not a partnership. You are the 
franchisor, they are the franchisee and they should do what you want them to. I utterly 
disagree with that, I think is a fault in the foundation that will give you trouble later on. Of 
course, it's a partnership. Of course you should know better because you are the parent 
and you are teaching, you are leading by example. You are putting pound for pound of 
money in and you are leading it. You should have the knowledge in terms of the 
marketing programmes, in listening to the customer, in product evaluation, in product trial 
and so on. Of course it's a partnership but of course you have got to actually win and 
carry the day within the community. Whether that is peculiar to an issue well like you 
have got to have 4 million even to come into this where you might need only 20,000 to go 
into something else. That is a very interesting question for you to address. Does the 
nature of the relationship change depending on the level of the investment or does it or 
should it stay the same. There are only two or three lawyers who actually specialise in 
franchising. Every two or three months they have free one-day seminars on franchising to 
which they invite people like myself. I cannot agree with their statements that franchising 
is not a partnership because I have been a franchisee and now a franchisor. If I can't win 
my people rather than actually dictate, by logic, professionalism and talent and resource. 
have been at a meeting today with Brand 0, whether we are being naive as a new 
franchisor by allowing them to have a certain say. I don't think so because they are 
building the brand for me. I give them more than I get from them both people and 
resources. Our brand quality assurance manager, is most likely there key person and is 
on my payroll. But of course, I am investing for the long term. Therefore the more he goes 
in and gets the quality right on the product, the more I am creating a cornerstone for that 
brand. That is why I don't have a problem 18 months down the line still building my own 
product, still testing it, still saying to the builders you have got to spend more. 
INT: Do you consider there to be a difference between individual and multiple franchise 
agreements? 
IA: The biggest investment is in a quality assurance programme. 
INT: Is that in a separate division? 
IA: Yes, working for me. 
INT: If you turn that off a second, I will show you something. 
IA: They get their sunbursts through quality evaluation, which is the inspection of quality. 
What we have done, we have put in quality evaluation four times a year, we have made 
our franchisees, which in this case is Brand 0, sign up and pay for four mystery guests. 
INT: So they cover the costs? 
IA: Yes. We have got the 30-minute guest comment card which is a shuffle of well its 
only ten questions but which means that you triple the industry average so they have to 
have a hundred guest comment cards a month. 
INT: Is that at checkout? 
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IA: Yes, just while they're creating their bill. So you've got quality evaluation, mystery 
guest, the guest comment and then the complaints you receive. So what we've done, 
we've taken those four evaluations, and remember in America you only need one, but 
we've done four. We've then done indices on a consolidated basis. And then we have 
created a league table and from that league table we've said, first directories, that's this 
September, up to now we haven't had any Sunbursts, so we've got a five Sunburst in 
Sheffield, the rest are four and these are three. 
INT: On those basis or on attributes as well? 
IA: They're all quality, it's all quality, it's nothing to do with whether there's a pool or a free 
restaurant because that's not what we've got, that's not what the brand is. 
INT: So it will be a minimum score to get the five Sunbursts, not just a comparative score? 
IA: That's right, yes. So this is the most important thing we do, it's quality. If you put that 
in place now back to the template, back to the engine on the block, it's product, it's this, 
it's signage, it means getting it right now. We will lose money on franchising for at least 
two years, but I think in five years' time the cornerstone will have been built on and there 
will not be faults - no one will be trying to throw 300 out of the system, like Firm B did 
when they bought Brand L, you know, we must throw 300 out. If you look at let's say 
quality, to me, it's too broad a range of properties within one brand - we're trying to 
actually get brand essence and get the core values of the brand in quite a tight way, and I 
suppose that is no different from a McDonald's burger, from the way you position the 
gherkin. I suppose without even thinking about McDonald's I'm trying to do the same 
principle. 
INT: So how much of that would be fed back into Firm M Head Office? Would they do any 
monitoring? 
IA: I pulled up on my e-mail two quality instructions yesterday, they both passed the 
instruction and what we have a gatekeeper in Firm M, and we send him everything, he 
then brokers it out to everyone, whether it is quality assurance there, we have our own 
quality assurance here so guest complaints come to us, not to America. They don't even 
involve us. In owning the territory we set everything up ourselves, including the CRS. 
That is part of the territory ownership, that you have to create a voice CRS. 
INT: So you still pay a royalty fee, but they run the reservation systems different don't 
they? 
IA: Basically when you convert to a Brand Z or Brand Q you go onto the Powerup system. 
They accepted our software for the UK. As you as the general manager open up your 
inventory, that is then held in Phoenix Arizona, that is the pool. You then have live-time 
www. brandy. com so if you at home you can pull one of those rooms down. If you're in a 
GDS, if you're in Boise Idaho in a travel agent... or if you want voice you can pick up on 
voice in the States or voice at the corporate, which is where we live. So we own the 
territory rights, that was part of the pre-requisite of buying the territory. When they sold it 
to us, you have to provide a voice reservation system. 
INT: That was up to you, to determine what to use? 
IA: As long as it qualified - well in fact what we did was do it in Brand 0 to start with 
because we have to provide them with a conversion schedule with the reservation service, 
but we closed that down and moved it into RCI which is a Firm M company because 
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they've got a stake in bringing in our business and cross selling the brand. However that's 
on contract to them -I can give them notice just because I've put it into Firm M, I haven't 
given my birthright away, I still have to provide it. I could have set it up in the office for 
people down the end of the room. 
INT: Will you cross sell your brands here? 
IA: The answer is, we will offer a Brand Z as an alternative to a Brand Z- if that isn't taken 
we will offer a Brand Q. We can't do that with Holiday Inn, that is a total no-no. So within 
Firm M brands, yes, we're looking the moment at the ways in which we can cross-sell at a 
point of sale as well in the properties if it is appropriate and doesn't clash with anything. 
INT: Does it tend to do that? 
IA: No. It is something we are looking at. The 0800 numbers are obviously totally 
dedicated to each brand, and we own them as well. When we go to Europe we have to 
do the same in Germany, in fact we will bolt it onto the UK one. We might have to have 
another pop for Germany. That's part of our right, to find the territory, you have to have a 
CRS as well. 
INT: So when it comes to expansion and when you are up and running, will you have your 
own franchisee meetings here so that you have opportunities for lateral communication? 
IA: We are already doing that in as much as there is only one in terms of Brand Z- we 
have a monthly forum within that. 
INT: Will they operate across the brand or will they be brand specific? 
IA: No, they are brand specific, there's a Brand Z one and a Brand Q one. In the same 
way that we go to a Brand X one. But we have shaped that as the largest franchisee, we 
chair it and everything, and then what we have done recently is to turn it, we have 
marketing in the morning, joint lunch, and then operations in the afternoon. But we 
proposed that to Firm B and Brand X. 
INT: Brand X UK. How does that feed into the Brand X brand worldwide? 
IA: Well they have 400 in America, and their Brand X. I have personal views on that 
which are personal and are not company views. 
INT: There's a lot of franchisees that are up in arms as well because of Firm B and Brand 
X but that's in the States, and that's superfluous to this investigation. 
IA: I just think there are certain things there, it's an attitude towards franchising. You may 
argue that, well if I were running 1800 hotels I would have to make a more autocratic way 
of managing the working partners. 
INT: So you think size is an issue? 
IA: It might be an issue for that, for this size they are partners and you could argue that 
our target of 40 Brand Q and 100 Brand Z will always be that and it may be that attitudes 
have to change about size. I just feel at the moment, I'm not stupid to say if you put me in 
charge of Brand X worldwide tomorrow, I wouldn't say well that's it, I'm doing it. I would 
like to think that we are creating a template, which, for the life of Europe anyway, could 
actually be sustained. 
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INT: And do you think that conversion will be easier in Europe or are you going to develop 
more of the portfolio. 
IA: I don't know. The next thing we've got to do is to find out what the universe is for this, 
whether it's conversion, new-build, developers, pub groups or whatever, you know who 
am I talking to? Is it 700,800,7000? That's the next stage for us, to find out who is 
disenfranchised, who is disillusioned, who is scared because they are independent and 
need to come into the fold of a brand, who needs international distribution. Undoubtedly 
the people who last week bought this hotel in Bayswater, realised that they needed an 
international brand to deliver the ADR in London. They clearly weren't getting it, so they 
desperately need an American brand, they needed an American brand on their hotel in 
London. 
INT: It has to be an American brand? 
IA: Oh I think so without a shadow of a doubt, I only think of international brands as 
American brands. You name me an international brand that didn't emanate from the 
States. 
INT: There are some coming. 
IA: It's interesting that we were preparing a paper for a pitch in Germany last week, and I 
went and took some of the Arthur Andersen with my German stuff, and to my pleasant 
surprise I did not realise until I was preparing this presentation that the biggest inbound 
market for Germany is America. I knew that was so for the UK but I would have thought it 
would have been France or Switzerland or even the UK for Germany. But actually the 
biggest inbound market both leisure and business, is the US. So here am I presenting a 
US brand to the Germans thinking "Will I do it? " and then I've got stuff to sustain that, so 
even Accor, even a French brand can't complete with that. 
INT: But they do have Accor in Germany. 
IA: This is the reason that we don't have a brand in France, we don't have the rights to 
France, for either Brand Z or Brand Q, we didn't want to. 
INT: Are there any going into France? 
IA: I think you'd be mad. If you tried to go and compete with Camponile and Accor in 
France on a budget brand you must be stupid. I don't think it would work in the same way 
I don't think that Travel Inn could go and start competing in America. There are enough 
mature brands there. 
INT: Travel Lodge did, didn't they? 
IA: But the budget market is mature in the States now anyway, 20% of the mix, and it's 
only 4% here. 
INT: Do you by any chance have an organisation chart I could have a look at? 
IA: I am just thinking whether what I've got is the way we're going. Just let me see if I've 
got it somewhere. I've got a model of this bricks and brand. 
At this stage, the informant is gone for about five minutes looking for an organisation 
chart. 
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INT: You were talking about Firm B earlier, and you were talking about autocratic, how 
would you describe them as being? With your comments about information and about 
how they are structured, how they have gone from brand to regional to geographical, 
would you describe them as a hierarchical organisation? 
IA: Well everyone is a bit. 
INT: I mean as a franchisee do you have someone within the UK you can report to? 
IA: Me? 
INT: As the Brand X franchisee. 
IA: As a franchisee, no, the relationship is between the CEO of Firm A and the CEO of 
Brand X by Holiday Inn. Each brand has a brand CEO, a guy called XXXX. 
INT: So the CEO of Firm A would report to them. 
IA: It's a mature relationship, but we don't report, no. 
INT: Would they have access to your figures? 
IA: Yes in the same way as we as franchisors have access. We could go and demand or 
go and do an audit on Brand 0 just like that. 
IA: I'm trying to find the new chart that we're working on, and I don't think I've got it. 
INT: And with Firm M you said that you have a gatekeeper in the States? 
IA: Yes, that is a practical way in which we can, let's say I have a problem with the 
Internet site, they haven't loaded some of the pictures, or the rates are wrong in the 
inventory, then we would go to this one guy who represents the chain. 
INT: How would you describe your communication with them? 
IA: It's growing all the time and I think that actually the issue that they want a gatekeeper 
is more that them wanting to know what's going on, but they would say that it's more out 
of them actually helping us to mature and grow into the Firm M ways, but obviously more 
and more people in my team are making relationships, so my sales people have been 
over, talked to their sales people, my Head of Marketing has been over to talk to them 
about an international marketing programme, the quality assurance guy has been as well. 
INT: That's your initiative? 
IA: Yeah, there has been a need to do that, so although the gatekeeper is still getting, he 
may be cc'ed something, I could see that relationship changing over the years. 
INT: As you get more experienced and get the project up and running? 
IA: Yes. 
INT: Were you free to, to go and talk to him? 
IA: Yes. 
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INT: And do you have frequent communication with Firm B as well? 
IA: Yes, they have a well-documented system where they have an owners' forum which 
you are elected onto, so all the owners are members of a owner's forum which they 
contribute to, and then you can actually be elected as one of the four representatives of 
Britain on the European the EMEA, Europe and Eastern Africa, and then XXXX comes to 
that meeting and reports to the owners. The owners represent the franchise community. 
INT: So they have a decision-making voice? 
IA: Yes, we say to those four guys, the issues we want you to raise are these. 
INT: Does it work the same in Firm M as well? 
IA: Yes it does at Brand Z and Brand Q level. There is an owner's board, there's a board 
for Brand Q and Brand Z both made up of owners. 
INT: They're elected as well? 
IA: They're elected in Brand Z, and they are a board of one from each territory, and we 
are allowed our own board members I think once we reach I think 20 Brand Qs within 
Britain we would automatically have our representation on the board of Brand Q. 
INT: So do the owners elect their own representative? 
IA: No it would be me. I would be that board member. We actually had that conversation 
in Canada with the Brand Z and Brand Q people because they had 64 hotels and they are 
on both boards, the Brand Z people separately from the Brand Q people. So the Brand Z 
guy, because of the growing division of the growing territories, he's got a mature territory, 
we now both influence Brand Z because Brand Z has 1900 hotels and now 100 hotels 
outside the US. It has an international meeting for the first time. It is going to be in New 
York in October. The Brand Q issue, where there are 600 hotels, 10% outside the 
States, they will have a governing board at which we with our contract have a this right. 
So Brand Z have got to discuss how we represent ourselves to Brand Z, Brand Q have 
already in their constitution a set number of directors of which there is what is called 
Regent 13 or whatever in the world. But it's already structured there to grow into. 
Whereas with Brand Z you are elected. At the next Brand Z conference I could put myself 
up for election, so it doesn't work in the same way as Brand Q. Constitutionally they are 
different in terms of elected owner-representation. 
INT: So if I were an individual franchisee for Brand Z let's say, my regular meetings 
where you were on the board would enable me to voice my concerns, my gripes, 
whatever I have, and then you would take it forward to the board. 
IA: Yes, but it's not by region. So if I went to the Brand Z conference in Canada and I 
thought, well, okay, I'll put up for this, and I got elected, I would be representing the Brand 
Z community so it could be a bit daft if they elected me because 1800 or 1900 hotels are 
over there. So I don't want a guy in Arizona saying 'what are we doing about the hairdryer 
mandate for the bathrooms' or something, so it would be daft. The guy in Canada is 
actually on it, and he's in North America, so it would be absolutely foolish for me to do 
that. Because of that we are going to have an international meeting because there are 
four in China, 12 in Israel, but these guys don't want to sit on where there's 1800, so let's 
have an international forum. The Brand Q one constitutionally allows for a representative 
of a region of the world based on size. 
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INT: And what about in Firm B, is there such a process in Firm B? 
IA: No, it's just this owners' forum in which the senior people from Firm B come along and 
report to them in the sense they own them. But then the owners representing us go back. 
I could be elected to the owners' meeting, but at Brand Z and Brand Q you are actually 
elected to the board. 
INT: Is the Firm B one they have in October, this kind of GM meeting they run 
concurrently. Are we talking about the same forum? 
IA: For us in Brand X, we have a monthly marketing meeting which we all put in a certain 
amount of money, Firm B match it and there is a marketing plan written for the UK. That's 
tactical underneath what they should be doing with the brand. There's now an operation 
meeting just to get back the details of the operation. There is then an owners' meeting 
once a fortnight, and two of those Holiday Inn and Brand X owners are on the European 
owners' forum. So if the chairman of Holiday Inn is going to resign, one of us would be 
nominated onto the European Owners to replace him. But then when it gets there is 
obviously an element of other countries, and they make up the owners' meeting which 
then meets with Firm B regularly. Then the owner for either the brand or the country 
reports back to us on what's been decided. 
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Setting the Context 
a) Tell me about background and role within company 
" length of time 
" previous positions/experience 
" current responsibilities 
" how current role fits within organisation 
b) Tell me more about the actual company itself and its portfolio 
" number of brands 
" number of hotels 
" breakdown of hotels across brands 
" types of affiliations used 
" proportion of affiliations used 
" change in corporate make up over past years 
" particular affiliations for particular brands 
" particular affiliations for particular geographic areas 
c) Planning for growth 
" market entry preference 
" planned procedure for growth (or opportunistic) 
" who responsible: 
" different for different affiliations 
different for different countries/geographical regions 
Organisation Structure 
a) Tell me about how organised 
" type of organisation structure currently utilised 
" e. g. by brand/geographical area 
" reasons for particular structure 
" number of levels within hotel division from corporate to unit. 
" number of people employed within hotel division 
" rough percentage at different levels 
" activities/functions at corporate level 
" Is an organisation chart available? 
b) Describe the nature of the organisation structure 
" centralised vs. decentralised 
" bureaucratic vs. organic 
" formal vs. informal 
" hierarchical vs. lateral organisation 
" easy or complex to deal with 
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c) Changes in organisation structure 
" reasons for change 
" frequency of change 
" easy difficult to implement 
" Impact of change 
d) Describe organisation culture 
" how influenced by structure 
" how influences structure 
" similar cultures within affiliated firms 
" change when structure changes 
How it works in practice 
a) Decision-Making 
" consultation in strategic/operating decisions 
" vehicles/process for gaining agreement, implementing brand initiatives, new 
products or services 
" how differ across different types of affiliations 
" any implications of difference 
" examples of how works in practice 
" how much input from unit level 
" dependent on type of decision 
" examples 
b) Communication Practices 
" describe nature of communication within organisation as a whole 
" formal vs. informal 
" direction 
" purpose 
" first name basis 
" media used to maintain contact 
" examples of above 
" other forums for communication/networking (meetings, conventions, etc) 
" how differ for different types of affiliates and/or brands 
" type and degree of contact across different brands 
" any implications of difference 
" type and degree of contact across different types of affiliation 
9 any implications of difference. 
c) Co-ordination and Control 
" key performance measures used for unit level 
" Regional 
" Brand 
" MIS systems in place 
" how do these differ across different types of affiliation 
" Any possible implications of difference 
" Maintenance of brand standards 
" how monitor? 
" difference between types of affiliation 
" any implications of difference 
Anything of relevance I have missed? 
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Appendix C: Project Summary 
Oxford Brookes University 
The School of Hotel & Restaurant Management 
International Hotel Groups: Organisation Designs for the 21st Century 
What the research is about ................ 
Increasing levels of competition within the hospitality industry have led many hotel 
groups to pursue aggressive international growth strategies. Often this growth has 
been achieved through the simultaneous use of a range of different market entry 
methods: acquisition, management contracts, franchising, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures and partnerships with varying degrees of equity participation. While there 
are clear benefits to firms through the utilisation of multiple market entry methods 
to achieve growth, there are also challenges that arise in determining the best way 
to structure these complex organisations. Most research has tended to explore 
the reasons why firms choose to adopt certain modes of market entry. 
Comparatively little research has been undertaken into how these firms are 
organised to achieve organizational goals. As one of the key issues identified for 
international hospitality firms is how to organise, integrate and manage their 
activities, this research is investigating the structure of international hotel groups 
utilising 'diverse affiliations'. 
Why the research is important ........................... 
The links between structure, strategy and organisational effectiveness are well 
established. However, traditionally organisation structures used within the industry 
have been predominantly characterised by formality with defined levels of 
hierarchy and reporting procedures. While these designs were able to cope with 
relatively stable environmental conditions, they are no longer deemed sufficient to 
enable the flexibility, responsiveness and speed of action necessary to operate in 
today's dynamic global marketplace. New organisational designs with more 
organic and flexible structures are prescribed. 
As hospitality firms expand internationally, they are faced with dual pressures to 
achieve both local responsiveness and global integration. They also have the 
challenge of operating multiple affiliations where different levels of co-ordination 
and control are afforded senior managers. Recent research into the fast food 
sector of the industry suggests that a firm can achieve synergistic benefits by 
utilising different structures and organisational processes for the different 
organisational forms it employs. As industry experts predict continued growth 
through multiple affiliations, research into how best to organise these compound 
organisations to achieve organisational goals is essential. 
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How the research will be conducted .............. 
The first stage of the research will analyse the formal corporate structure of a 
sample of international hotel groups using utilising multiple affiliations in relation to 
the portfolio of hotels and the different affiliations employed. This stage of the 
research is currently underway. 
In the second stage of the research a more detailed investigation of 
communication and decision making processes and practices of a sample of 
international hotel groups will take place. These practices will then be evaluated in 
relation to organisation structure and the different affiliations employed. 
In order to progress with the research industry participation is needed. Your 
commitment would involve a series of interviews with different members of your 
organisation conducted by an experienced researcher. All company information 
will be treated in strict confidence. 
As a participant in the research project you will benefit by........ 
" obtaining objective feedback about your company's approach to structure in 
relation to current best practice. 
" receiving recommendations on the design of your organisation in order to 
maximise the potential of the different affiliations employed 
" contributing to relevant, applied academic research that will raise the profile of 
the industry. 
" contributing to up-to-date knowledge about the industry that will enrich the 
teaching received by both postgraduate and undergraduate students. 
For further information please contact .................... 
Maureen Brookes 
Senior Lecturer in Marketing 
School of Hotel & Restaurant Management 
Tel: 01865 483893 Fax: 01865 483878 
Email: meabrookes@brookes. ac. uk 
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Appendix D: Case Summary Overview Sheet (Firm G) 
Case Study 
Interview 
Company: Firm G 
Informant: XXXX 
Position: Vice President Distribution Services 
Location: Headquarters 
Date: June 4', 2001 
This interview was held with XXXX, corporate level vice president for Firm G on 
the afternoon of the 4th of June, 2001. The interview was held in his office at 
corporate headquarters in the UK. 
This meeting was requested when I met the informant at a conference. An email 
follow up and further intervention by a mutual acquaintance secured the interview. 
I am not sure how keen the informant was to actually undertake the interview or 
whether he actually read my project brief or any details about who I was. 
Subsequently the interview started off with the informant adopting a superior 
position and exercising his rights as the expert and being somewhat patronising. 
His initial body language supported this attitude and he was neither friendly nor 
welcoming. As a result, it was quite difficult to extract information out of him at the 
beginning. He provided answers but it took a lot of probing to get him to elaborate. 
However, as the interview progressed I was able to demonstrate a certain level of 
knowledge about Firm G and the industry in general and fortunately turn the 
interview around. The tone of the interview changed somewhat and the informant 
was quite forthcoming and open in his answers. The interview started to go much 
more smoothly at this point and the informant was actually quite helpful towards 
the end. 
One benefit to this interview is that the informant had worked with three other key 
players in the industry and was able to share views on these firms individually and 
in a comparative manner. While these comments cannot be used as primary data 
for other firms in this study, they can be used as points of investigation for other 
case study firms or for triangulation purposes. 
There was a negative side to this interview as well, as that it was interrupted by 
both phone calls and by people entering the office. This did detract slightly from 
the flow of the interview. The tape was turned off during these instances but the 
interview would have progressed more smoothly without these interruptions. 
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Setting the Context 
a) Tell me about background and role with the company 
(establishing respondents' credibility to answer historical questions about the affiliation) 
" length of time with firm 
" current responsibilities 
" role played in the development of the affiliation 
" current role in terms of managing or involvement with the affiliation 
b) Overview of Relationship with Affiliate 
" description of the current nature of the affiliation. 
" overview of historical development 
" Original formation 
" reasons for establishing the agreement 
" how partner identified 
" partner selection criteria 
o priority of criteria 
" negotiation process: 
o how conducted 
o critical issues during 
o current agreement: technical nature 
o what included 
" brand name, distribution, marketing, anything else in terms of support services 
reservations 
" loyalty programme 
" proprietal programmes 
" procurement 
" brand initiatives e. g. 100% guest satisfaction 
" training 
" other functional support? 
o Any change since the beginning of the affiliation 
How it works in practice: 
a) Decision-Making 
" involvement in brand/strategic decision making at onset of agreement 
" consultation in brand/operating decisions 
" vehicles/process for gaining agreement, implementing brand initiatives 
" involvement of other affiliated firms 
9 decisions over own portfolio 
Has the nature of decision making change through the course of the 
relationship 
" for brand/strategic decisions 
" more or less autonomous 
" more or less control over own portfolio development 
" factors driving that change 
" involvement of other affiliated firm 
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b) Communication practices: then and now 
Formal communication 
" key people involved in managing the affiliation: 
" corporate only 
" other organisational levels 
" number of people involved 
" purpose at different levels 
" defined in contractual agreement 
" vehicles, media or channels for communication 
" frequency of communication 
" split between planning purposes and reporting purposes 
" other forums for networking (meetings, conventions, etc) 
" any with other affiliated firms 
" any changes in communication practices since the affiliation began 
" nature of change 
" factors driving that change 
Informal Communication 
o describe in early days of affiliation 
  how far down organisational levels 




o first name basis 
o Any with other affiliated firm 
" purpose 
o Any change since beginning of affiliation 
" nature of change 
" factors driving that change 
c) Co-ordination and Control 
" performance measurement established at beginning of agreement 
" procedures used (e. g. brand standards, growth targets) 
" how implemented 
" who responsible for managing? 
" any controversy caused by approach? 
" access by Brand Owner to MIS systems? 
" Any change since beginning of affiliation 
nature of change 
factors driving change 
d) Conflict Resolution 
" any formal procedures written into the contract 
" describe nature and type of procedures? 
" nature of issues that created conflict? 
" how manage 
" Any change since the beginning of the affiliation 
  nature of change 
  factors driving change 
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e) Maintaining the Relationship 
" your opinion on success of the affiliations 
" key ingredients for successful maintenance 
" overview of how affiliation has evolved 
" critical issues 
Organisation Structure 
" at start of agreement 
" any change 
" how describe culture 
" how compare with affiliates 
" implications for decision making 
" implications for communication 
" implications for control and coordination 
" any changed 
" impact on operational and strategic decision making 
" organisation charts available 
Organisational processes within own firm 
" how compare with those used across affiliation 
o decision making 
o communication 
o control 
" same employed across different market entry models? 
o describe differences 
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Appendix F: Using Memos for Data Analysis in NVivo 
Note: NVivo files reveal that this memo was created on the 7 th March, 2005 and 
the last modification took place on 15t' March, 2005. 
At this first stage of the analysis the primary data is reviewed. Tree nodes have 
been created up according to the interview schedules. As coding was undertaken, 
however, some new free nodes that emerged from the data were also created. At 
this first stage interview transcripts from sample firms were coded and then 











The transcripts were coded and thoroughly checked against the codes manually. 
This coding took place over a number of days, starting with the date this memo 
was created. At a subsequent date, the transcripts were checked again against 
the codes. In-Vivo coding is used at this stage when going through the transcripts 
again. Where I was unsure about which code to choose, multiple codes were 
applied. This process is timely and may create overlap, but is important while I 
firmly establish where the data best lays. 
On the last modification date of this memo, additional notes to the interview and 
report on the interview were read through for coding. The following free nodes 




After the first coding, a number of additional codes were added including joint 
ventures and plural forms. It became clear at this stage that when looking across 
the different case firms, it is quite complex at firms to determine how things are 
run. For example, Firm B with its large portfolio in different countries with different 
types of operations. 
After reading and rereading the transcripts, it emerged that for some of the 
respondents, relationships between the different parties involved with the hotel 
groups seemed to be a key issue. Using NVivo's search tool, a search was run for 
the word 'relationship' in these initial transcripts. This yielded a record of 100 
instances but after rereading through these findings to double check on the 
relevance of the word to relationships between the different organisational bodies, 
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the findings were reduced to 27 relevant recorded instances in the transcripts 
representing 5 different case firms. A second search and review yielded 139 
instances in 14 documents that was reduced 39 relevant instances. 
A tree node has therefore been created with a number of children during 




relationship management and 
relationship evolution. 
Note: this memo has had to be modified to some extent in order not to reveal the 
identity of any participants or their organisations. It was also modified to provide 
more of an overview of the process undertaken. 
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Appendix G: Data Display by Case (Firm C) 
Background : Firm C started trading in the 1960's as part of a larger, privately 
owned and diversified North American company. The hotel portfolio developed 
slowly through one brand within the home country until the 1980's. At that time 
Firm C began to develop this core brand internationally and added another brand 
to its home country portfolio. Since that time, expansion of Firm C can be 
described as rapid and global with properties in all seven continents. 
Portfolio : Firm C has five brands in its current portfolio ranging from mid-market 
to luxury properties, all targeting business and leisure guests. C1 is the core brand 
with city centre and resort properties that range from the 3- to 5-star market. C2 is 
a midmarket brand that Firm C developed in house to suit the home market. It 
subsequently began to expand overseas in 2002. Brand C3, the luxury brand, 
was acquired from Firm F in the 1990s. It consists of both city centre and resort 
properties. Brands C4 and C5 are the latest additions as a result of an alliance 
with another hospitality firm. These two brands are operated under one banner 
through the alliance agreement. All five brands are distributed through the same 
CRS system and all share the same customer loyalty programme. The operating 
characteristics of these brands are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Portfolio of Firm C 
BRAND MARKET HOTELS ROOMS LOCATION 
Cl Upmarket 424 99,246 Operates in 61 countries. 
properties but Americas, EMEA and 
range from 3-5 Asia/Pacific, latter has 
star, original smallest representation. 
brand 
C2 Midmarket 260 19,968 Predominantly Americas with 
properties most properties in North 
America, limited presence also 
in EMEA and Asia/Pacific. 
Operates in countries. 
C3 Luxury 13 5029 Global spread with properties 
properties in 8 countries in the Americas, 
EMEA and Asia/Pacific. 




Total 723 127,213 
As of year-end 2002. 
Affiliation: The complexity of Firm C becomes apparent on examination of how it 
is affiliated with its portfolio of hotels. Different market entry strategies have been 
adopted for different brands. 
C1 developed predominantly through single and multiple franchise agreements in 
the home country. International expansion has taken place through a mixture of 
ownership, management contracts and through master franchise agreements held 
with local firms in several geographical areas. The Firm recently purchased 
controlling interest of its largest franchisee organisation in the Asia/Pacific region. 
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C2 is a franchised brand both internationally and in the home market. Brand C3 is 
slightly more complex. Although Firm C acquired this Brand from Firm F, the latter 
still manages a small number of these properties under license. The remainder of 
the properties are operated under management agreement for third party owners, 
with Firm C having some equity in some units. Brand C4 and C5 hotels are 
franchised. While Firm C, has the operating rights to this brand through an alliance 
agreement, two other hospitality firms have the ownership and development rights 
for this brand outside of North America. The alliance has also created an 
investment partnership that will fund future development of all 5 brands. A 
summary of the different affiliations of the brand is presented in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Affiliation of Firm C's Portfolio 
BRAND MARKET HOTELS AFFILIATIONS 
C1 Upmarket 424 Development through franchising in 
properties home country, ownership and master 
franchise agreements in international 
locations, some management 
contracts. 
C2 Midmarket 260 Developed through franchising in 
properties home country and international 
locations. 
C3 Luxury properties 13 Developed through management 
agreements, equity interest in some 
properties. 
C4/C5 Mid to upmarket 26 Developed through franchising in 
home country and international 
locations. 
As at year-end 2002 
Growth Strategy: Further expansion is planned for all brands and the market entry 
strategy remains differentiated. Within C1, expansion is planned in gateway cities in the 
home country through management contracts. Within the home country, C1 will adopt 
what is reported to be a more strategic approach to franchising as it seeks to achieve 
greater brand consistency across the portfolio. Growth is planned through master 
franchise agreements with local partners in international locations. The Firm has recently 
signed a joint venture agreement to develop both C1 and C2 throughout one country in 
the Asia/Pacific. 
C2 will continue to be developed in airport and secondary locations in the home country 
through franchising. International expansion is also planned through franchising, with 
conversion of small chains an option. 
C3 will seek further development in select gateway and resort destinations through 
management agreements with equity investments in some locations. Licensing is also 
identified as a potential option. 
C4 and C5 will be developed further through conversion franchising and both brands will 
continue to be managed under one division at corporate level. 
Organisation Culture: According to a key informant, the organisation culture is very 
informal. The corporate level of Firm C is reported to be 'very accessible' and the use of 
first names throughout the Firm reflects this. 'Classless' was also a descriptor used in 
relation to the organisation culture. The origins of this culture are attributed to the 
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founding father, but it was also stressed that they 'actively choose to remain and operate 
this way'. The culture is also described as one that is `inclusive' and this is why the 
company is very open towards the partners used to develop different brands. According 
to the informant, this culture helps them to build and maintain relationships with different 
brand partners. 
Organisation Structure: Firm C is reported to have changed its organisation structure 
within the last few years in line with a change in strategy. What was created is described 
as, 
'halfway between a matrix and a shared services organisation, so 
that now the staff functions are also shared services'. 
These shared services however, operate across all of the divisions of the larger 
conglomerate firm. Functional support at this level includes marketing and sales, 
accounting, human resources, IT, public relations, mergers & acquisitions, provisions and 
reservations. Marketing and sales and accounting are by far the largest functional areas. 
Within this broader support, Firm C (at the level of the hotel division) is reported to have a 
'brand management structure'. A President heads Firm C, with responsibility for each 
hotel brand residing with an Executive Vice President or Vice President. The organisation 
chart depicts IT, reservations, human resources and contract administration also at the 
highest level within this division. The situation structure varies however, according to the 
particular brand and the market entry strategies employed. For instance, the franchised 
brands are structured differently than managed brands. For each brand however, the 
operational and functional responsibility provided is divided geographically on the basis of 
'three economic arenas'. The informant was keen to emphasise that not all brands were 
operated within their Firm. Using C1 as an example, it was reported that, 
the worldwide brand is not an 'entity', as there are different 
ownership permutations globally. They are separate to our 
divisions, but we are one brand. ' 
Different geographic arenas may also be structured differently within individually brands. 
According to the informant, this sometimes complicates issues. However, the situation 
structure was also reported to be complex within the 'entity' of Firm C. One informant 
reported, 
'I think we have three or four organisational structures within the 
same organisation. But it's very confusing to run. Its very 
complicated and I have to say that this is one of the more 
complicated business directives, everything is run a little different, 
and every structure is a little different, the compensations are 
different, the nature is different, some are not for profit, some are 
for profit and it is very confusing. ' 
Firm C therefore displays a high degree of horizontal differentiation. The organisation 
chart depicts up to 5 organisational levels between the Brand President and the 
operational staff at unit level. However, the number of vertical layers does differ according 
to the brand and according to the type of affiliation. The 5 layers reported reflect those 
relating to franchising in the home country. Where there are inter-firm agreements, these 
are not depicted on the chart. Furthermore the number of hierarchical positions varies 
within functional departments as well. The spatial differentiation of Firm C is quite high as 
its 723 hotels are located in 60 countries around the world. However, there is still a 
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relatively high concentration of properties within the home region. Overall, Firm C depicts 
a high level of complexity. 
There is also a high level of formalisation reported for both franchised and managed 
properties and this is considered integral to maintain brand identity and integrity. Brand 
standards, operating manuals, job descriptions, and pro forma documents for reporting 
are used, but the extent to which they are used differs between the franchised portfolio 
and the units that are owned and managed under contract. 
The informant suggested that Firm C is 'hierarchical to some extent' and that within some 
parts of the Firm there are relatively high levels of centralisation. The detailed and 
complex organisation chart depicts clear reporting lines at different hierarchical levels 
within the Firm. However, the use of franchise agreements within the home country and 
master franchise agreements internationally is suggested to create high levels of 
decentralisation. 
The situation structure of Firm C, however, is also reported to change frequently. 
According to the informant, 
`we constantly evaluate, re-evaluate, change to meet the needs 
and the strategy to which, which is designed to meet the needs of 
the customers. So we are very flexible and fluid in the way that we 
do change organisational structure fairly often. That is we change 
the structure, because the strategy has changed. ' 
Organisational Processes 
Coordination and Control: As with the situational structure, there are reported 
differences between the control procedures used for the franchised and the managed 
portfolio. 
Financial Control: Within the managed portfolio, financial control procedures are much the 
same for the different brands. The budgeting process starts at the unit level and then 
moves up the hierarchical reporting lines within geographic regions for approval and then 
to corporate level in a consolidated format for final approval. Performance against budget 
is monitored through the company's MIS system and through standardised monthly 
operating reports. For the franchised portfolios, financial monitoring is limited to the 
revenue contribution, as opposed to the bottom line. According to the informant, 
'we have access to a lot of data, not profit and loss, but the 
contribution to the system from the member hotels. We have 
information on their denied revenue, which they turned off the 
system, and therefore denied revenue, which they could have had 
if they had not closed. Occupancy, contribution to revenue, 
customer service scores, revenue per available room, all of those 
kind of standards, we watch those very carefully. ' 
The view from corporate level however, is that they are providing a service to the 
franchised community through this monitoring as, 
`we have lots of stuff to help them, to see how what they are doing 
is impacting on their success or lack of success. This is part of 
what we provide as a service. This monitoring to help them to 
know. ' 
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In addition, it is reported that the franchisees also use these statistical reports produced to 
measure how the corporate level is doing in terms of the value they get for their franchise 
fee, 
'It seems as though the erm, the franchisees are happy with that 
too, because it's their way of measuring how we are doing, "How 
many rooms have you booked for us? " Or "How are the sales? "' 
The franchised owners and managers are reported to use these statistical reports to 
compare their performance against the managed portfolios. The informant suggested, 
Yeah and believe me, they are comparing! And they are 
contacting us, and they are demanding, and that's the way it 
should be. They are paying us money, they have a right to that. ' 
However, franchisees do not have access to as many internal operating reports as the 
managed portfolio for these purposes. 
Quality Control: Hotels in both the managed and franchised divisions are monitored 
against adherence to brand standards that incorporate both hard or technical elements as 
well as softer elements indicative of service quality. Brand standards are taken very 
seriously within Firm C. According to the informant, 
'A brand is a promise. When somebody goes in to a [C1 or C2], 
we've made certain promises that we market and we can't have 
people who are abusive of that and don't prescribe to it, and we 
have methods of dealing with that if it happens. ' 
How it is dealt with however, is different between the managed and franchised divisions. 
For the managed portfolio within the home country, 
'the managed hotels have a group that oversees them that has an 
executive Vice President, three regional VPs and it has some 
rooms people and an HR person who go out and help them, and 
work with them. And they have meetings three or four times a 
year, where they can give input and get what's new and all of that. ' 
The level of support provided to the franchised division is not as extensive. While there is 
still a hierarchical team reported to be responsible for maintaining brand standards in the 
franchised portfolio, the informant did clarify that the level of support offered to owned and 
managed properties was much higher. 
Initial training is provided to franchised properties in relation to customer service and 
service guarantees. It also relates to other centrally coordinated functions such as the 
proprietal reservation system and associated programmes such as yield management. 
The training for the day-to-day operations of the hotel is left to the franchisee. However, 
there are reported to be requests for help sometimes and Firm C is prepared to help out 
where they can. One example given was a recruitment tool kit developed for the 
managed division and then made available to the franchised division. 
Training provided to master franchisees will vary according to each agreement. However, 
it appears that Firm C would prefer to offer as much training in their systems as possible 
and then let them take responsibility for training throughout their own Firms. It was 
reported: 
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'You know you can give a man a fish or you can teach them how 
to fish. We prefer to teach them how to fish. ' 
There are some programmes for managed hotels that are mandatory, but not necessarily 
available to franchised properties. However, according to the informant, 'for the most part, 
we offer whatever we have we think works'. 
Customer Satisfaction: A similar process is employed to monitor customer satisfaction 
levels across both franchised and managed divisions and within those properties run 
under master franchise agreements. These are conducted on a brand-by-brand basis, 
usually annually and controlled through the corporate office in the home country. 
According to the informant, 
'we do have reports that come out on guest service levels, and 
comparative data between hotels, ......... `we watch those very 
carefully. It's our scorecard of how we're doing, it's how we know 
who to help, who needs help, by analysing these kinds of reports. ' 
Firm C also monitors their performance in terms of the service they provide to the various 
owners and management companies that operate their brands. Informally, regional Vice 
Presidents work with the owners to ensure they are getting what they want. Firm C also 
conducts an annual survey of the owners and GM's to find out `how we are doing and 
what they'd like to see differently. ' 
Coordination Processes: Firm C runs its own University for developing managers across 
its different brands. This University offers business and leadership courses around twenty 
times a year in different locations in the home country. Other informal coordination and 
control processes varied according to the brand. With Brand C1, it has an interlocking 
directorate with one of its key master franchisees. Conferences for owners and/or 
general managers tend to be held annually for different brands, normally in the home 
country region. Meetings are also held within the marketing and sales functions on a 
regular basis, but again the actual practice varies from brand to brand. 
Decision Making: Decisions about implementing different programmes are reported to go 
through a different process depending on the type of programme and whether the hotel is 
a managed or franchised property, including the master franchisees. For instance, there 
is reported to be more leeway in HR initiatives than with marketing initiatives and the latter 
are more likely to be mandatory. With any programme however, Firm C is reported to 
believe it is very important to get buy in at the top level for both managed and franchised 
hotels for any new brand initiatives. According to the informant, 
'we don't just go, `here it is you swallow it because we're 
shoving it". It's very much done through relationships and 
showing what the benefits will be and encouraging them. ' 
In both the managed and franchised divisions, a process is undertaken with any new 
initiative to get buy in down through the hierarchical layers, even if it is a mandatory 
marketing programme. Once buy-in is achieved, there is reported to be a good deal of 
support from the corporate office to implement the programme and provide the requisite 
training. It is not clear whether the level of training is the same for both the franchised and 
managed estate. It is recognised that particularly for HR initiatives, franchisees are under 
no obligation to sign up and this has resulted in HR programmes for different brands 
running in some regions but not others. 
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Not surprisingly, there is more autonomy at the unit level within franchised units than 
within the managed estate. The brand standards and standard operating procedures 
provide fairly extensive guidelines particularly within the midmarket brands run under 
management agreement. While there is still a hierarchical team reported to be 
responsible for maintaining brand standards in the franchised portfolio, according to the 
informant 
`well we kind of have standards and you're going to have 
guidelines.... but the day-to day operations, it's your baby. ' 
The level of autonomy for individual units operated under master franchise agreements, is 
dependent on the master franchisee. There is however, reported to be more autonomy 
within the luxury Brand C3. 
Communication: There are a number of formal communication vehicles set up to 
manage communication. These however, are different for different brands and types of 
affiliations. There are also different practices reported for different geographical regions. 
For instance, the nature of the marketing association is reported to be run differently for 
different brands, and differently within single brands for the home country and 
international divisions. 
Within Firm C, communication is described as frequent and informal, although there are 
reported to be different practices across the group, especially within the different types of 
affiliations. There are also different norms in different parts of the world. In the 
Asia/Pacific regions for instance, there is reportedly 'more formality in dealing with "Mr 
this' and 'Ms That°. However, these differences are believed to be related to the national 
or regional cultures of the different organisations and do not impact upon the nature of the 
communication between these affiliated organisations and the head office. This is 
reported to be frequent and informal and to make use of emails. It was suggested that the 
affiliated organisations are not afraid to contact them or to ask questions. 'There's a lot of 
informal communication in between meetings as well, that's how we've set it up' (IC). 
However, there is reported to be a downside of this in terms of how time consuming it is. 
Generally communication is seen a vital mechanism to support decision making and to 
strengthen relationships across the different organisations involved in running the 
portfolio. It was identified that: 
'one of the things about us, and part of our culture, and our way of 
operating is that communication is a very big part. And building 
relationships is a very big part of how we operate. Being inclusive 
and trying to include them in decisions that are made. Although at 
the bottom line we own the brand and we have to protect the 
brand, but they have a lot of input'. 
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Appendix H: Data Display by Market Entry Mode: Management 
Contracts 
Background and Portfolio Characteristics: All firms within the sample utilised 
management contracts within their portfolios. While the majority of sample firms 
had employed this market entry method for some time, Firm E has only recently 
decided to expand through this market entry method. In contrast Firm F recently 
decided to focus solely on this market entry method. Within the firms with multi- 
branded portfolios (Firm B, Firm D and Firm G) management contracts were more 
prevalent in their upmarket brands. Firm C is an exception however, as it also 
employs franchising and master franchising for its most upmarket brand. 
Growth Strategy: All sample firms were planning to continue to use this market 
entry method. The major reason given for this growth strategy was the level of risk 
involved compared to owning property and/or franchising. Risk was assessed in 
relation to the economic environment and to the level of profitability. However, 
informants also report an increasing trend towards the hotel management 
company undertaking an equity investment in the properties. Equity investments 
were undertaken in order to demonstrate commitment to hotel owner, retain a 
greater element of control/decision making and support the development of the 
property in countries with weaker economies. 
Organisation Culture: As this market entry method was adopted by all case 
study firms there appears to be limited relationship between organisation culture 
and preference for management contracts. However, Firm E did not adopt this 
growth strategy in the past as it wanted to retain full control over its portfolio. This 
strategy appears consistent with the culture described by the informant. 
Organisation Structure: There were no discernable differences reported in the 
organisation structure for brands/areas operated under management contract as 
those that were fully owner-operated and those run under leasehold agreements. 
Sample firms that utilised these multiple entry methods tended to house these 
elements of the portfolio together under one operating umbrella when it came to 
the structure. However there were differences reported between these elements 
and for franchised elements of the portfolios. Informants report smaller spans of 
control within these structures and more involvement of senior managers with the 
unit level. Senior managers were reported to be involved so that they could help 
the hotels drive more business and improve the bottom line. This bottom line was 
reported to be important not only for managing their own profitability but also in 
terms of managing the hotel as an 'asset' for the hotel owner. As a result, the 
structures adopted can be described as centralised, with hierarchical layers and 
formalised control procedures. These structures are deemed necessary to retain 
control over the brand as without ownership of the physical hotel property the 
brand was their key operating asset. Given the level of competition, the brand 
must be managed appropriately in order to be able to renew contracts with current 
owners and to sell the brand to new owners. One informant suggested: 
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'If you are a brand management company, what happens 
when a property supplier decides that your brand is not the 
strongest brand to put on the hotel anymore? Then what do 
you get? Where is your security? Are you just then effectively 
just like a Coke? You have absolutely no assets, your bottles 
do that for you, you are just a brand, which is fine if you are 
Coke. I am not sure that hotel brands have that much legs in 
them, once you don't have any hotels choosing to put them 
up. ' (I B) 
Organisation Processes 
Organisational processes employed across the sample are reported to be 
influenced by the actual contractual agreement signed with the hotel owners. Two 
environmental forces are driving change in contractual agreements; the level of 
competition amongst hotel management companies and the increasing 
sophistication of the hotel owner. According to one informant: 
'But it is so competitive these days that you are always going 
to be walking into the room immediately after a Sheraton or 
immediately before Hyatt or whatever. So you know those 
kinds of deals have tended to become a little more 
complicated. And the considerations of the variations of 
those in the way that they impact in any practical sense 
needs to be managed. ' (IG) 
As a result, the negotiation process is reported to be quite important. As one 
informant suggested: 
`we submit our standard contract, it's heavier than your 
thesis, and they are generally very heavily negotiated. ' (IF) 
Key negotiation points reflect the length of the agreement, brand and operating 
standards, revenue guarantees, property upkeep, normally expressed as a 
percentage of revenue to be invested in the property, and conflict resolution 
procedures. Most informants identified a trend towards reduced contract length, 
although this was also a negotiation point. Negotiations were becoming trickier 
and according to one informant: 
'Owner profile has changed, contracts have changed, surely, 
but owners have changed in the last 10 years. They are just 
much more knowledgeable than they used to be. And they 
are no longer prepared to just hand it over like in the old 
days......... we were a lot freer, to basically do what we 
wanted to do. It's no longer the case. ' (IF) 
The implications of this can be seen in the different organisational processes 
below. 
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Coordination and Control: As suggested above, from a financial control 
perspective senior management were very concerned with the bottom line in 
hotels run under management contract. The majority of financial control was 
based on the budgeting process. This process reflects a bottom-up approach 
requiring approval at successive hierarchical organisational levels. While there 
was reported to be some discretion about financial decisions at the unit level, most 
informants identified clear parameters to decision making. 
However, within the financial function, informants identified a greater involvement 
of hotel owners in capital expenditure, approval of operating expenses and in 
approving the budget. This appears particularly to be the case when hotel owners 
are individuals or when institutional owners employ asset managers to keep an 
eye on the unit property as an investment. 
Quality control procedures were also reported to be formalised and standardised. 
Quality is measured against brand standards and customer satisfaction levels 
through mystery inspections, annual surveys and customer feedback procedures 
using both hard and soft standards. Quality is also measured in terms of 
employee satisfaction for some firms. General Managers are often incentivised on 
their performance against a number of indicators including financial, quality, 
customer satisfaction measures, and for some firms, employee satisfaction. In 
terms of the physical quality of the property, here again the owner has a say, 
although upkeep and refurbishment is negotiated and stipulated in the contracts. 
Communication Processes: Most informants report communication within these 
elements of the portfolio to be frequent, informal and multi-directional. However, 
there is some variation. For instance, communication in Firm F is far more 
reflective of these characteristics than Firm E. In the latter, there is a reliance on 
formal communication channels and these tend to cross hierarchical levels only for 
reporting and dissemination purposes. However, the culture of these two firms is 
very different, and this could have an impact on the communication processes 
employed. 
Decision Making: In line with the formalised and hierarchical structure, much 
decision making within these portfolios remains highly centralised. Management 
interest in the unit level, the perceived need to control the brand and to effectively 
manage the asset, means in reality that there is limited discretion at the unit level. 
However, there is reported to be much more involvement in the owner in 
operational decision making. As one informant suggested, 
The owner has always been the guy across the hallway, we 
get things like the owner now wanting to make decisions. (ID) 
For example, owners are reported to want to get involved in the appointment of 
General Managers and operational decision-making. One informant suggested, 
We have leeway; we try and work it out. It is fairly hard to 
tell an owner who has just invested a £100,000,000 or 
£120,000,000 in that hotel, that I'm not interested in your 
opinion about the china on the table. ' (IF) 
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Other informants also reported the need to manage the relationships with hotel 
owners and that there were frequently 'considerations about stroking the owners 
fur (IG). Asset managers were also reported to have had an impact and one 
informant reflected on their role as follows: 
`They don't have operational jurisdiction, they can't tell 
anyone to do anything, all they can do is tell the GM to come 
and meet with him and look at numbers, look at this or 
advise, or I had a bad lunch today, or whatever, but they 
don't have operational control per se, but they can make the 
GM's life miserable. ' (IF) 
As a result, more time is reported to be spent on managing the relationships with 
hotel owners, however it depends on the personality of the representative of the 
hotel owner as: 
'sadly what often happens when the asset manager is an 
outside company the asset management group feel the need 
continuously to justify their own existence. ' (IF) 
This relationship management is reported to influence the negotiation process. 
One informant added, that 'choosing a developer/owner to work with becomes 
more important'. This same informant added that they, 
`look at characteristics of developers: finance, reputation, 
background, experience, how solid they are, their culture and 
whether we think we have chemistry. Sometimes that is 
difficult in certain cultures where management styles are very 
different. ' (IF) 
Another informant cautioned that they 'still have to make a judgement call' to make 
and, 
'the other thing just to throw further confusion is that where 
we fall out with an owner or we just can't find an owner with 
whom we want to work, we will just occasionally underwrite a 
hotel to get it done. ' (IG) 
Overall therefore there seems to be some loss of operational control and 
potentially flexibility due to the owner approval of budgets, etc. Strategic flexibility 
is also reduced due to equity commitment, but is still higher than with pure lease or 
ownership models according to the informants. 
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Appendix I: Profile Affiliate A 
Background: Affiliate A began trading in 1970's under the direction and sole 
ownership of a key individual who remains the Chairman today and maintains 85% 
of the shares. Although the informants suggest that Affiliate A has some diverse 
interests, its core business is hotels. 
Portfolio: Affiliate A has a limited portfolio of ten upmarket and full service 
properties representing 1926 hotel rooms, all located within prime locations in the 
home country. The size of the units varies from 54 rooms to 450 rooms. Due to 
the location of its hotels, key target markets are reported to be international 
business and leisure guests. 
Affiliation: All ten properties are fully owned and operated. These properties are 
all co branded and operated under a corporate franchise agreement with Firm C, 
the Brand Owner. The agreement includes territorial rights for the current 
portfolio, but does not include development rights within the home country. 
Growth Strategy: According to one informant, growth for Affiliate A has been 
'organic' and 'controlled'. Company documentation supports this and reveals that 
Affiliate A is not driven by a development plan that demands we add scores of 
hotels to our portfolio each year, but is focused on identifying 'new projects where 
we can add real value and derive a real reward'. 
Affiliate A currently has plans to expand its portfolio through management 
contracts and leasehold agreements. These market entry methods are perceived 
by informants to enable the Firm to retain higher degrees of control. Expansion is 
planned within the home country only in further prime city and airport locations. 
Two further properties are currently under development. 
Organisation Culture: A wide variety of terms are employed to describe the 
culture within Affiliate A. According to one key informant, the firm is 'idiosyncratic', 
but the culture is still very 'tangible'. The same informant suggested there is a 
'family-run amorphous style' that is 'fluid' and gives rise to 'free spirits'. This 
culture is attributed to the 'entrepreneurial' style of the founding father by all three 
informants. One suggested this culture is, 
'most appropriate for breaking down those chimneys, if you 
like, bringing people together, trying to create an open and 
honest environment. ' 
This same informant added, 
'it's an emotional company, erm, it's an open environment. 
If you have a good idea, no matter who you are, it will be 
listened to. And if people buy into it then it will be taken 
forward. It will take risks. ' 
The third informant added that as a result, 
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'we are happily schitzo we can take the best of [Affiliate B] 
and the best of [Brand Owner]! We are happily schitzos! ' 
Organisation Structure: The structure of Affiliate A is reported to have changed a 
number of years ago in response to the need to reinforce the company culture. 
According to one informant: 
The Chairman's model of culture, which in his head is about 
empowerment, about liberating people, about values, which 
in his head couldn't be sustained through a command and 
control structure. ' 
What is described by one informant as 'an interesting study in matrix structure' 
was therefore created. This descriptor is used because General Managers were 
removed from each property and junior or middle managers acting as Head's of 
Department now report directly to their 'discipline manager at corporate level. 
According to another informant, the reason for this is, 
if, you have a rotten apple GM who is counter culture in 
terms of his or her values, that property you could write it off, 
because they have absolute power. And if they are visionary 
and leading edge fine. If they are organisational terrorists, 
with their own script, it gives them little chance of changing 
the culture. ' 
Another informant added, 
'if you have a matrix structure, by definition, it isn't strictly just 
about that property. If you are HOD for Food and Beverage, 
you link in with the equivalent in all the other properties and 
the Head Office F&B managers. In that way, it's more 
permeable, it's more amorphous, whereas with a top end 
structure it's more like a chimneystack in every sense of the 
word. So that, as far as I am aware, was the driving force 
behind the change. ' 
According to another informant, 
'rooms, sales, food and beverage, conference and 
banqueting, housekeeping, etc, all the functional areas are 
headed up by an HOD and they all have equal status, in 
theory. ' 
This structure is supported by 'a couple of hundred people' at head office who 
support the 1700 people employed within Affiliate A. The Chairman is supported 
by 4 further executive directors who are reported to have 'broad responsibilities' 
and these are not clearly defined by the job titles. At the next level are Directors for 
purchasing, operations, commercial development and finance. The company 
secretary also sits at this level. Marketing and sales sit within commercial 
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development and this represents the largest functional area within the corporate 
office with responsibility divided on a geographical basis. The number of 
organisational levels between the Chairman and the operational staff does vary by 
function. Within operations however, there are only 5 organisational levels 
identified by the organisation chart between the Chairman and the Heads of 
Department at unit level. 
Affiliate A is therefore not considered to be a complex organisation as there are 
limited degrees of horizontal, vertical and spatial differentiation. The findings 
regarding centralisation however, are somewhat mixed. While all the informants 
frequently used the term 'empowerment' to describe the organisation, much 
decision-making still remains at the corporate level as suggested by the reporting 
structure. The relative size of this organisational level would seem to support this 
type of decision-making. In addition, informants report on decisions undertaken 
unilaterally by the Chairman. However, there is also a relatively low degree of 
formalisation that is more consistent with an empowered organisation. 
Informants recognise however, that it is the size of the organisation that enables 
this type of structure. One informant questioned, 
'How do you keep that family-run amorphous style, fluid 
with... 30,40,50,100 hotels. I know it couldn't do it with 100, 
know it couldn't. You have to have more centralisation, 
more command and control, and the minute you start using 
those words you are running contrary to the [firm] culture. ' 
Organisation Processes 
Coordination and Control: Financial Control: Financial control is predominantly 
achieved through the budgeting process. Informants within this Firm were 
somewhat more reluctant to discuss the actual process but did suggest that there 
was involvement at the unit level by various Heads of Department, the Discipline 
Directors and the corporate level. The organisation chart however, depicts 44 
positions at the corporate level within the Accounts Department, making this the 
largest department. The largest section of this department is given over to hotel 
accounting systems. The payroll function is also undertaken at corporate level 
suggesting that the corporate level maintains the majority of the financial control 
function. 
Quality Control: Since the recent start of an ongoing refurbishment programme, 
Affiliate A has adopted brand values rather than brand standards. They have 
identified ten values that are described as 'well defined' but according to one 
informant, 
'the real key challenge is the internalisation of that message. 
In a non-patronising way, which is key'. 
Maintenance of the brand values appears to rely heavily on Discipline Managers 
within this organisation. According to an informant, it is their role to, 
329 
'implement policy across the group, so that there would be 
consistency across the group, rather than 10 individuals 
working to their own hotel needs. ' 
However, the informant also suggested that: 
We do act independently I would say to our own goals and 
this again is one of the key challenges for us moving forward, 
how do we integrate and mesh in with each other more 
effectively? I'd say we don't do that so well, but I think we do 
it far better than other groups at the moment simply because 
of the structure we have. ' 
Customer Satisfaction: Customer satisfaction is a key element of quality within 
Affiliate A and is monitored in three ways. A national marketing firm is charged 
with undertaking customer surveys and this is referred to as 'a GAP audit, a reality 
check'. The results of these surveys are monitored at corporate office and any 
corrective action necessary is determined by the relevant Discipline Manager. The 
corporate level also monitors guest willingness to return through guest comment 
cards. The third way customer satisfaction is monitored is through guest 
invocations. Affiliate A offers a 100% Guest Satisfaction Guarantee and therefore 
monitors the level of invocations to monitor guest satisfaction levels. 
Informal Processes: Informants reported very few informal processes for 
managing control. The key mechanism was reported to be the brand values. One 
informant reported: 
'It emerged that we thought our values, as defined by the 
employees in the organisation, were the most important 
thing, and moving forward the emphasis in our positioning 
had to be on the values and how this was translated. That 
was the key challenge for me and still is, is internalising this 
positioning of values and what it means for the customer, 
and what it means for the employees. I'm taking the 
emphasis away from the product. ' 
Decision Making: Despite the 'empowered organisational culture', all informants 
reported the involvement of the Chairman in the decision making to some extent. 
In some cases, the Chairman is reported to undertake unilateral decisions. One 
example given of this was with regard to refurbishment and a realignment of the 
brand image. According to one informant: 
'The design was very much in his head, and he is not a 
designer! His wife is very involved in the design side, but he 
had his own ideas of what he wanted, which was, I can look 
at it and smile now, because some interesting stuff went on. 
He had in his mind what kind of design he wanted and so 
that whole programme started. ' 
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However, this approach did cause consternation, particularly within the marketing 
division whose members, 
'felt very strongly that there was an identity crisis going on 
here. There was a lot of confusion, people were lost and 
confused about what we stood for as a product. ' 
Despite these issues created within the Firm, the Chairman proceeded as he 
desired. According to another informant, the Chairman also has the final decision 
when it comes to any type of decision that requires a certain level of expenditure. 
The informant suggested that: 
'Yeah, this is family run, everything goes to [chairman] on an 
expenditure point of view of any magnitude. If he likes it, it 
gets off the ground, and if he doesn't, it doesn't, and it's very 
simple. ' 
The informant explained: 
'I haven't done a single business case in 15 months, I'll go in 
there and I'll say, paraphrasing, trust me, I need to do this, 
and you get the look that says well, that's great, if it doesn't 
I'll kick you. And you know the score and you get on and do it 
accordingly. ' 
However, this approach does imply that different organisational levels participate 
in decision-making, even if final authority remains at the most senior level. The 
extent of the level of empowerment within this Firm is therefore somewhat 
unclear given these comments and the size of the corporate office. 
Communication: Formal communication within the Firm between the corporate 
level and the unit level hotels is facilitated through the Discipline Managers. Their 
role is reported to be as a disseminator and formal reports come through this 
position. The exact nature of the communication however, can vary according to 
the discipline. For instance, within marketing, rather than send a formal written 
monthly update of activities to departmental members, the informant believes in 
using face-to-face communication and perceives, 
'Email to me is the kiss of death. No matter how well you 
intend to communicate a particular way, someone out there 
will misread it. Guarantee you. So, my attitude is, if you 
want to get the message across, do it with all the nuances of 
the English language and the tonality, etc. It is the only way 
to influence people, is verbal. ' 
Informally, communication is reported to be frequent, informal and lateral. One 
informant suggested that: 
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'that is the culture here as we are not a formal management 
structure here. A housekeeper will go straight to the 
chairman if she has a problem, that she doesn't feel is being 
addressed adequately within the value set of the 
organisation. So we are very fluid, very permeable and we 
have the same mindset. ' 
This mindset is also said to lead to create an amiable and distinct communication 
culture within this Firm. According to another informant, 
'there's a lot of heresy goes on here ... in a sort of 'knocking 
the boss' sort of syndrome. ' 
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Appendix J: Profile of Affiliate B 
Background: Affiliate B is part of a publicly-owned conglomerate headquartered 
in Europe. It began trading as part of a larger organisation in the 1960's. It began 
to expand operations outside of its home region in the 1980's through a joint 
venture with another hotel firm that is now part of Firm B in phase two of this 
research. That relationship ended and in the mid 1990's Affiliate B entered into a 
master franchise agreement with the Brand Owner. 
Portfolio: Affiliate B's portfolio consists of 110 upmarket and full-service hotels, 
predominantly in the 4-star category. These co-branded properties are located in 
city centre, airport and resort locations in 38 different countries within the EMEA. 
The portfolio of hotels is quite diverse with room capacity- ranging from 40 to 700 
bedrooms. Affiliate B targets domestic and international business and leisure 
travellers and each segment is supported by its own brand loyalty programmes. 
The independent business traveller represents the key target market for this 
Affiliate. During the course of this research, Affiliate B sold its share in a further 
seven properties operated under a different brand name with a different inter-firm 
agreement. Affiliate B also operates hotels under different brands but these are 
outside the scope of this investigation. 
Affiliation: Affiliate B originally developed organically through hotel ownership but 
it has sought to decrease its equity investments in hotel properties. Currently it is 
affiliated with its portfolio of co-branded properties through direct ownership, 
leasehold and management agreements, with or without equity, and through 
franchising. Management agreements account for the bulk of its portfolio, yet 85% 
of revenue is derived from the owned and leased elements. The agreement with 
the Brand Owner includes development rights for a defined geographical territory 
and has recently been amended from 30 to 50 years duration. 
Growth Strategy: Future expansion plans under the master franchise agreement 
with the Brand Owner are to decrease the reliance on full ownership in favour of 
leasehold, management and franchised agreements. One informant reported: 
'Starting out as a small and unknown operator, the only way 
to achieve fast growth without massive investment of funds, 
was to accept a higher financial risk level in the contract 
portfolio of hotels. Our major focus has been on variable 
lease contracts and capped committed contracts, both 
management and lease. ' 
The master franchise agreement signed with the Brand Owner included specific 
and ambitious development targets. Preferred growth is through management 
contracts without equity, but equity will be invested in strategic locations. This 
market entry method is reported to offer more control over the quality of the 
product and service delivery. Franchising was used as a growth strategy in the 
past, but only in tertiary locations when the market would not tolerate further hotel 
development. However, master franchising has been used more recently, for 
instance in Italy and Israel. According to one informant, 
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'that was for two reasons. Strategy number one we needed 
to increase the number from 29 in the first year to 49 and we 
achieved that by franchises, which is the fastest way of 
growth. We did that at the beginning and then of course we 
decided that is not where we make the money first, and 
second we decided it doesn't help to maintain the quality and 
similarity of the quality. ' 
Organisation Culture: All informants within Affiliate B used the term 
'entrepreneurial to describe the organisation culture. The CEO is credited with 
creating and maintaining this entrepreneurial culture as well as the 'informal' 
nature reported by all key informants. One informant added that this made Affiliate 
B flexible in its approach. Two of the informants also related the culture to the 
Firm's national roots, but also suggested that this was starting to change given its 
international growth. This growth is also reported by two key informants to be 
having an impact on the informal nature of the organisation and its flexibility. 
Organisation Structure: Company documentation promotes Affiliate B as 'flat, 
flexible and entrepreneurial, lean but not mean' and organisation charts do reflect 
this. There are three organisational levels depicted in the charts that are divided 
geographically. At corporate level, around sixty employees are responsible for 
strategy development, goal setting, brand guidelines, growth strategy, succession 
planning, auditing, creating brand awareness and meeting financial targets. These 
corporate level employees are housed within 17 departments. At the regional 
level, fourteen directors are responsible for profitability and revenue, brand 
compliance, managing owner relationships, exploring operational synergies, 
leadership development and strategy implementation. At unit level, GM's are 
responsible for recruitment and development, meeting business objectives, brand 
delivery, profit generation, and ensuring customer, owner and employee 
satisfaction. 
However, senior managers interviewed in this study, identify that the structure of 
the firm is having to change due to its increasing size. These changes are 
reported to be necessary to increase efficiency and to achieve greater control. 
Two of the three informants identified increasing levels of formalisation within the 
firm. Greater levels of hierarchy were reported but these were not readily depicted 
by the organisation chart supplied. As one informant commented, we are, 
'now a company running operations for 38 countries.... it 
came from a very informal structure and then we have 
maybe gone a little bit too far to the other side .... and we are like many other companies in a constant seek for improving 
the organisational structure, meeting structures, 
communication structures, and so on. ' 
Another informant suggested that previously they were 'very informal, very, very 
flexible at the same time' but considered that 'maybe it is getting too big for that' 
and there is a greater need for efficiency. 
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That being said, informants were clear that before and after growth, decisions are 
still undertaken by relatively few senior members at the corporate level and as 
such it is considered by members of the organisation to be centralised. 
Informants also noted that the franchised hotels were really treated as a separate 
division. One informant suggested, 
'to me we have two sets, managed and franchised. We lump 
the others into managed. ' 
Further probing suggests that working with the franchise hotels involves getting 
them involved in the firm's purchasing programme and sales programmes. In this 
way, the quality of the brand in the franchised properties can be controlled. These 
properties are perceived as important in creating brand awareness in secondary 
and tertiary markets. However, it was also noted that they could use this approach 
given the small number of franchised properties. 
Organisational Processes 
Coordination and Control: Financial Control: Within the OLM divisions, the 
budgeting process is the key financial control tool used within this firm. As with 
other firms it begins with a bottom up approach from unit level and then moves up 
the hierarchy for corporate level approval. In this firm however, there are less 
hierarchical levels to move up. However, unit level managers within this firm are 
reported to have more authority over financial decisions on pricing and 
promotional events. For franchised properties however, the corporate level only 
has access to revenue figures and contributions made to revenue through the 
reservation system. 
Quality Control: A number of processes are used to monitor quality and these are 
mostly undertaken through external agencies. Quality is measured through 
adherence to brand standards and through customer satisfaction scores. Affiliate 
B also subscribes to an external benchmarking agency that monitors brand 
awareness and brand satisfaction levels against competitor firms. These 
processes are followed whether unit level properties are owned, leased and 
managed or franchised. Customer satisfaction is taken very seriously within 
Affiliate B and according to one informant, the CEO 'is the kind of guy who will ring 
on a Sunday a guy who has written to complain to us'. 
Performance at the unit level within the OLM divisions is also monitored through a 
proprietal programme that assesses each unit against the above, as well as on 
health and safety and environmental issues. In this way a balanced approach is 
undertaken to performance measurement. 
In addition to these processes, Affiliate B has a hotel management school and 
runs regular training programmes and development activities for members of staff. 
For General Managers, there is also a company mentoring programme where 
current GM's are trained as mentors and then mentor departmental managers to 
become future GM's. These training and development initiatives are supported 
through a policy of promotion from within the company. 
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Decision Making Processes: Informants all emphasised the degree of 
empowerment within the company for unit level employees to make decisions. 
However, further probing suggests that these decisions are set within defined 
parameters. In addition, as identified above, there is still a high degree of 
centralised decision-making within this Firm. The nature of the franchise contract 
grants more decision-making authority to the franchised hotels. 
Communication Processes: There are a number of formal vehicles to encourage 
communication within Affiliate B, apart from the formal reporting procedures. With 
the size of the firm rapidly expanding, it decided to develop an intranet to facilitate 
communication between the corporate, regional and unit levels of the firm. In 
addition, this can be used for more informal communication between different 
organisational members. A bi-monthly staff magazine is also distributed to keep 
staff members informed of current events within the firm. 
Within the OLM division, there is a good deal of informal communication reported 
across the geographical divisions and across different organisational levels. This 
informal communication is reported to be driven by the CEO who is reported to 
have an `open door policy'. There is not as much informal communication 
between the corporate level and franchisees. 
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